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ABSTRACT 
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE STRATEGY: 
DETERMINANTS AND OUTCOMES 
Keywords: Voluntary disclosure, corporate strategy. 
Business leaders increasingly face pressure from stakeholders to be transparent. There 
appears however little consensus on the risks and payoffs of disclosing vital information 
such as corporate strategy. To fill this gap, this study analyzes firm-specific determinants 
and organisational outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. Stakeholder 
theory and agency theory help to understand whether companies serve their interest to 
engage with stakeholders and overcome information asymmetries. I connect these 
theories and propose a comprehensive approach to measure voluntary disclosure of 
corporate strategy. Hypotheses from the theoretical framework are empirically tested 
through panel regression of data on identified determinants and outcomes and of 
disclosed strategy through annual reports, corporate social responsibility reports, 
corporate websites and corporate press releases by the 70 largest publicly listed 
companies in the Netherlands from 2003 through 2008.  I found that industry, 
profitability, dual-listing status, national ranking status and listing age have significant 
effects on voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. No significant effects are found for 
size, leverage and ownership concentration. On outcomes, I found that liquidity of stock 
and corporate reputation are significantly influenced by voluntary disclosure of corporate 
strategy. No significant effect is found for volatility of stock.  My contributions to theory, 
methodology and empirics offers a stepping-stone for further research into understanding 
how companies can use transparency to manage stakeholder relations. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Many organisations poorly communicate strategy. They fail to describe in simple – let 
alone inspiring - terms where their organisation (or group, or country for that matter) is 
now, where it is going and how it should get there. Why? Is it so difficult to communicate 
strategy? Is it not important enough? Is it unwise to be transparent? Is there no strategy 
available?  
Voluntary communication of corporate strategy appears not be a topic for substantial 
research as such (as yet), but a range of comments on this topic can be found in the 
massive body of knowledge on strategic management, finance, accounting and corporate 
communication. Literature review shows that scholars differ whether strategy can or 
should be communicated at all. The paradox raises the question whether it is beneficial 
for an organisation to communicate its strategy. Because if it is, why do organisations 
often seem so reluctant in communicating their strategy? And if it is not beneficial, why 
bother trying?  
These questions triggered the writing of this dissertation, being a professional consultant 
and public relations executive, trying to understand the dynamics of communicating 
corporate strategy. Or as the topic is formulated in management research terminology: 
exploring determinants and organisational outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate 
strategy.  
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1.1 Research objective and methodology 
Based on the identified gap in business practice and academic research, this section 
formulates the research objective, research questions and methodology of my research. A 
justification on the methodology is provided, followed by the pursued usefulness of this 
research for research and business practice. 
 
Research objective and research questions 
To fill the gap in business practice and in academic research on voluntary disclosure of 
corporate strategy, the research objective of this thesis is formulated as follows:  
To develop understanding and provide empirical evidence that help leaders of 
publicly listed companies understand how voluntary disclosure of corporate 
strategy contributes to corporate success.  
 
This research objective drives the following research questions: 
1. What are determinants of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy? 
2. What are outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy? 
 
Methodology 
As no earlier comprehensive research is known on voluntary disclosure of corporate 
strategy, literature research is conducted to construct a (preliminary) theoretical 
framework to identify and formulate the determinants and outcomes of voluntary 
disclosure of corporate strategy. The hypotheses that are based on these determinants and 
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outcomes are tested in a large-scale quantitative study, based on secondary data, available 
in the public field. The data are longitudinal, spanning a period of six years.  
 
The research questions are answered using the following process: 
• A theoretical framework is constructed to explain voluntary disclosure of 
corporate strategy. Literature review shows that there is no generally accepted 
theory that explains disclosure of valuable corporate information. Therefore, I 
propose stakeholder theory in combination with agency theory to identify 
determinants and outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. 
• From this framework, hypotheses are developed on determinants and outcomes of 
voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy.  
• To test these hypotheses, a research sample is identified and developed to obtain 
generalisable results for publicly listed companies. The sample is built from 
public data, produced by the 70 largest publicly listed companies in the 
Netherlands for the years 2003 through 2008. This sample represents over 99% of 
all Dutch publicly listed companies in the selected timeframe in terms of turnover 
as well as profit as well as assets under management as well as employees. All 
these companies follow International Financial Reporting Standards.  
• Relevant data are found from public sources to test the hypothesised determinants 
size, industry, leverage, profitability, ownership concentration, listing status, 
listing age and the hypothesised effects on liquidity of stock, volatility of stock 
and corporate reputation. Voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy is measured 
by a thorough analysis of 10.867 press releases, 399 annual reports, 399 corporate 
 10 
websites and 399 corporate social responsibility reports that the companies in the 
sample published when they were listed during the selected timeframe. 
• Empirical results are obtained through panel regression. With repeated 
observations of enough cross-sections, panel analysis permits the researcher to 
study the dynamics of change with short time series. Panel data analysis endows 
regression analysis with both a spatial and temporal dimension. The temporal 
dimension pertains to periodic observations of a set of variables characterizing 
these cross-sectional units over a particular time span. 
• Finally, the results are put in perspective in terms of contributions and limitations. 
Conclusions are given and suggestions for future research are provided. 
 
Justification of the methodology 
Ontologically, this study follows a realist approach. Epistemologically, this research 
pursues an empiricist approach. Methodologically, quantitative research is used to pursue 
generalizable projections based on a relatively large set of comprehensive data over a 
multi-year period, rather than the in-depth investigation of my research objects, for 
instance through case-studies. Although scholars differ on what distinguishes quantitative 
research from qualitative research, it is generally accepted that a major difference 
between qualitative and quantitative research is that qualitative research is inductive and 
quantitative research is deductive, requiring a hypothesis before research can begin. 
Another major difference between qualitative and quantitative research is that in 
quantitative research, the researcher is ideally an objective observer that neither 
participates in, nor influences what is being studied - rather than it is thought that the 
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researcher can learn the most about a situation by participating and/or being immersed in 
it. These basic underlying assumptions guide and sequence the types of data collection 
methods employed (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Remenyi et al., 1998). 
 
With my research, I aim to be as objective as possible, contrasting the more subjective 
approach in qualitative research. Explanatory laws are pursued, rather than in-depth 
descriptions. My research measures what it assumes to be a static reality in hopes of 
developing universal laws that are replicable. This is opposed to research that is an 
exploration of what is assumed to be a dynamic reality. It does not claim that what is 
discovered in the process is universal and, thus, replicable. The main idea behind my 
research is to be able to separate things easily so that they can be counted and modelled 
statistically, to remove factors that may distract from the intent of the research.  
A quantitative approach fits my research goals as a very clear idea of the object of 
measurement preceded the measuring itself. The result of my research is a collection of 
numbers, which are subjected to statistical analysis to come to results. Quantitative 
research is ideal for testing hypotheses, and for hard sciences trying to answer specific 
questions (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Remenyi et al., 1998). As this is my goal, 
identifying determinants and outcomes of voluntary disclosure, to help business leaders 
decide whether they should communicate their corporate strategy, I took a quantitative 
approach to fit my research objectives. 
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Usefulness for research and business 
As for the usefulness for organisations: stakeholders of publicly listed companies can 
make use of this study to improve their understanding of: 
1. what determinants shape the disclosure policy of a publicly listed company and in 
what direction; 
2. how voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy benefits a company, especially 
through improved liquidity of stock and corporate reputation, to be balanced against 
perceived proprietary cost.  
This dissertation contributes to the extant literature in strategic management, finance and 
accounting on disclosure in various ways. The contributions can be summarized as 
follows: 
• Theoretically: Literature on corporate strategy offers no theoretical foundation 
whether corporate strategy should be communicated and if so, what its determinants 
and outcomes could be. I propose a framework that connects instrumental stakeholder 
theory with agency theory (Freeman, 1984; Hill and Jones, 1992; Jones, 1995) to 
identify and explain (firm-specific) determinants and organisational outcomes of 
voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. I thereby extend instrumental stakeholder 
theory and stakeholder-agency theory in their explanatory power towards 
communication with stakeholders. I also extend literature on strategic management 
with a theoretical framework on sharing corporate strategy. 
• Methodologically: this is the first study to extend the operationalisation of disclosed 
corporate strategy in annual reports, as introduced by Santema (2002) into a 
comprehensive framework of 22 variables that measures disclosure of corporate 
 13 
strategy through websites, press releases, corporate social responsibility reports and 
annual reports. 
• Empirically: as scientific research on disclosure primarily focuses on backward-
looking financial disclosure rather than disclosure of forward-looking qualitative 
information, (Ferreira and Rezende (2007), my research on disclosure of corporate 
strategy contributes to the extant literature on (financial) disclosure. Using the newly 
developed theoretical and methodological framework mentioned above, determinants 
and organisational outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy are 
hypothesized and tested, offering empirical results for a multiyear period (2003-2008) 
for the 70 largest publicly listed companies in the Netherlands. 
 
The remaining sections of this introduction describe the background, relevance and scope 
of my research. First, the globally rising importance of corporate transparency is 
discussed, including differing examples of how (leaders of) Dutch publicly listed 
companies deal with this emerging development. This section illustrates how business 
leaders struggle with the increasing need to communicate. Second, as disclosure is a key 
concept in this research, different forms of disclosure are distinguished: voluntary versus 
mandatory disclosure, financial versus non-financial disclosure and quantitative versus 
non-quantitative disclosure. Third, it is discussed to what extent having a corporate 
strategy is considered relevant by various leading authors.  
In the final section of the introduction, the research design and remaining structure of this 
dissertation is outlined. 
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1.2 The rising importance of corporate transparency 
There is arguably no time in history when the average global citizen was more informed 
about himself and his environment than in the 21st century. People are more 
knowledgeable, critical and powerful than ever in determining what they want and how 
they want it. If leadership is about giving guidance, than leaders seem to have little 
choice in communicating to their environment what they want and how they want it. 
Especially since history shows that there is always enough reason to question leadership. 
So why is it that so often so many stakeholders of organisations openly question where 
their leaders are taking them? 
 
Until recent years, firms managed to keep most things to themselves. Many American 
firms did not even publish annual reports until the 1930s when U.S. national legislation 
required them to do so. In the 21st century, sceptical and self-empowered stakeholders are 
taking matters into their own hands and increasingly speak up. At the 2003 annual 
meeting of his investment company Berkshire Hathaway, CEO Warren Buffet said: “If 
you can’t understand a company’s financial statement in two minutes it means that 
management doesn’t want you to and that they are probably hiding something” (Tapscott 
and Ticoll, 2003). Additionally, the scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Ahold and Parmalat at 
the turn of last century as well as the global credit-crisis at the end of the first decade of 
this century have placed the corporate governance systems of modern corporations under 
close scrutiny. In an attempt to develop a grounded theory of corporate disclosure, 
Holland (2005) interprets that dealing with choice, private disclosure, knowledge 
intensive intangibles, stories, benchmarking, feedback, learning, outcomes, response and 
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many other elements of voluntary disclosure “as tentative means to deal with a new 
enhanced information asymmetry” can be considered to be “at the heart of the disclosure 
and valuation crises observed in financial markets”. Lapses in the personal and 
professional integrity of accounting firms and their corporate clients have led to 
undermining of confidence in capital markets and to substantial erosion of trust in 
institutions of modern capitalism. These corporate scandals suggest that managers’ 
tendency to withhold bad news can be cast as a standard agency problem where 
managerial disclosure preferences are not aligned with those of shareholders. As a result, 
investors and regulators are forcing companies to improve disclosure policies 
(Filatotchev et al., 2006; Kothari et al., 2009). The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation of 2002 
came as a reaction to the corporate scandals at the turn of the century, forming another 
step in a remarkable development towards more openness. In a similar vein, the 
Netherlands adopted a code for corporate governance, known as the “Code Tabaksblat” 
in 2004, shifting power to shareholders and requiring increased transparency from 
executives. 
In this respect, Modaff and Dewine (2002) observe four major changes in organisational 
life that trigger new ways of communication. The first change is that managers have a 
larger span of control than ever before, whilst the job of supervision is getting more 
complicated and time consuming, leading to wider participation in decision making. A 
second major difference in thought about organisations is a shift from authority-based 
leadership towards guidance based on coaching. The third major organisational change is 
the use of computerized information technology, which has become a pervasive and 
essential ingredient of the organisation today. The fourth major change is that today an 
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organisation’s competition is no longer regional or national but global. To be responsive 
to global pressures, organisations must legitimately empower their core employees 
(Conrad and Poole, 2002). All these developments have changed communication in and 
by organisations. The coaching-style demands less authoritarian messages, competition 
demands quick responses, various stakeholders demand different tones of voice, flattened 
hierarchies make that communication flows in every direction. 
Pushed or pulled by authorities, globalization and the increased supply and demand of 
information, organisations do appear more open and sensitive toward their environments 
than ever before (Cheney and Christensen, 2001; Christensen, 2002; Brynjolfsson and 
Saunders, 2009; Meerman Scott, 2011). This process will not only lead to more 
communication and interactions, but also finally to a ‘‘nexus of transactions’’. The sphere 
of influence of the organisation thus becomes a dynamic space as new transactions 
develop and change with new partners. In the end, the key to this emerging organisational 
concept is managing the ‘‘transactivity’’ of the organisation (Coebergh et al., 2001; 
Jonker and Foster, 2005). 
 
Tapscott and Ticoll coined the term “The naked corporation” (2003) as a metaphor of the 
seemingly inevitable necessity for corporations to become more transparent than ever. 
The ownership of wealth that once belonged to a privileged few is now spreading to other 
stakeholders through pension, mutual fund, and individual investments. The social 
distance between business and the people is getting smaller, especially in the Western 
world. Tapscott and Ticoll observe: “Customers can evaluate the worth of products and 
services at levels not possible before. Employees share formerly secret information about 
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corporate strategy, management and challenges. To collaborate effectively, companies 
and their business partners have no choice but to share intimate knowledge with one 
another.” Tapscott and Ticoll (2003) acknowledge however that “opacity is still alive and 
kicking”, since in some situations opacity apparently remains desirable and necessary, 
“for example in keeping trade secrets and personal data being properly kept confidential.”  
The global response of organisations to this growing need of understanding direction is 
expressed in what is being called corporate communication. Businesses are not limiting 
their communication to their products and services anymore; they move from the 
traditional unidirectional approach to contemporary multidirectional approaches to 
integrated communication. Various forces are identified that trigger organisations on a 
global scale to consider the risks and payoffs of disclosure of information (Prakash and 
Hart, 1999; Modaff and Dewine, 2002; Tapscott and Ticoll, 2003; Coebergh and Cohen, 
2009; Meerman Scott, 2011): 
• increased criticism and demand for information and accountability by stakeholders 
(consumers, authorities, etc); 
• less bureaucracy that facilitates an easier flow of information; 
• the information revolution that results in an increased availability of information, 
raises the bar of an expected minimum for individuals and organisations; 
• increased competition for investors and customers through globalization. 
Authors on globalization generally agree that technological development, from better 
transportation and carrier services to the telephone and mass media, created a smaller, 
more integrated world. Now, the information revolution is making the world even smaller 
and more integrated. Communications, trade and employment, personal and political 
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transactions are occurring on a global scale, in real time, ignoring boundaries between 
states.  However, many agree that due to global economic convergence, business is 
moving away from localism, tradition, and parochialism. Similarly, it is expected that 
globalization and digitization promise not only a more efficient and effective government 
but a more transparent one as well (Prakash and Hart, 1999, Coebergh and Cohen, 2009). 
Changes have taken place in business and corporate communication theory and practice. 
Globalization leads to the growth of major worldwide brands, an overall decline in the 
number of brands and a growing flexibility and sophistication in the use of brands. 
Especially through branding, corporations try to express themselves since it has become 
difficult to differentiate through products or services: people don’t buy a camera, a watch 
or a car: they buy a brand (Olins, 2000). Melewar and McCann (2004) suggest that 
corporations increasingly try to maximize effectiveness and efficiency to communicate 
with an increasingly large and complex environment through corporate branding. What 
defines it as corporate is its cohesion: the idea of people coming together and working 
towards a common goal (Stuart, 1999). According to Olins (2000), brands help to choose 
in a complex and competitive world, they offer consistency and, thirdly, empathy (for the 
buyers’ identity), because, in the end: “nobody claims that a Burberry raincoat keeps out 
rain better than its competitors.”  
 
As for leaders of Dutch publicly listed corporations in the first decade of the 21st century, 
mixed views can be found in the media on the pros and cons of communicating corporate 
strategy (Coebergh and Cohen, 2009). CEO Groenink of ABN AMRO Bank stated in 
2002, after two years being CEO, commenting on his unsatisfactory exposure in the 
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press: “What I have learned is that it is impossible to share ambitions with others in a 
clear, understandable way” (Lukassen and Mos, 2002). Wise or stubborn, CEO 
Burgmans of Unilever suggested in 2004 not to regret to intensively communicate 
Unilever’s (failed) corporate strategy “Path to growth” in detail in 1999: “I considered it 
my duty towards shareholders as we asked them permission to spend billion’s of Euros’ 
for restructuring” (Berentsen and Couwenbergh, 2004). Evidence that some companies 
fear disclosure comes from the successful Dutch (family owned) retail firm Zeeman 
Groep, one of the largest 200 corporations in the Netherlands and with about 1.000 
outlets one of the largest chains in Europe for low-cost confection clothing. In 2006, the 
CEO of Zeeman Groep said to the press that they stopped publishing annual reports and 
financial statements since 2004, risking regulatory fines, commenting “Because of 
competition we do not want to provide too much public information” (Verbeek, 2006). 
Shortly after publication of this comment, Zeeman Groep did publish the regulatory 
financial statements and stated that their restrictive policy was limited to annual reports 
only. 
The revered CEO Elverding of Dutch chemical company DSM questioned in a farewell 
interview whether shareholders are interested in a long-term strategy: “I have spoken to 
thousands of analysts, investors and fund managers, and most view the company as a 
cash flow. They don’t realize that big corporations require time, needing months to 
communicate a decision to the shop-floor and where enormous projects are needed to 
implement change” (Klok, 2007).  
More optimistic is CEO Kleisterlee of Dutch electronic corporation Philips, arguing on a 
CEO conference that transparency is beneficial for corporations: “Never before has the 
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job of a CEO been more challenging. Never before have we been more exposed. 
Transparency has taken on a whole new meaning, as the world's eyes are on our every 
move. Our decisions are scrutinized by shareholders, regulators, our employees, the press 
and others. At the same time we are under more pressure than ever to create sustainable 
value for our stakeholders. With that comes the imperative to communicate more, but not 
in the grand standing, hyped manner of some. We need more straight talk with our 
stakeholders, and we need to listen. Not just to our investors, but to all that have a vested 
interest in our companies. If we fail to create that dialogue, the void will be filled with 
more fear, uncertainty and doubt” (Kleisterlee, 2002). 
The developments and statements put together in this introduction show that various 
global developments increase pressure on companies and their leaders to face the demand 
for transparency and to improve understanding what the risks and payoffs are of 
voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. It is apparent that business leaders take very 
different approaches in positioning their corporate communication towards these new 
challenges, ranging from maximum opacity to maximum transparency. As yet, business 
and academic literature gives little and conflicting guidance what the risks and payoffs 
are for either opacity or transparency, especially concerning communication of corporate 
strategy. My research aims to fill this gap in the literature, thereby supporting the 
decision making process for business leaders to develop a sustainable policy in 
communicating their corporate strategy. 
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1.3 Forms of disclosure 
Meek et al. (1995) define voluntary disclosure as involving disclosures in excess of the 
requirements and include accounting and other information that managers of a company 
deem relevant to the needs of various stakeholder groups. Such disclosures are aimed at 
reducing the information asymmetry among managers and investors, and provide 
clarifications about long-term business sustainability that concerns various stakeholder 
groups. Building on this definition, the following forms of disclosure can be 
distinguished: voluntary versus mandatory disclosure, financial versus non-financial 
disclosure and quantitative versus non-quantitative disclosure.  
 
Voluntary versus mandatory disclosure 
Voluntary disclosure is generally presented as a measure of self-regulation or as a 
response to the expectations of stakeholders and civil society for more. Mandatory 
disclosure results from legislation or regulation. Richard et al. (2009) observe that 
bottom-line results are influenced by the legal system in which a corporation 
functions. The Dutch legal system is code-based, but traditionally reluctant to 
reduce accounting flexibility through legislation (Camfferman and Cooke, 2002). 
Since the 1970s, influential regulation specific to publicly traded companies has 
been established in the United States, under the supervision of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), strengthened in 2002 by the Sarbanes-Oxley law 
which applies to all companies listed in the American market. Disclosure is not 
only called for by shareholders and investors to analyze the relevance of their 
investments, but also by the other stakeholders, particularly for information about 
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corporate social and environmental policies. Disclosure for potential shareholders 
and investors is usually financial and mandatory, while that for other stakeholders 
is most often voluntary and non financial. Because of market failures and fears of 
competitive disadvantage, the state has an interest to create laws to make firms 
disclose (Nitsche and Von Hinten-Reed, 2004; Vives, 2007; de Bos et al., 2008).  
 
Financial versus non-financial disclosure 
Financial disclosure corresponds to the most standard definition of disclosure (see 
Stanga (1976), for one of the first definitions of this kind of disclosure, including 
only information relating to financial management). Financial disclosure refers to 
information relating to company accounts. More recent definitions include more 
information relating to the interests of a company’s shareholders, such as stock 
options or managers’ pay (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Non-financial disclosure is 
less circumscribed and therefore less closely defined. It includes information 
relating to the company’s social and environmental responsibility as well as 
information relating to the firm’s operating methods or to managers’ health 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001).  
 
Additionally, it is possible to distinguish disclosure in being either quantitative, when it is 
based on quantifiable elements (for example, the disclosure of managers’ pay), or 
qualitative (for example, the company’s social responsibility policies). Financial 
disclosure assumes a large amount of quantitative data while non-financial disclosure is 
mainly based on qualitative data. Nevertheless, with the increase in disclosure linked to 
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governance, mandatory financial disclosure increasingly includes qualitative data, for 
example information relating to managers’ health. The focus of my research object will 
be on voluntary non-financial disclosure – qualitative or quantitative. An example of 
voluntary non-financial disclosure is the message of the CEO in an annual report, which 
typically evaluates corporate strategy in qualitative terms, incidentally using quantitative 
terminology (e.g. disclosing quantified targets on growth). This type of disclosure is quite 
different from the disclosed information in the financial statement in annual reports and 
other publications as it typically contains an analysis of the past, present and future of the 
company. However, most research on (voluntary or mandatory) disclosure, especially in 
accounting and finance literature, is focused on financial statements.  Literature on 
voluntary non-financial disclosure is primarily been done from an impression 
management perspective, analyzing how companies attempt to make a certain impression 
on their readers or viewers (see also Santema and Van de Rijt, 2001; Santema et al., 
2005). 
 
The scope of this study is also limited culturally. The study of communication as it has 
developed in the United States and in Europe is thoroughly Western, strongly influenced 
by a vision of individualism and with a focus on language and thought (Littlejohn, 2002). 
Eastern thinking and theory rather tend to focus on the notion of wholeness and unity, on 
emotional and spiritual convergence and on intuitive insight (Kincaid, 1987). In some 
cultures, individuals are comfortable working without specific knowledge about tasks 
while in other cultures they would be very uncomfortable (Modaff and DeWine, 2002). It 
has been widely acknowledged that corporate communication processes have a clear 
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cultural embedding. Communication, in general, is governed by a set of rules that are 
both culturally and contextually bounded (Samovar and Porter, 1991). Low context-
cultures, such as the Western culture, are likely to appreciate a larger extent of disclosure, 
as the message is more important than the context and the physical appearance. These 
differences are to be considered whenever international research in communications is 
studied. For example Higgins (1996) found that U.S. and European executives display a 
more positive attitude toward open, specific and timely communications than their 
Japanese counterparts. But strong differences also are present within low context-
cultures: Ulijn et al. (2000) showed that readers from French and Dutch business letters 
(when both translated into English) recognized substantial differences in structure and 
were likely to prefer the letters that were originally written in their mother tongue. 
 
 25 
1.4 The relevance of having a strategy 
Whether corporate strategy as such is a valuable economic good is not undisputed in 
academic literature. According to Grant (2010), strategic management is still a young 
field, lacking an agreed, internally consistent, empirically validated body of theory, 
drawing widely from economics, psychology, sociology and biology (Grant, 2010). 
Unlike more technically oriented managerial disciplines, such as finance, operations 
research or production management, strategy analysis does not generate solutions to 
problems that can be calculated in scheduling algorithms or net present values.  
Rumelt et al. (1991) perceive strategic management, or terms like “policy” or just 
“strategy”, being about the direction of organisations, and most often, business firms. In 
this approach, it includes those subjects that are of primary concern to senior 
management, or to anyone seeking reasons for the success and failure among 
organisations. Firms, if not all organisations, are in competition; competition for factor 
inputs, competition for customers, and ultimately, competition for revenues that cover the 
costs of their chosen manner of surviving. Firms have choices to make if they are to 
survive. Those which are strategic include: the selection of goals, the choice of products 
and services to offer; the design and configuration of policies determining how the firm 
positions itself to compete in product-markets; the choice of an appropriate level of scope 
and diversity; and the design of organisation structure, administrative systems and 
policies used to define and coordinate work. It is a basic proposition of the strategy field 
that these choices have critical influence on the success or failure of the enterprise, and, 
that they must be integrated. It is the integration (or reinforcing pattern) among these 
choices that makes the set a strategy (Rumelt et al., 1991). 
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Eisenberg and Goodall (2004) assert that success begins with strategy, but they observe, 
“Despite the importance of strategy, few organisations actually have one.” Also Porter 
notes, quoted in an interview: “Companies have bought into an extraordinary number of 
flawed or simplistic ideas about competition …As a result, many have abandoned 
strategy almost completely” (Hammonds, 2001). Mankins and Steele (2005) note, “At 
most companies, strategy is a highly abstract concept, often confused with vision or 
aspiration, and is not something that can be easily communicated or translated into 
action.”  
Analyzing business strategies of Dutch firms in the twentieth century, Sluyterman (2005) 
finds that although leaders seemingly put a lot of time and effort in developing a 
corporate strategy, in practice they follow the crowd or a fashionable ideology. The 
“fashion” to create conglomerates in the 1960s and 1970s as well as the trend to grow 
through mergers and acquisitions in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in a series of corporate 
disasters. Execution of strategy often failed because circumstances forced companies to 
create flexible alternatives, especially because the small open economy of the 
Netherlands is highly sensitive for dynamic global developments. However, the Dutch 
economy proved to be one of the most successful economies in the world during the last 
century, notably because of its traditional ability to deal with international opportunities 
(Sluyterman, 2005).  
To date, there is no agreement in literature on the contribution of strategy on 
performance. Some authors (Miller and Cardinal, 1994; Hopkins and Hopkins, 1997) find 
strategic planning positively affects firm performance, while others (Mintzberg et al., 
2005) observe that planning does not generally benefit performance. Several authors 
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(Wrapp, 1967; Eisenberg, 1984; Weick, 1995) suggest that strategy absence need not be 
associated with organisational failure. Deliberate building-in of strategy absence may 
promote flexibility in an organisation; organisations with tight controls, high reliance on 
formalized procedures, and a passion for consistency may lose the ability to experiment 
and innovate. However, leading authors in strategic management theory contend that 
corporate strategy is key to corporate success (Peters and Waterman, 1982; Porter, 1980, 
1985, 1996; Collins and Porras, 1994; Collins, 2001; Mintzberg et al., 2005). 
 
Efforts to synthesize differing ideas on the contribution of strategy into coherent 
frameworks have resulted in two highly differing dominant theories in the strategy 
literature to explain why some firms perform in a superior manner and, consequently, are 
associated with higher value (Makhija, 2003). The first is based on industrial 
organisational economics, and takes an external market orientation to address this issue. 
This perspective, referred to as the market-based view of the firm, typically stresses 
privileged end-product market positions as a basis for above-normal future returns and 
thus higher current firm value (Porter, 1980, 1985). In this perspective, competitive 
advantage is due to barriers to competition arising from the structure of the market. Porter 
(1980) defines competitive strategy as being a broad formula for how a business is going 
to compete, what its goals should be and what policies will be needed to carry out those 
goals. In contrast with the market-based view is the resource-based view of the firm, 
which focuses inwardly on the firm’s resources and capabilities to explain firm 
profitability and value. According to the resource-based view, competitive advantage is 
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provided by distinctive, valuable firm-level resources that competitors are unable to 
reproduce (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Barney, 1986, 1991).  
In both the market-based and the resource-based view of the firm, having a distinctive 
way of approaching the market is considered fundamental for organisational success. I 
follow this essential notion, assessing that corporate strategy is an important resource and 
means for corporate success, which therefore has substantial relevance for stakeholders to 
be familiar with. How the market-based and the resource-based view of the firm are 
integrated into an operationalised description of corporate strategy is described in 
paragraph 4.1: “Measuring voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy”. 
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1.5 Thesis structure 
After the introduction, outlining the goals and relevance of my research, the remainder of 
this thesis is structured as follows. 
Chapter 2 gives an overview what academic and business literature in various disciplines 
offers on what might explain voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. Stakeholder 
theory and agency theory are explored in further detail as they provide promising 
arguments to identify potential determinants and outcomes of voluntary disclosure of 
corporate strategy. From these theories, a theoretical framework for my research is 
constructed, using voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy as an instrument for 
corporations to serve their interests. 
Chapter 3 identifies potential determinants and outcomes of voluntary disclosure, based 
on the theoretical framework that is developed in chapter 2.  Firm characteristics, 
stakeholder theory and agency theory offer arguments to suggest that size, industry, 
leverage, profitability, ownership concentration, listing status and listing age are 
associated with voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. Stakeholder theory and agency 
theory also suggest that disclosure influences cost of capital through engagement with 
stakeholders and controlled information asymmetries among principals and agents 
respectively. Cost of capital is typically being proxied by liquidity and volatility of stock, 
hypothesised as outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. Additionally, 
stakeholder theory and related studies in legitimacy theory and reputation theory, suggest 
that corporate reputation is an outcome of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. 
These potential benefits can be expected to be balanced against potential cost of 
disclosure that literature identifies: production cost, litigation cost and proprietary cost. 
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Chapter 4 describes how proxies are developed for voluntary disclosure of corporate 
strategy, for determinants and for organizational outcomes of voluntary disclosure of 
corporate strategy respectively, in order to allow usage for panel regression to obtain 
generalisable empirical evidence. 
Chapter 5 offers the results and discussion of the panel regression of determinants and 
outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. 
Chapter 6 puts my research in perspective by assessing its contributions and limitations. 
Suggestions for future research are given and overall conclusions complete this chapter.  
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2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Traditionally, textbooks on either corporate strategy or on corporate communication 
mention very little on what they could have in common: communication of corporate 
strategy. As Forman and Argenti (2005) put it: “Although an entire discipline is devoted 
to the study of organisational strategy, including strategy implementation, little attention 
has been given to the links between communication and strategy.” In addition, most 
financial reporting textbooks focus on mandatory financial reporting and provide little, if 
any, coverage on important voluntary disclosures (Hirst et al., 2008).  
Textbooks on corporate strategy typically make reference on how strategy is formulated 
and formatted, how key elements like structure, systems, culture and power can be 
understood and what managerial styles are optional (e.g. Mintzberg et al., 2002; Wit and 
Meyer, 2010), leaving communication (or sales and marketing for that matter) of 
corporate strategy largely for granted. However, the importance of communicating 
corporate strategy is increasingly acknowledged in leading textbooks in the first decades 
of the 21st century. Johnson and Scholes (2008) note in the 8th edition of their textbook 
for the first time that: “Deciding strategy is only one step: strategic decisions need to be 
communicated. Managers have to consider which stakeholders to inform and how ther 
should tailor their messages to each stakeholder. Shareholders, key customers and 
employees are likely to be particularly central, all with different needs.” Johnson and 
Scholes (2008) unequivocally state that “Unless people understand the strategy, then it is 
unlikely to be implemented.” Grant (2010) observes in the 7th edition of his textbook for 
the first time that “most companies – public companies in particular – see value in 
communicating their strategy to employees, customers, investors, and business partners – 
 32 
and, inevitably, to the public at large.” Grant (2010) concludes that “the greatest 
challenge of managing an organisation is coordinating the actions of different 
organisational members” whereby strategy can “promote coordination in several ways”, 
functioning as “a communication device.” 
Underpinning the emerging acceptance in leading textbooks that communication of 
corporate strategy matters, business and academic literature identified two key 
arguments: 
• leaders of organisations, by nature, need to give direction to their organisation, 
especialy during times of change; 
• competitive advantage of organisations increasingly comes more from the intangible 
knowledge, capabilities, and relationships created of employees than from physical 
assets and access to capital. 
 
Leaders need to communicate direction 
In academic and business literature on leadership, management and corporate strategy, 
various leading authors have delivered arguments why communication of corporate 
strategy appears to be relevant. Porter (1980) mentions that unequivocal communication 
of the firm’s resources and intentions is “a form of establishing commitment, perhaps the 
single most important concept in planning and executing offensive or defensive 
competitive moves.” Porter suggests that communicating strategy is a core responsibility 
of leaders: “A leader ... has to make sure that everyone understands the strategy. Strategy 
used to be thought of as some mystical vision that only the people at the top understood. 
But that violated the most fundamental purpose of a strategy, which is to inform each of 
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the many thousands of things that get done in an organisation every day, and to make 
sure that those things are all aligned in the same basic direction. The best CEO's I know 
are teachers, and at the core of what they teach is strategy. They go out to employees, to 
suppliers, and to customers and they repeat: "This is what we stand for, this is what we 
stand for." So everyone understands it” (Hammonds, 2001). This 21st century view 
echoes how Drucker (1954) defined management almost half a century earlier: “The 
function which distinguishes the manager above all others is his educational one. The one 
contribution he is uniquely expected to make is to give others vision and ability to 
perform.” This notion resonated earlier writing of Chester Barnard (1938) on the 
functions of the executive: “The essential functions are, first, to provide the system of 
communications; second, to promote the securing of essential efforts; and, third, to 
formulate and define purpose.” Barnard (1938) stated that “An organisation comes into 
being when: there are persons able to communicate with one another, who are willing to 
contribute action, to accomplish a common purpose.” Barnard (1938) sees 
communication as the means by which organisation is accomplished: cooperation and a 
sense of common purpose are literally created through communication: “Obviously a 
common purpose must be commonly known, and to be known must be in some way 
communicated.” As management-icon Jack Welch (2005) put it: “Leaders make sure 
people not only see the vision, they live and breathe it…No vision is worth the paper it's 
printed on unless it is communicated constantly.” Business-leaders, according to Welch 
(2005) “give people a clear sense of the direction to profitability and the inspiration to 
feel they are part of something big and important”, and they “establish trust with candor, 
transparency and credit.” 
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More specifically, communication is increasingly thought to be crucial regarding 
strategic change, defined as an alteration in an organisation’s alignment with its external 
environment (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 1996; Kotter, 
1996). This includes one of the challenges of strategic change: dealing with corporate 
culture, which influences managers' perceptions and motivations (Barney, 1986; Dutton 
and Penner, 1992). Next to culture, corporate identity affects how managers both 
interpret and react to environmental circumstances (Meyer, 1982). Both cultural values 
and a strong sense of identity therefore guide managers, not only in defining what their 
firms stand for, but in justifying their strategies for interacting with key stakeholders 
(Porac and Thomas, 1990). Thick cultures homogenize perceptions inside a firm and so 
increase the likelihood that managers will make more consistent self-presentations to 
external observers. By creating focal principles, that is, general understanding of the right 
way of doing things in a firm, thick cultures contribute to the consistency of firms' 
images with stakeholders (Camerer and Vepsalainen, 1988). 
An important implication of this cognitive perspective is that the success of strategic 
change will depend not only on an organisation’s ability to implement new structures and 
processes, but also on the organisation’s ability to convey the new mission and priorities 
to its many stakeholders (Smircich, 1983; Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991, Reger et al., 
1994). Higgins (1996) finds that the more strategic options a company seems to have, or 
the greater the need for strategic change seems to be, the more stakeholders consider the 
benefits of communicating corporate strategy to be viable.  
Many researchers point on how managerial cognitions and “sense making” processes 
affect the likelihood and content of strategic change (e.g. Reger et al., 1994). Collins and 
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Porras (1994) researched the underlying principles that could yield enduring, great 
companies and found that “the fundamental distinguishing characteristic of the most 
enduring and successful corporations is that they preserve a cherished core ideology 
while simultaneously stimulating progress and change in everything that is not part of 
their core ideology.” In addition, Collins and Porras (1994) state that transparency adds to 
a firm strategy: “And by being very clear about what should never change, they are better 
able to stimulate change and progress in everything else.” Kotter (1996) considers 
“communicating the change vision” one of eight crucial steps to realize change. 
Discussing winning cultures, Welch (2005) promotes candor as key to success, stating, 
“Candor gets idea rich, generates speed and cuts cost.” 
 
Valuing strategy as an (intangible) asset 
Analyzing the mechanics of disclosure, this study focuses on the increased relevance of 
non-financial information, focussing on the determinants and organisational outcomes of 
voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. The upcoming relevance of this type of 
information has increasingly been subject to scientific research during the last decades. 
Conglomerate complexity, internationalization and global reputation make that earnings 
may not fully reflect a firm's true value, and that companies therefore should 
communicate more than just basic financial information (Schadewitz and Blevins, 1997). 
Since the 1990s, intangible assets like brand, goodwill or reputation are increasingly 
accepted as having real financial value. An indication of this development is given by 
calculating the difference of the net asset value of virtually any Fortune 500 company 
with its market capitalization: the gap between the two is presumably the (significant) 
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value of its intangible assets (Olins, 2000). Also since the 1990’s, the usefulness of 
conventional measures of financial performance, such as earnings and book value per 
share, have increasingly been called into question, most notably by Kaplan and Norton 
(1992), introducing the balanced scorecard. Since traditional accounting figures have 
limited value in helping investors assessing future earnings, companies increasingly 
invest in other ways to communicate the value of the company, for instance through 
forward looking statements, of which corporate strategy is an example. 
 
From both an internal and external perspective, Kaplan and Norton (2001) find that most 
of today’s organisations operate through decentralized business units and teams that are 
much closer to the customer than large corporate staffs. As a consequence, these 
organisations are thought to recognize that competitive advantage comes more from the 
intangible knowledge, capabilities, and relationships created by employees than from 
investments in physical assets and access to capital. Strategy implementation therefore 
requires that all business units, support units, and employees be aligned and linked to the 
strategy. Kaplan and Norton (1992, 2001) defend a clear link between an overarching 
vision and specifically mentioned critical success factors and critical measurements to 
stimulate the vision is broadly understood and followed. 
Kaplan and Norton (2001) conclude that “With the rapid changes in technology, 
competition and regulations, the formulation and implementation of strategy must 
become a continual and participative process. Organisations today need a language for 
communicating strategy as well as processes and systems that help them to implement 
strategy and gain feedback about their strategy. Success comes from having strategy 
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become everyone’s everyday job.” To this point, there is increasing research on the 
importance of company-internal variables for explaining performance (Kangis and 
Williams, 2000). Kaplan and Norton (2004) even label intangible assets as the ultimate 
source of sustainable value creation. The problem with this point of view lies in the lack 
of empirical evidence (Stanton et al., 2004; Vives, 2007; Coff et al., 2008).  
 
Altogether, popular academic and business writers increasingly acknowledge through 
their work that communicating corporate strategy makes business sense. However, none 
of these writers elaborate on this assumption. No guidelines are given on determinants 
and outcomes of communicating corporate strategy, and no theoretical ground is offered 
that explains communication of corporate strategy. In the following sections, I aim to fill 
this gap by combining elements of stakeholder theory and agency theory, adding 
voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy as an instrument that can generate beneficial 
organisational outcomes that can be explained by these theories. 
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2.1 Connecting theories 
In spite of the apparent increased recognition of the importance of communication of 
corporate strategy as described in the previous section, there does not exist a (generally 
accepted) comprehensive framework to understand the dynamics of communicating 
corporate strategy - or voluntary disclosure of non-financial strategic information. In this 
research it is therefore attempted to connect academic contributions from stakeholder 
theory and agency theory to this understanding that touch upon my research questions.  
 
In search of theories that have powerful explanatory power for voluntary disclosure, 
stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984; Freeman et al., 2010) arguably offers the most 
compelling arguments for organisations to be transparent to a wide audience, being a 
variety of stakeholders. Work in stakeholder theory has influenced the business 
disciplines of finance, accounting, marketing, and management (Buchheit et al., 2002), 
with theories and methods associated with the four business areas tending to overlap 
(Biehl et al., 2006). This is especially evident in the fields of accounting and finance, 
where many journals publish work from both disciplines. Although finance scholars 
traditionally ignore the moral foundation of stakeholder theory (except as it relates to the 
obligation of a firm to its shareholders and other financiers), most recognize the 
importance of stakeholders in providing high financial returns consistent with an 
instrumental stakeholder perspective (Freeman et al., 2010). In general however, 
stakeholder theory has gained little attention in the accounting literature and education, as 
an analysis of twenty-one introductory accounting textbooks demonstrated that the 
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interests of shareholders are predominant and that other theoretical perspectives are given 
scant attention (Ferguson et al., 2000). 
A central issue in finance literature is whether managing for stakeholders improves 
profits (Smith, 2003), typically assuming that satisfying a broad group of stakeholders is 
inconsistent with the idea of shareholder wealth maximization. 
My research on voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy is partly built on stakeholder 
theory and a few theories that are closely linked to this body of knowledge: instrumental 
stakeholder theory (Jones, 1995), stakeholder-agency theory (Hill and Jones, 1992) and 
legitimacy theory (Suchman, 1995). These theories offer compelling insight to incentives 
for companies to voluntarily disclose corporate strategy.  
However, as with academic literature on strategic management or on communication 
theory, textbooks and scholarly articles on stakeholder theory and related theories do not 
explore voluntary disclosure as a powerful instrument for stakeholder management. To 
fill this gap, a research model is created to test whether stakeholder theory indeed has 
explanatory power for voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy.  
To create this research model, key elements of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Eisenhardt, 1989; Cooke, 1989) are used in conjunction with stakeholder theory to 
understand how companies deal with (presumably) valuable information like corporate 
strategy and test what the determinants and (organisational) outcomes of voluntary 
disclosure of corporate strategy are. 
These theories are quite different in history and focus but at the same time they are 
complementary and are even integrated by some scholars (Hill and Jones, 1992). Both 
theories analyse conflicts and collaborations among interest groups, being either 
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principals versus agents (agency theory) or the organisation in its wider societal context 
(stakeholder theory):  
• Agency theory offers specific insights in the cost and distribution of valuable 
information (such as corporate strategy) and the outcomes on the stock exchange, 
whereas stakeholder theory offers specific insights in the interaction of an 
organisation with society as a whole and its effects – not just on the stock exchange 
but also for instance in terms of corporate reputation.  
• Stakeholder theory adds value for an organisation where principals and agents might 
have limited or no conflicts amongst each other, but at the same time might forget 
about stakeholder interests in a broader context and risk keeping a license to operate. 
Agency theory adds value for an organisation that faces issues concerning 
information asymmetries among principals and agents. 
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The key elements of both theories for this research are given below: 
Table 2.1: Key elements of stakeholder theory and agency theory 
Key elements Stakeholder theory Agency theory 
Focus The organisation and those 
groups without whose support 
the organisation would cease 
to exist.(*) 
Principals (shareholders) and agents 
(executives) 
Key idea Organisations need sustainable 
support from all stakeholders 
Conflicts of interests between 
principals and agents influence (the 
organisation of) information(-
asymmetries) and risk-bearing costs 
Proposed function of 
voluntary disclosure of 
corporate strategy in this 
study 
Instrument to engage with 
stakeholders 
Instrument to reduce information 
asymmetries. 
Use for business leaders Improved economic 
performance through 
engagement with stakeholders 
Reduced adverse selection through 
reduced information asymmetries. 
 
The following paragraphs will elaborate on both theories in their relation to disclosure as 
either an instrument of engagement or to reduce information asymmetries. 
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2.2 Stakeholder theory 
Stakeholder theory is fundamentally a theory about how business works at its best, and 
how it could work (Freeman et al., 2010). It is descriptive, prescriptive, and instrumental 
at the same time, and it is managerial (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Stakeholder theory 
is about value creation and trade and how to manage a business effectively. “Effective” 
can be seen as “create as much value as possible” (Freeman et al., 2010). If stakeholder 
theory is to solve the problem of value creation and trade, it must show how business can 
in fact be described through stakeholder relationships.  
Freeman et al. (2010) acknowledge that stakeholder theory, that they are happy to label as 
a “framework”, has been criticised as not really being a theory because theories are 
connected sets of testable propositions. Freeman et al. (2010) propose to think of 
stakeholder theory as “a genre of management theory”, taking a “philosophical 
pragmatist” approach. A clear definition of stakeholder management is essential to 
understanding the empirical evidence that does or does not provide support for the idea 
that managing for stakeholders is related to financial performance. There are multiple 
interpretations of stakeholder management in the empirical literature (Freeman et al, 
2010). For the purposes of my research, I follow the definition of Preston and Sapienza 
(1990), based on the concepts of Freeman (1984), defining stakeholder management as 
“the proposition that business corporations can and should serve the interests of multiple 
stakeholders.” 
 
Stakeholder management scholars typically suggest that the organisation’s survival and 
success depend upon the ability of the organisation to manage valuable relationships with 
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its stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Jones, 1995; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Hillman and 
Keim, 2001). Freeman (1984) asserts that organisations with high stakeholder 
management capability actually involve multiple stakeholders on critical issues and seek 
voluntary agreements. Freeman (1984) is one of the few strategic management authors 
who suggest that corporate communication managers should take responsibility for 
strategically managing stakeholders. “Stakeholders” is an overarching term 
comprehending two groups of people that are considered essential in managing 
favourable relations (Oliver, 1991; Clarkson, 1995; Mitchell et al., 1995; Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995): people without whose help a company cannot survive (e.g. shareholders, 
suppliers, customers, employees) and people who are not essential for an organisation’s 
resources but can nevertheless assert enormous institutional pressures on the company 
which may hamper their organisational performance (e.g. the media, governmental 
agencies, the general public). The stakeholder theory suggests that an organisation’s 
management is expected to take on activities expected by those identifiable groups or 
individuals who can affect and who are affected by the achievement of an organisation’s 
objectives. This implies that stakeholders have an interest to assess (disclosed) corporate 
strategy of an organisation, taking corporate strategy as the essential summary of how an 
organisation can or might affect stakeholders. I explore this theoretical assumption in my 
research by analyzing to what extent (Dutch publicly listed) organisations invest in 
disclosing information that affects stakeholders, as far as it is publicly communicated as 
corporate strategy.
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2.2.1 Focus on economic performance: instrumental stakeholder theory 
The dominant literature on corporate strategy reinforces economic theory upon which 
much of the field of strategic management is based (e.g. Schendel and Hofer, 1979; 
Porter, 1980; Andrews, 1980). The primary, and to some scholars the only, important 
dependent variable is economic performance. The resource-based approach (Barney, 
1991), with its emphasis on developing competitive advantage to enhance the creation of 
economic rents, reinforced the attention in strategic management literature on economic 
performance as the most dependent variable. 
Freeman et al. (2010) observe that because of the focus on economic performance in 
strategic management literature, “Stakeholder approach has struggled for broad 
acceptance in the field of strategic management. The only way to convince many 
strategic scholars of the importance of stakeholder theory is to demonstrate a strong 
positive link between following its precepts and economic performance, measured in 
traditional terms. To respond to this apparent need to convince related fields of theory, 
scholars in stakeholder theory increasingly identify arguments why stakeholder 
management should be associated with higher financial performance (Jones, 1995; Post et 
al., 2002). Some researchers have argued that responsible stakeholder treatments can help 
a firm to avoid value-destroying outcomes associated with stakeholder actions such as 
legal suits, adverse regulation, consumer boycotts, strikes, walkouts, and bad press, in 
order to optimize the company’s stability, risk reduction and future cash flows (Cornell 
and Shapiro, 1987; Wang et al., 2003). Several empirical studies have added support for 
the idea that stakeholder management leads to higher levels of organisational 
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performance, looking for instance at companies that actively research stakeholders 
interests (Kotter and Heskett, 1992; Greenley and Foxall, 1997; Hillman and Keim, 2001) 
 
Although stakeholder theory is not only oriented towards economic performance, and 
according to many scholars it shouldn’t limit itself to this as well but also further develop 
the descriptive and prescriptive or normative elements (Donaldson and Preston, 1995), I 
will limit myself in this study on the instrumental stakeholder perspective, as developed 
by Jones (1995). The focus of the instrumental theory of stakeholder management is the 
contract as a metaphor for the relationships between the firm and its various stakeholder 
groups. The firm is expected to gain competitive advantage if it is able to develop 
relationships with its stakeholders based on mutual trust and cooperation. Implicit in this 
theory is the notion that the problems of opportunism and a lack of trust and cooperation 
are real problems in firm/stakeholder relations such that instrumental conclusions are 
appropriate (Jones, 1995).  
The instrumental stakeholder perspective is intended to strengthen the case for using the 
stakeholder model as a central paradigm for the business and society field. The theory is 
built on an integration of the stakeholder concept, economic concepts (including agency 
theory), insights from behavioural science, and ethics. It focuses on the contracts 
(relationships) between the firm and its stakeholders and posits that trusting and 
cooperative relationships help solve problems related to opportunism. Because the costs 
of opportunism and of preventing or reducing opportunism are significant, firms that 
contract on the basis of trust and cooperation will have a competitive advantage over 
those that do not use such criteria. This instrumental theory of stakeholder management 
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essentially turns the neoclassical theory of the firm upside down. It implies that behaviour 
that is trusting, trustworthy, and cooperative, not opportunistic, will give the firm a 
competitive advantage. In the process, it may help explain why certain "irrational" or 
altruistic behaviours turn out to be productive and why firms that engage in these 
behaviours survive and often thrive (Jones, 1995). 
As for the contribution of stakeholder management to corporate performance, Jonker and 
Foster (2005) note that “The effect of stakeholder relationships on the ongoing success of 
organisations is now well recognised and generally accepted by most scholars, even by 
many who subscribe to the neo-classical, Friedmanite view of the firm.” Scholars have 
recognised that even if the primary raison d’etre of a firm is to serve its shareholders, its 
success in doing so is likely to be affected by stakeholders of one form or another (Jonker 
and Foster, 2005).  
Within stakeholder theory, instrumental stakeholder theory offers the most promising 
building block to explain voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy as it connects 
stakeholder management with economic theory and economic performance, the areas of 
research by which corporate strategy as such typically is explained. 
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2.2.2 Linking stakeholders and reputation: legitimacy theory 
In line with stakeholder theory, suggesting that the welfare of an organisation depends on 
acceptance by stakeholders, “Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that 
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995). At it’s 
simplest, within the organisational view “legitimacy [is] an operational resource ... that 
organisations extract - often competitively - from their cultural environments and that 
they employ in pursuit of their goals” (Suchman, 1995).  
Since an organisation’s survival over time often depends on its conforming to normative 
expectations rather than simply operating with greater efficiency (Oliver, 1991), the 
importance of ensuring both understanding and acceptance of new strategies among key 
constituents is a central element of the legitimacy imperative for organisations. 
Legitimacy theory is used to examine how firms gain legitimacy and cultural support 
within their institutional contexts to build their reputations (Staw and Epstein, 2000; 
Deephouse and Carter, 2005). To be seen as legitimate, firms must take actions within 
their institutional contexts.  Scott (1995) indicates that, in order to survive, organisations 
must conform to the rules and belief systems prevailing in the environment (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983), because institutional isomorphism, both structural and procedural, 
will earn the organisation legitimacy (Suchman, 1995; Dacin et al., 2002). Drawing on 
Pfeffer’s (1981) argument that one of the key tasks of management is to “provide 
explanations, rationalizations, and legitimation for the activities undertaken in the 
organisation”, literature on legitimacy has examined the ways in which organisations aim 
 48 
to restore legitimacy after controversial events, ward off stigma, or otherwise protect 
themselves from negative events (Fiss and Zajac, 2006).  
Legitimacy theory builds on organisational theory, focussing on the steps that 
organisations take to ensure their continued legitimacy (e.g. Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; 
Suchman, 1995) and institutional theory, explaining corporate behavior and disclosure 
practice (Oliver, 1991).  
Hybels (1995) argues that good models in legitimacy theory must examine the relevant 
stakeholders, and how each influences the flow of resources crucial to the organisations’ 
establishment, growth, and survival, either through direct control or by the 
communication of good will. Legitimacy, just like money, can therefore considered to be 
a resource a business requires in order to operate. Certain actions and events increase that 
legitimacy, and others decrease it. Low legitimacy will have particularly dire 
consequences for an organisation, which could ultimately lead to the forfeiture of their 
right to operate.  
 
Research suggests that disclosure can either be establishing, maintaining, extending or 
defending legitimacy (Ashford and Gibbs, 1990). In line with legitimacy theory, 
contingency theory suggests that communicating with stakeholders is in the interest of an 
organisation. Thompson (1967) stated that organisations must not only perform their 
missions successfully, they must also use “appropriate language” to convince important 
environmental elements that they are fit for future action. Consistent with contingency 
theory, the processes by which this communication is achieved should be shaped by the 
nature of the environment. It is argued that organisations may be able to influence their 
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environments largely by controlling networks of communication as an essentially 
strategic action (Dirsmith and Covaleski, 1983). 
According to legitimacy theory, keeping investors informed of the company’s on-going 
situation when they are not going to meet filing requirements might maintain or enhance 
the legitimacy of the firms. Legitimacy theory, as described by Preston and Post (1975), 
suggests that disclosures are carried out in response to the changing perceptions of 
corporate and fiduciary communities. Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) suggested that 
organisations could enhance their legitimacy through the use of symbolic 
communication. Cowen et al. (1987) suggested that a company might attempt to manage 
external perceptions of corporate legitimacy through numerous disclosures of trivial 
information and activities. For example, organisations can use press releases, annual 
reports, other corporate documents, and company websites as legitimizing tactics to 
affect internal and external stakeholders’ perceptions of the firm (Aerts, 2005). 
Lightstone and Driscoll (2008) therefore expect companies to use voluntary disclosure to 
manage their organisational legitimacy. 
In sum, legitimacy theory extends stakeholder theory by acknowledging that 
communication with stakeholders adds to sustainable acceptance of an organisation by 
stakeholders, which can become apparent through its corporate reputation. 
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2.3 Agency theory 
Agency theory is directed at the ubiquitous agency relationship, in which one party (the 
principal) delegates work to another (the agent), which performs that work (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989; Cooke, 1989). Agency theory is concerned with 
resolving two problems that can occur in agency relationships. The first is the agency 
problem that arises when the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and, 
secondly, when it is difficult or expensive for the principle to verify what the agent is 
actually doing.  
Agency theory questions why managers voluntarily disclose information. Managers, in 
the knowledge that shareholders will seek to control their behaviour through bonding and 
monitoring activities, may have an incentive to try and convince shareholders they are 
acting optimally and disclosure may be a means of achieving this.  Agency theory 
reinforces the idea that shareholder interests have a pre-eminent position over the 
interests of other stakeholders by envisioning managers primarily as agents for the 
shareholders, with the responsibility of looking after their interests (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Fama, 1980).  
 
Information and incentive problems that are touched upon by agency theorists impede the 
efficient allocation of resources in a capital market economy. Disclosure and the 
institutions created to facilitate credible disclosure between managers and investors play 
an important role in mitigating these problems (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Agency theory 
fosters the disclosure of corporate information as a way to control managers’ actions and 
align incentives for managers and owners. In a corporation, the agency problem caused 
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by the separation of ownership from management has long been of concern. Management 
can exploit the information asymmetry to act in a manner that is contrary to the interests 
of shareholders. One method of mitigating the agency problem is to reduce information 
asymmetry between management and shareholders.  
 
Information asymmetries oppose on the one hand those who are commonly called 
insiders: managers and majority shareholders, and on the other hand the outsiders: 
minority shareholders, creditors, and other stakeholders. One could also include the 
regulatory authorities among these outsiders, and information professionals - the 
rating agencies and financial analysts. As part of a separation between the ownership of 
capital and oversight, information asymmetries pose the problem of the ex post oversight 
by shareholders of the choice of managers. The response provided by the traditional 
literature relating to corporate governance was the definition and implementation of 
incentive contracts. These were supposed to solve the following two problems: first, the 
cost of perfect information and, second, the inability of shareholders to process 
information correctly (which is the major reason for delegating power). However, 
incentive mechanisms, whose objectives are to make manager’s interests coincide with 
those of shareholders, have shown their pernicious effects (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Farvaque et al., 2009). Since the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century, then, the 
solution to the problem of information asymmetry seems to be disclosure, supported by 
an apparent consensus between the academic literature, economic actors, public 
authorities and the media. Disclosure, whether voluntary or mandatory, would have the 
virtue of reducing information asymmetries and of allowing effective oversight of 
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managers, and (re-)establishing good governance. A rich literature about the advantages 
of disclosure, both for firms’ shareholders and the economy as a whole, has flourished 
since the 1990s. However, very quickly, and particularly following the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, the disadvantages of regulation that is over restrictive in terms of information 
disclosure came to light. The costs of establishing disclosure, and the pernicious effects 
of it, have increasingly been highlighted by a revival of the literature on the subject 
(Farvaque et al., 2009). However, no research as yet has analysed what this all means for 
disclosure of corporate strategy, which is the object of this thesis. 
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2.3.1 Avoiding adverse selection 
An important problem caused by information asymmetry is adverse selection. A classic 
paper on adverse selection is Akerlof's "The Market for Lemons" (1970), noticing that, in 
a “market for lemons”, the average value of the commodity tends to go down, even for 
those of perfectly good quality. Because of information asymmetry, unscrupulous sellers 
can "spoof" items and defraud the buyer. As a result, many people not willing to risk 
getting ripped off will avoid certain types of purchases, or will not spend as much for a 
given item. It is even possible for the market to decay to the point of nonexistence. Healy 
and Palepu (2001) translate Akerlof’s lemons problem for the stock market by 
considering a situation where half the business ideas are ‘‘good’’ and the other half are 
‘‘bad’’. Both investors and entrepreneurs are rational and value investments conditional 
on their own information. If investors cannot distinguish between the two types of 
business ideas, entrepreneurs with ‘‘bad’’ ideas will try to claim that their ideas are as 
valuable as the ‘‘good’’ ideas. Realizing this possibility, investors will value both good 
and bad ideas at an average level. Therefore, if the lemons problem is not fully resolved, 
the capital market will rationally undervalue some good ideas and overvalue some bad 
ideas relative to the information available to entrepreneurs. 
Akerlof (1970) discusses two primary solutions to the lemons problem: signalling and 
screening. Both theoretical solutions suggest that voluntary disclosure of valuable 
information is in the best interest of organisations in a competitive environment.  
Stiglitz (1975) pioneered the theory of screening. In this way the under informed party 
can induce the other party to reveal their information. They can provide a menu of 
choices in such a way that the choice depends on the private information of the other 
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party. Examples of situations where the seller usually has better information than the 
buyer are numerous but include used-car salespeople, mortgage brokers and loan 
originators, stockbrokers, Realtors, real estate agents, and life insurance transactions. 
Examples of situations where the buyer usually has better information than the seller 
include estate sales as specified in a last will and testament, or sales of old art pieces 
without prior professional assessment of their value. This situation was first described by 
Arrow (1963). In sum, the notion of adverse selection is important for companies in 
deciding on their disclosure policy as uninformed investors “price protect” against 
adverse selection, which can become manifest through market liquidity (Welker, 1995).
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2.3.2 Dealing with information asymmetry: agency and signalling theory 
Closely related with agency theory, if not overlapping (Watson et al., 2002) is signalling 
theory, focussing on motives to overcome information assymetry. Signalling theory 
concerns the study of the signals of sellers that influence the market price of a good or 
service. It has been applied to many areas, including financial markets, advertising and 
public relations (Marcus and Goodman, 1991). According to signalling theory, the 
disclosure of corporate information can be considered as a signal to capital markets, sent 
to decrease the asymmetry of information which often exists between managers and other 
individuals, to optimise financing costs and to increase corporate value. Agency and 
signalling theories are quite interrelated as both are based on the existence of 
asymmetries between the information available to managers and investors respectively. 
Therefore, the mechanisms used for controlling managers may serve as signals to markets 
and a way of reporting good management by executives. Both theories provide 
companies with incentives to divulge information. 
In his seminal article, Spence (1973) proposed that two parties could get around the 
problem of asymmetric information by having one party send a signal that would reveal 
some piece of relevant information to the other party. That party would then interpret the 
signal and adjust her purchasing behaviour accordingly - usually by offering a higher 
price than if she had not received the signal. There are, of course, many problems that 
these parties would immediately run into: how much time, energy, or money should the 
sender (agent) spend on sending the signal? How can the receiver (the principal, who is 
usually the buyer in the transaction) trust the signal to be an honest declaration of 
information? Assuming there is a signalling equilibrium under which the sender signals 
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honestly and the receiver trusts that information, under what circumstances will that 
equilibrium break down? 
Porter (1980) applied signalling theory to business strategy by stating: “It should be clear 
that an entire competitive battle can be waged through announcements before a single 
dollar of resources is expended.” Porter suggests that the appropriateness of a competitive 
strategy can be determined by testing the proposed goals and policies for consistency, 
amongst others on issues of communication and implementation. Communicating 
corporate strategy is in this view comparable with making a statement toward 
competition. These and other “types of market signals” can have two fundamentally 
different functions according to Porter: they can be truthful indications of a competitor’s 
motives, intentions or goals or they can be bluffs. 
Whether disclosure signals function as a stimulus or threat for competition remains under 
debate. Verrecchia (1983) theorizes that market competition may provide disincentives 
for voluntary disclosure through increased proprietary costs. Wagenhofer (1990) suggests 
that corporations balance disclosure between maximizing the market price of the firm 
versus not stimulating market entry by a competitor and imposing political costs. 
Alternatively, Darrough and Stoughton (1990) suggest that competition through threat of 
product market entry encourages voluntary disclosure. Also Clinch and Verrecchia 
(1997) suggest that when competition increases, disclosure decreases. 
In sum, signalling theory extends agency theory by appreciating that disclosure of 
valuable information can help to overcome information asymmetries and avoid adverse 
selection. 
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2.4 A framework  
This section connects agency theory with stakeholder theory to provide a comprehensive 
framework to explain determinants and outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate 
strategy. An earlier attempt to connect both theories was suggested by Hill and Jones 
(1992), who created a stakeholder-agency theory by suggesting that managers have a 
responsibility to act as trustworthy agents to multiple stakeholders rather than just the 
stockholders. In their view, managers have the responsibility to draw together 
stakeholders to accomplish tasks in an efficient manner. This view is consistent with the 
“nexus-of-contracts” perspective of the firm (Macey, 1999, Coebergh et al., 2001), which 
suggests that a corporation can be described as a “complex set of explicit and implicit 
contracts” (Macey, 1999), following earlier work by Coase (1937) and Cornell and 
Shapiro (1987). Hill and Jones (1992) find that explicit and implicit communication and 
negotiation processes serve as monitoring and enforcement devices that motivate 
managers to stay focused on financial objectives, since information asymmetry exists 
between managers and stakeholders. As insiders, managers are in a position to filter or 
distort the information that they release to other stakeholders. Management control over 
critical information complicates the agency problem. It makes it difficult for stakeholders 
to identify if management is acting in their interests. The obvious response is for 
stakeholders to gather more information about corporate activities, but the cost of 
gathering and analysing information may be prohibitive (Hill and Jones, 1992).  
 
My research extends the theoretical connection between stakeholder theory and agency 
theory by introducing voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy to serve both theories to 
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engage with stakeholders in order to realize improved economic performance as well as 
to reduce information asymmetries in order to avoid adverse selection. 
 
Voluntary disclosure as an instrument 
As stakeholder theory shows that engaging with stakeholders pays off, and agency theory 
shows that principals and agents are confronted with information asymmetries, the 
question emerges how voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy could fit in. Stakeholder 
theory suggests that organisations need to engage with stakeholders as they have the 
power (in its various forms) to influence the achievement of organisational outcomes. 
Good relationships with stakeholders can also be seen as an intangible organisational 
source of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). According to Van Riel (2000), high 
stakeholder management capabilities have even become more of a necessity in the post-
industrial society than they were in the industrial era. Insofar as stakeholder theory has 
been used to explain disclosure, this has been merely limited to predict levels of 
corporate social disclosure (e.g. Campbell et al., 2006; Boesso and Kumar, 2007).  
A number of authors have suggested that the essential building-block of stakeholder 
relationships is communication (Cheney and Christensen, 2001; Zineldin, 2002; 
Coebergh, 2004, 2005; Jonker and Foster, 2005). A prerequisite for attaining favourable 
relationships with stakeholders is managing favourable stakeholders’ perceptions of the 
organisation (Scott and Lane, 2000), because favourable perceptions positively guide 
their future actions toward the company (Weigelt and Camerer, 1988) and thus also their 
relations with the company. According to Van Riel (2000) “Communication enables an 
organisation to begin a dialogue to create awareness, understanding, and appreciation for 
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the firm’s strategic goals, ideally resulting in the satisfaction of the interests of both the 
firm and its environment.” However, the approaches, methods and responsibilities 
entailed in genuine stakeholder communication are not well understood. Neither are the 
implications for organisational action. Crane and Livesey (2003) suggest that stakeholder 
relationships nowadays are characterised by a complex array of shifting, ambiguous and 
contested interactions between interested parties and within diverse organisations. This, 
they claim, ‘‘highlights the central role of communication in constituting, managing and 
maintaining stakeholder relationships’’ (Crane and Livesey, 2003). 
Most research on disclosure is focused on communication between managers and 
investors. However, as Healy and Palepu (2001) observe in their study on disclosure 
literature: “Corporate disclosure can also be directed to stakeholders other than investors. 
However, there has been relatively little research on these types of voluntary 
disclosures.” 
 
Some researchers find that communication of corporate strategy can be instrumental in 
dealing with a wide variety of stakeholders. For example Seiter (1995) analyzed a 
company’s mixed success in explaining its strategy to employees, customers and the 
community. Botan (1997) analyzed how a company’s strategic communication campaign 
helps to build ethical relationships with the company’s key targeted constituencies. 
O’Connor (2002) investigated the organisational stories about a firm’s strategy that the 
CEO delivers to investors, employers, customers and partners.  
Pearce (1982) applied the stakeholder approach to a very specific form of communicating 
corporate strategy, being the development and communication of mission statements. 
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Based on the perspective that firms are collections of multilateral contracts over time, 
Freeman and Evan (1990) demonstrate how effective stakeholder management puts firms 
in a stronger position to adapt to external demands. The firm then enjoys greater 
efficiency through an enhanced ability not only to create and satisfy individual contracts, 
but also to coordinate multiple contracts simultaneously (Post et al., 2002; Freeman et al, 
2010). Excellent relationships and effective management of the entire network can 
enhance organisational flexibility (Harrison and St. John, 1994). 
 
Higgins and Diffenbach (1985, 1989) are arguably the first scholars to empirically 
identify benefits of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. Surveying American 
analysts, Higgins and Diffenbach (1985) observe that analysts find that a firm’s corporate 
strategy is important for their assessment of a company and its stock. In 1989, Higgins 
and Diffenbach surveyed 500 executives of 1.200 large U.S. companies on their motives 
to communicate corporate strategy. The respondents of their survey gave the following 
arguments: improved relations with stockholders, the financial community and regulators 
and government agencies. Secondly, executives expected an increase of consumer 
recognition of the corporation, effectiveness in dealing with suppliers, morale of 
company employees and of share value. Without mentioning stakeholder theory, Higgins 
and Diffenbach (1989) clearly suggested that voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy 
has a significant impact on stakeholder management. 
In sum, various research offers arguments to identify voluntary disclosure of corporate 
strategy as a powerful instrument for (instrumental) stakeholder theory and agency theory 
to engage with stakeholders and overcome information asymmetries. 
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The proposed framework 
Based on the arguments given previously, I propose that voluntary disclosure of 
corporate strategy can function as an instrument to engage with stakeholders, leading to 
positive organisational outcomes that contain improved economic performance through 
engagement with stakeholders, which is a focal point of stakeholder theory. This theory 
also explains differences in the extent to which organisations need sustainable support 
from stakeholders. These differences help to identify determinants of voluntary 
disclosure of corporate strategy. 
I also propose that voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy can function as an 
instrument to reduce information asymmetries, leading to positive outcomes such as 
reduced adverse selection, or negative outcomes, such as increased cost of information or 
risk. These potential organisational outcomes are focal points of agency theory. This 
theory also explains differences in the extent to which organisations are susceptible for 
conflicts of interests between principals and agents that influence the organisation of 
information and risk-bearing costs. Also these differences help to identify determinants of 
voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. 
Voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy is thereby proposed as an instrument for both 
stakeholder theory and agency theory to generate organisational outcomes in these 
theories. Both theories are used to identify and explain determinants of voluntary 
disclosure of corporate strategy. 
Following these proposals, voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy can be placed in the 
following framework: 
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Figure 1.1: Theoretical framework 
 
The schematic framework above shows that stakeholder and agency theory suggest that 
economic performance and adverse selection respectively are influenced by how 
organisations deal with information asymmetries. My research suggests that voluntary 
disclosure of corporate strategy is an instrument to manage this influence. To improve 
understanding what drives voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy, stakeholder and 
agency theory are used to identify its determinants. 
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3 HYPOTHESES 
Using the proposed theoretical framework that was developed in the previous chapter, 
this chapter uses stakeholder theory and agency theory to identify determinants and 
outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy.  
The essential arguments from both theories that lead to the identified outcomes and 
determinants of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy are summarised schematically 
in this section. Literature on stakeholder and agency theory provides arguments to 
identify three beneficial organisational outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate 
strategy: improvements in liquidity of stock, volatility of stock and corporate reputation. 
Literature on stakeholder and agency theory provides arguments to identify two negative 
organisational effects of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy: damage caused by 
either proprietary cost or by litigation cost. 
 
Table 3.1: Hypothesised outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy 
Outcomes 
(benefits) 
Arguments from stakeholder theory Arguments from agency theory 
Liquidity of 
stock 
Instrumental stakeholder theory 
suggests that engagement with 
stakeholders leads to economic 
success. 
Disclosure mitigates adverse selection, 
reduces uncertainty and thereby price 
and thereby increases liquidity of stock. 
Volatility of 
stock 
Instrumental stakeholder theory 
suggests that engagement with 
stakeholders leads to economic 
success 
Disclosure is related to information 
asymmetry and risk, which is reflected 
in stock-movements (= volatility). 
Corporate 
reputation 
Stakeholders appreciate 
engagement. 
Out of scope from agency theory. 
Proprietary 
cost 
Depending on content and 
circumstances, proprietary 
information can be abused by 
different stakeholders 
Depending on content and 
circumstances, agents fear that 
proprietary information can be abused 
by principals. 
Litigation cost Company policy and characteristics 
influence the risk of (legal) 
conflicts with stakeholders 
Agents and other insiders take legal 
risks into consideration in decisions on 
disclosure. 
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Building on stakeholder and agency theory, the following range of determinants for 
voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy are identified: 
 
Table 3.2: Hypothesised determinants of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy 
Determinants Arguments from stakeholder theory Arguments from agency theory 
Size Pressure from stakeholders is 
related to the size of the company 
Size is related to the potential 
information asymmetries between 
principals and agents  
Industry Stakeholder-cultures vary by 
industry 
Differing (proprietary) cost structures 
vary by industry 
Leverage Pressure from stakeholders is 
related with (the size and 
distribution of) their financial stakes 
Investors’ information requirements 
increase with the agency cost of the firm 
that are supposed to be higher for firms 
with proportionally more debt 
Profitability Communicating good or bad news, 
e.g. on profitability, can influence 
support from stakeholders 
Disclosure of good or bad news can 
influence adverse selection or 
(proprietary and litigation) cost. 
Ownership 
concentration 
Whether stakeholders are 
homogeneous or heterogeneous is 
of influence for overall support of 
stakeholders 
The power-balance between agents 
(generally insiders) and principals 
(generally outsiders) influences 
information asymmetries. 
Dual-listing 
status 
The international variety of 
stakeholders of an organisation is 
related to the overall pressure from 
these stakeholders 
The international variety of shareholders 
of an organisation is related to 
information asymmetries between the 
principals and agents 
National-listing 
status 
National visibility and status is 
related to pressure from 
stakeholders 
The national position on the stock 
market is related to information 
asymmetries between principals and 
agents 
Age The number of years that a 
company has interacted with 
stakeholders influences overall 
support of stakeholders 
The number of years that a company has 
acted on the stock-exchange is related 
with perceived cost of information and 
risk 
 
The arguments from stakeholder and agency theory that help to identify determinants and 
outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy are discussed in the following 
sections, leading to hypotheses on how these determinants and outcomes are related with 
voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy.
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3.1 Determinants of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy 
Whatever theory on corporate disclosure is considered – research often implies firm 
characteristics to be important drivers for disclosure (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). Firm 
characteristics are also of great importance from an empirical point of view, where 
empirical research typically controls for endogenous determinants of disclosure policy 
that are not necessarily part of the underlying theory (Core, 2001). The determinants of 
voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy that are identified are derived from the 
theoretical framework that is described in the previous chapter, as well as from the extant 
literature in finance and accounting on (financial) disclosure. 
 
 
3.1.1 Size 
The variable most consistently reported as significant in studies examining differences 
across firms in their disclosure policy is firm size. The positive relation between 
(financial) disclosure and asset size is broadly accepted (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; 
McNally et al., 1982; Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; Foster, 1986; Chow and Wong-
Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Wallace et al., 1994; Meek et al., 
1995; Zarzeski, 1996; Schadewitz and Blevins, 1997; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; 
Abraham and Tonks 2004, Bushman et al., 2004; Prencipe, 2004). Research explaining 
why large firms disclose more, typically explain this because large firms: have more 
stakeholders demanding disclosure, more incentives to reduce information assymetries 
and, thirdly, advantageous economies of scale: 
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Large firms face more demand and pressure from more stakeholders: 
Large corporations have a more pronounced effect on society and, therefore, 
normally have a higher number of stakeholders that influence the corporation 
(Knox et al., 2006). Media and the public generally demand more information 
from large corporations than from smaller ones (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). 
Similarly, larger firms can be expected to be subject to higher political costs, 
leading to a greater level of disclosure in order to reduce political cost (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). In the Dutch legal system it is recognized that large 
corporations typically have more stakeholders than small companies and therefore 
have more legal obligations in disclosing information (Vergoossen and De Bos, 
2005). Furthermore, large firms face higher demand for information from 
customers, suppliers, analysts, and the general public that causes an increased 
pressure to disclose information (Cooke, 1989). More specifically, larger firms 
typically have a larger investor and analyst following, and, thus, more pressure on 
the company to release information (Bhushan, 1989). Since “sell-side” analysts 
are rewarded by the trading commissions they generate for the brokerage firms 
that employ them, they have an obvious incentive to concentrate their efforts on 
firms with many shareholders. For the Netherlands, Van der Meer (2006) also 
found that size is a key determinant for analyst following. 
 
Large firms have more incentives to reduce information asymmetries: 
Larger firms are supposed to be more complex and therefore have more to 
explain. Agency theory suggests that large firms have higher agency costs as 
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larger firms carry out a greater number of contracts and more complex than 
smaller firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). Also signalling 
theory suggests that information asymmetries will be larger, which justifies more 
disclosure to mitigate them. Large firms also have a more diverse ownership, and 
as a result, higher agency cost that they try to reduce by higher voluntary 
disclosure levels (Meek et al., 1995).  
However, Bushman et al. (2004) note that “governance transparency”, defined as 
“the intensity of governance disclosures used by outside investors to hold officers 
and directors accountable”, is not related to firm size. In addition, various studies 
found no relation between complexity (for instance in diversification) and 
disclosure (Hossain and Reaz, 2007; Francis et al., 2008).  
 
Large firms have an advantageous (direct en proprietary) cost structure: 
Direct costs decrease with size (Land and Lundholm, 1993; Cooke, 1989). 
Smaller firms sense to a greater extent the disadvantages that, in terms of 
competitive advantage, derive from a higher level of disclosure (Singhvi and 
Desai, 1971; Meek et al., 1995).  Secondly, large firms are in a better position to 
“hide” proprietary information, i.e., profitable segments. They also provide more 
highly aggregated information for a given number of segments, which should 
reduce proprietary costs (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Meek et al., 1995). 
Based on the arguments mentioned above, I hypothesize as follows: 
H1 Company size is positively associated with voluntary disclosure of corporate 
strategy. 
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3.1.2 Industry 
Levels of disclosure are not likely to be identical throughout all sectors of the economy 
(Stanga, 1976; Cooke, 1989; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Abraham and Tonks, 2004).  
Higgins and Diffenbach (1989) found that the importance of communicating corporate 
strategy varies according to specific industry and company circumstances. Watson et al. 
(2002) state there does not appear to be (ex ante) a clear relationship between industry 
and disclosure, and as a result a great variety of justifications for an industry effect exist. 
An obvious argument considers industry to be a contingency variable for shareholders 
demand of information and therefore, disclosure pressure. An industry effect can be 
found from the nature of industry’s operations that determine the optimal disclosure 
policy (Botosan, 1997; Core, 2001; Grüning, 2007). A further explanation for industry-
specific disclosure policies might result from herd behavior (Arya and Mittendorf, 2005) 
as financial markets expect information one firm discloses to be available industry-wide. 
Hence, an industry-specific pressure to disclose this information results can be expected 
(Cooke, 1991). From a reputational perspective, Van Riel (2007) finds that “Some 
industries are seen as more trustworthy, others as more risky; some are seen as profiteers, 
others are seen as more giving. All companies therefore operate in an industry context – 
and either suffer or benefit from the positive or negative halo around the industry.” 
Proprietary (i.e. competitive disadvantage and political) costs vary across industries 
(Verrecchia, 1983, 1990). For example, because of the nature of their products and their 
research and development, chemical companies are likely to be more sensitive about 
disclosures to competitors and the public than companies in certain other industries.  
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Finally, O’Brien and Bhushan (1990) found that analyst following is positively associated 
with industries with more stringent disclosure requirements and a larger number of firms. 
Some researchers however find that industry is not strongly associated with disclosure. 
Meek et al. (1995) found little variation in the disclosure of strategic information among 
industry groups. Watson et al. (2002) analyze industry-effects on disclosure against the 
background of legitimacy and agency theory, but find that implications are ambivalent.  
Based on the arguments mentioned above, I hypothesize as follows: 
H2 Voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy is related to the industry in which 
the company is operating. 
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3.1.3 Leverage 
Leverage concerns the use of various financial instruments or borrowed capital to 
increase the potential return of an investment. Leverage can be measured as the amount 
of debt used to finance a firm's assets. A firm with significantly more debt than equity is 
considered to be highly leveraged. Agency theory predicts that investors’ information 
requirements increase with the agency cost of the firm. Agency cost are supposed to be 
higher for firms with proportionally more debt in their capital structures since potential 
wealth transfers from debt holders to shareholders and managers increase with leverage 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989; Leuz, 2004; Vergoossen and De Bos, 
2005). However, empirical research shows various results on the association between 
leverage and disclosure: 
 
Positive association between leverage and disclosure 
Several empirical studies confirmed a positive association between leverage and 
voluntary disclosure of segment reporting (Mitchell et al.,1995). Holthausen and 
Leftwich (1983) find that leverage is, together with firm size, one of only two significant 
variables explaining choices of accounting techniques in their literature review that study 
the economic consequences of voluntary and mandatory choices of accounting 
techniques. Bradbury (1992) found a significant, positive relationship between leverage 
and disclosure for New Zealand firms. Rajanj and Zingales (1998) show a positive 
correlation between the CIFAR disclosure index and external financing. Ahmed and 
Courtis (1999) conclude from their meta-analysis that disclosure increases with leverage. 
Jaggi and Low (2000) find that disclosure increases with leverage in common law 
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systems and has no significant relation in code law systems.  
Prencipe (2004) found financial leverage to be significantly related to the extent of 
segment reporting, confirming that companies produce segment information in order to 
reduce agency costs in the relationship with financial creditors, and that once they 
produce such information for lenders they also disclose it in the annual reports. 
Using a sample from 34 countries, Francis et al. (2005) find firms in industries with 
greater external financing needs have higher voluntary disclosure levels. Utrero-Gonzalès 
(2006) shows that lower debt levels express a strong regulatory requirement for 
disclosure: theorizing that greater disclosure would allow firms to raise equity capital 
more easily. Khurana et al. (2006) measure the part of a firm growth that is financed 
externally. They show that the more transparent a firm is, the higher this share will be. 
Their underlying idea is that disclosure facilitates external financing, investments and 
growth.  
 
Negative association between leverage and disclosure 
Some studies find a negative association between leverage and disclosure, presenting 
various explanations. Meek et al. (1995) explain a negative relationship between leverage 
and voluntary disclosure for U.S., U.K., and continental European multinationals, by 
suggesting that agency theory might be far less influential on disclosure than size and 
proprietary cost. Zarzeski (1996) explains the found negative association because 
creditors may be able to obtain private information. For Singapore, Eng and Mak, (2003) 
suggest that the inverse relationship between debt and disclosure is consistent with debt 
being a mechanism for controlling the free cash flow problem (Jensen, 1986), reducing 
 72 
the need for disclosure. Bushman et al. (2004), based on CIFAR-data, find that 
“governance transparency is significantly and negatively related to the importance of 
bank financing relative to external equity financing.” Prencipe (2004) reports a similar 
phenomenon for Italy “where banks are the typical lenders, the relationship between the 
two variables may become less clear since companies may privately provide detailed 
information to the banks without disclosing it in the annual reports.” 
 
Conflicting results 
Research in various countries found no relationship between leverage and disclosure: 
Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) in their sample of Mexican firms; McKinnon and 
Dalimunthe (1993) and Kelly (1994) for Australian firms; Wallace and Naser (1995) and 
Gul and Leung (2004) for companies in Hong Kong; Leuz (2004) for firms in Germany. 
The explanations for these findings that there is no association between leverage and 
disclosure typically converge around the assumption that – at least in the countries where 
no association was found - it is likely that information is provided privately to the 
(powerful) lenders and not in the annual reports. This assumption is in line with research 
where a negative association between leverage and disclosure is found. Finally, 
Camfferman and Cooke (2002) find that gearing is significantly positively associated 
with disclosure in The Netherlands, but negatively (not significant) related in the U.K.   
 
Although apparently various studies have reported conflicting results, there seems to be 
substantial indication that voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy can be expected to 
increase with leverage, especially in the Dutch economy (Camfferman and Cooke, 2002).  
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This follows the suggestion of stakeholder theory that the power of stakeholders to 
influence management is a function of the resources they control that are essential to the 
corporation (Smith et al., 2005). The bigger the interests of (external) stakeholders are, 
the bigger the pressure for disclosure can be expected. 
Based on the arguments mentioned above, I therefore hypothesize as follows: 
H3 Leverage is positively associated with voluntary disclosure of corporate 
strategy. 
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3.1.4 Profitability 
Stakeholder theory suggests that organisations have incentives to engage with 
stakeholders. My proposition is that communication with stakeholders constributes to 
stakeholder management. It can be expected that the more successful an organisation 
functions, the more it is inclined to communicate this success. Next to stakeholder theory, 
agency and signalling theories are used to explain the relationship between profitability 
and disclosure. Empirical literature on the association between good news in general, and 
profitability in specific, delivers complex and conflicting results. Key findings are 
summarized below in five categories: first inconclusive results on the relation between 
profitability and (voluntary) disclosure, followed by theoretical and empirical arguments 
why organisations highlight good news, hide bad news, hide good news and highlight bad 
news respectively. 
 
Conflicting evidence 
To date, the empirical evidence on the relation between firm performance and disclosure 
is mixed. Analytical models and empirical work show that the relationship between 
voluntary disclosures and (realized) profitability is complex and depends on the type of 
competition (Verrecchia, 1990). Several studies did not find a relationship between 
profitability and disclosure (Raffournier, 1995; Prencipe, 2004). Mcnally et al. (1982) do 
not find profitability (as a source for good news) to be significant in explaining voluntary 
disclosures by New Zealand companies. Other research supports the hypothesis that 
managers have incentives to release both good and bad news either way (Ruland et al., 
1990). Lang and Lundholm (1993) contend that disclosure is influenced by a company’s 
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relative performance and hence, the direction of the relationship between performance 
and disclosure is rather unclear. Meek et al. (1995) find no evidence that voluntary 
disclosure behaviour is different between more and less profitable firms in the United 
Kingdom. 
Aboody and Kasznik (2000) suggest that disclosure is largely driven by CEOs who make 
opportunistic voluntary disclosure decisions that maximize their stock option 
compensation, observing that top executives have compensation-related incentives to for 
instance accelerate the disclosure of bad news and delay announcements of good news. 
Berger and Hann (2007) find mixed evidence in testing the hypothesis that managers 
conceal abnormal profits in order not to attract competition.  
 
More disclosure on good news: 
The main underlying thought that organisations are expected to disclose good news 
comes from Akerlof’s (1970) model of a “lemons” market, where asymmetrical 
information causes bad quality products to drive out the good, since buyers find it 
difficult to tell the difference. There is a risk of adverse selection in being perceived as a 
“lemon”; so profitable, well-run firms have incentives to distinguish themselves from less 
profitable firms. One way to do this is through voluntary disclosure (Singhvi and Desai, 
1971; Foster, 1986). Thus, more profitable firms - having good news to tell - can be 
expected to disclose more voluntary accounting information. Ross (1979) suggests that if 
favourable disclosures are considered to increase the value of the firm, then outsiders will 
interpret no news as bad news. As a result, all managers without bad news have an 
incentive for disclosure, and only firms with the worst news are not expected to disclose 
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information. Verrecchia (1983) follows this reasoning with a model showing conditions 
under which information will be disclosed given that nondisclosure can be interpreted 
either as bad news or as good news with anticipated high disclosure cost. Related 
research suggests that if managers’ main objective is to maximize current market value, 
companies with good news will voluntarily release that information when the benefits 
exceed the costs associated with disclosure (Lev and Penman, 1990). Rappaport (2006) 
states that specific disclosure will not prove too costly: "The reality is that executives in 
well-managed companies already use the type of information contained in a corporate 
performance statement. Indeed, the absence of such information should cause 
shareholders to question whether management has a comprehensive grasp of the business 
and whether the board is properly exercising its oversight responsibility.” For conference 
calls, Hollander et al. (2010) document strong support for the assumption maintained in 
the literature that investors interpret silence negatively: “no news = bad news.” 
A second argument that organisations are expected to disclose good news is that there is 
extensive research indicating that managers often show a bias when they provide 
explanations for organisational outcomes (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Aerts, 1994). This 
so-called self-serving attributional bias is not characteristic for managers in particular; 
there is a large body of social-psychological research that indicates that people in general 
engage in self-serving attributional biases when they provide explanations 
(Hooghiemstra, 2003). People, including managers, tend to take credit for positive 
organisational outcomes and deny taking responsibility for deterioration in performance, 
by blaming it on the environment. Language is used to blur attributions. Aerts (1994) 
refers to such attributions as a “hedonic bias”: a general tendency to attribute anything 
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negative to external, environmental causes and to attribute favourable organisational 
outcomes to internal dispositional factors. Additionally, negative performances are 
explained in technical accounting terms, while positive performances are explained in 
strict cause-effect terminology so that management’s responsibility for them is clear. 
Finally, Lang and Lundholm (1993) offer two additional explanations why organisations 
are expected to disclose good news regarding other stakeholders than shareholders: to 
obtain and justify better contractual conditions in the supply chain, and - following the 
political process theory - justify considerable profits to avoid legal obligations.  
 
Empirically, a major share of research on disclosure found a positive association between 
profitability - or similar good news on corporate performance - and disclosure (Singhvi 
and Desai, 1971; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Clarkson et al., 1999; Watson et al., 2002; 
Prencipe, 2004). Kühn and Vives (1995) suggest that, on average, profits are higher for 
transparent firms. Their research also suggests that a firm that is less transparent than its 
competitor does not necessarily enjoy a strategic advantage, finding that more opaque 
firms exhibit less variability in products and output relative to more transparent 
competitors. One of the few studies that analyses disclosure through press releases 
(Clarkson et al., 1999), finds a positive association between the number of press releases 
issued and company performance. 
Research on impression management confirms the self-serving attributional bias of 
companies, showing that the amount of space devoted to reporting favourable 
information, e.g. increases in sales or profits, is significantly larger than the space 
devoted to unfavourable information (Kohut and Segars, 1992). Narratives of good 
 78 
performers are found to be easier to read than those of poor performers and good 
performers use “stronger” writing in their reports than poorer performers (Subramanian et 
al., 1993). Beattie and Jones (1997) show that especially companies with good 
performance make more extensive use of graphs in their annual reports than companies 
with poor performance. It is said that letters to the shareholders “are notorious for 
adopting optimistic attitudes and presenting euphemistic descriptions of company’s 
results and prospects” (Bruce, 1987). In addition, they are designed to send the right 
message, i.e. to enhance the story of corporate performance contained in the financial 
statements or to signal or, maybe more likely, to detract attention away from poor 
performance (Preston et al., 1996). That is, management seems likely to accentuate the 
positive, whereas the negative is obscured or even eliminated (Stanton et al., 2004). 
Kasznik (1999) provides evidence that managers use positive discretionary accruals to 
manage reported earnings upward when earnings would otherwise fall below 
management's earnings forecasts. Wilcox et al. (2010) find that firms with positive 
abnormal growth seek different types of disclosure to correct the perceived 
undervaluation. 
 
Less disclosure on bad news: 
Mirroring extra disclosure on good news, impression management research on annual 
reports finds that graphics contain distortions, e.g. in scale, so that an increase in profits is 
accentuated while a decrease in profits is graphically understated (Aerts, 1994; Preston et 
al., 1996; Beattie and Jones, 1997; Stanton et al., 2004). Jameson (2000) finds that 
language in annual reports is used to blur distinctions about the causes of poor 
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performance, presenting the company in a positive light. Hooghiemstra (2003) found 
some indication that letters of poor-performing companies are less readable than those of 
companies that performed well. Berger and Hann (2007) find that managers conceal low 
abnormal profits in order to avoid agency cost in terms of heightened external 
monitoring. 
Various research found that negative news disclosure is strongly weighted by the market, 
and positive news is discounted as firms and investment analysts have incentives to skew 
disclosure, concluding that managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain 
threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors (Kothari et al., 2009). 
Leuz et al. (2008) find that many firms go dark due to poor future prospects, distress and 
increased compliance costs after Sarbanes-Oxley. Kothari et al. (2009) theorize that 
capital market and human capital incentives dominate managerial disclosure behaviour 
and lead to managers on average withholding bad news and leaking good news early, in 
spite of incentives to disclose bad news promptly to avoid litigation and reputation cost. 
An example of this theory is that leading Dutch financial giant ING announced in august 
2004 that they adopted a policy to no longer give profit forecasts. Cees Maas, (then) CFO 
of ING Banking & Insurance, the largest Dutch financial commercial institution, 
commented that if forecasts are accurate, there are no rewards, but when forecasts are 
wrong, punishment is severe (Van der Heijden, 2004). 
By contrast, Tucker (2007) observes that prior researchers suggest that firms warning 
investors of an earnings shortfall experience lower returns than non-warning firms with 
similar risks and earnings news. Openness thus appears to be penalized by investors. 
Tucker (2007) critiques prior research in not acknowledging a possible self-selection bias 
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that occurs when firms with a larger amount of unfavourable non-earnings news ("other 
bad news") are more likely to warn. Tucker (2007) finds in her research that warning 
firms' returns remain lower than those of non-warning firms in a short-term window 
ending five days after earnings announcement. When this window is extended by three 
months, however, warning and non-warning firms exhibit similar returns. As a result, 
evidence suggests that investors do ultimately not penalize openness. 
 
Less disclosure on good news:  
An argument not to disclose (financial) success is based on the notion that managers face 
proprietary costs if the revelation of high abnormal profits attracts more competition and, 
hence, reduces the abnormal profits (Verrecchia, 1983; Wagenhofer, 1990).  
Analyzing listed companies in Hong Kong, Wallace and Naser (1995) found a negative 
relation between profitability and disclosure. The finding that comprehensive disclosure 
indexes may be decreasing with profit margins may be driven by the relative inaction of 
high profit firms because they feel that investors are satisfied with reported high profits 
and so would not wish additional information (Wallace et al. 1994). Wallace and Naser 
(1995) find their results inconsistent with research that found a positive relation between 
profitability and disclosure because of the unique characteristics of the capital market in 
Hong Kong, where many firms are closely held by a few wealthy families of Chinese 
ancestry. It is possible that personal connections and proper behavior may be more 
important for these families than the performance of their companies, obliging the 
Chinese manager to guarantee the composure of others while maintaining self-
composure. For German firms, Leuz (2004) found that the average or aggregate 
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profitability reported in the income statement is less informative on the profitability of 
the individual segments, essentially allowing firms to hide competitively sensitive 
information. Leuz (2004) contends that firms with more heterogeneous segment 
profitability are less likely to voluntarily provide segment reports, consistent with the 
notion of proprietary cost. For private companies, Dedman and Lennox (2009) find that 
companies withhold information from the public domain when gross profits are higher 
and when managers perceive that their markets are more competitive.  
Lang and Lundholm (2000) show that firms that increase disclosure to oversell or “hype” 
their stock suffer from negative earnings, although they may have been successful in 
lowering the firm’s cost of capital. Research confirms that managers routinely try to 
signal investors about their economic performance. Since investors are more favourably 
disposed to companies that demonstrate high and stable earnings, managers often try to 
smooth quarterly earnings and keep dividend payout ratios high and fixed, despite 
earnings fluctuations (Brealy and Myers, 1988). Anecdotic evidence that overselling 
profits is not perceived being trustworthy comes from Walker (2001), analyzing the 
“more than 100 quarters of uninterrupted growth in net income that have occurred under 
the reign of Jack Welch at GE”, stating that “it does seem curious that GE's many 
onetime gains, acquisitions, and special charges invariably and smoothly balance each 
other every three months.”  
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More disclosure on bad news:  
Litigation costs (Francis et al., 1994; Skinner, 1994, 1997) and proprietary cost (Clarkson 
et al., 1999) are the main reasons suggested in research for the release of bad news. In his 
grounded theory on corporate disclosure, Holland (2005) theorizes that disclosure, both 
public and private, increases when performance declines and during take-over battles. In 
a U.K. study, Skinner (1994, 1997) finds that firms with bad earnings news are more than 
twice likely to pre-disclose poor earnings performance than firms with good news. 
Withholding bad news is also thought to impose reputation costs, since investors dislike 
negative earnings surprises (Skinner, 1994). Abraham and Tonks (2004) found for the 
United Kingdom that companies whose future earnings are poor are more likely to make 
disclosures.   
Lang and Lundholm (1993) suggest that firms with negative information (particularly 
earnings information) might wish to convey more information to enhance creditability or 
to reduce the likelihood of legal liability. Penno (1996) theorizes that disclosure precision 
can be forecasted by the knowledge of the reporting firm's relative degree of success. 
Firms with a high degree of disclosure (of financial information) tend to be experiencing 
difficulties, while firms publishing less precise disclosures tend to generate more stable 
earnings.  
Penno (1996) calls disclosure with high precision “back-to-the-wall” policy, where 
initially unfavourable news is followed up by an extensive output of information. 
Disclosure with low precision is viewed as a “don't-rock-the-boat” policy, where good 
initial news is not followed by an extensive output of information. Wilcox et al. (2010) 
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find that firms with negative abnormal growth seek different types of disclosure to 
correct the perceived undervaluation. 
Interviewing 16 corporate directors of publicly listed companies in the UK, responsible 
for disclosure policy, Armitage and Marston (2008) found that no-one in their sample 
agreed with the suggestion that the degree of disclosure is linked to the company’s 
performance, and several executives stated that, if anything, it is more important to be 
open when performance is disappointing. One respondent’s view was that increasing 
disclosure with good performance would “look stupid”.  Altogether, the differing 
arguments and schools of thought are summarized in the scheme below, categorized in 
four quadrants: 
Figure 3.1: Scattered empirical findings 
The figure below shows contrasting empirical results from research on the influence of good or bad news 
on voluntary disclosure. The results are contrasted in four quadrants that represent four different strategies 
on disclosure that either highlight or downsize good or bad news respectively. 
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In sum, empirical research on the relationship between profitability (or other good news) 
and disclosure points at various directions. In line with stakeholder theory, it can be 
expected that organisations have incentives to express how corporate strategy pays off, 
confirming the strength and direction of the organisation in relation with stakeholders.  
Based on this analysis, I therefore hypothesize as follows: 
H4 Profitability is positively associated with voluntary disclosure of corporate 
strategy. 
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3.1.5 Ownership concentration 
Stakeholder theory holds that the power of stakeholders to influence management is a 
function of the resources they control that are essential to the corporation (Smith et al., 
2005). Publicly traded firms have dispersed shareholders who demand governance to 
protect their residual claims, monitor management actions and limit opportunistic 
behaviour (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). Stakeholder theory suggests that the more 
stakeholders an organisation has, and the more the interests of these stakeholders differ, 
the more cumulative pressure for disclosure an organisation can expect. It can therefore 
be expected that the lower the concentration of ownership in a company is (or the more 
ownership is diffused), the higher the pressure for disclosure of strategic information will 
be. This notion is mainly developed in agency theory but can be extended through 
stakeholder(-agency) theory: the lower the concentration of stakes in a company is (or the 
more stakes are diffused), the higher the pressure for disclosure of strategic information 
will be. 
Similarly, agency theory contends that the interests of the principals (shareholders) and 
managers (agents) are distinct, irrespective of their block size in shares. Agency theory 
argues that with greater ownership diffusion firms are more likely to experience pressure 
from shareholders for greater disclosure practices to reduce agency costs and information 
asymmetry (Raffournier, 1995). In general, principals are considered to be outsiders, and 
agents are considered to be insiders. Insider ownership is usually expressed as the 
percentage of the firm’s outstanding shares held by insiders. Institutions (e.g. mutual 
funds, pension plans, trust funds, and other large investors) holding 10 percent of a 
company’s shares are typically considered to be insiders, so the total of insider plus 
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institutional holdings can exceed 100 percent of outstanding shares. This distinction of 
insider and outsider ownership is not refuted by the observation that many controlling 
owners can be members of the board or participate in management. The board is viewed 
as the ultimate internal monitor whose most important role is to scrutinize the highest 
decision makers within the firm. This means that shareholders who want to take an active 
part in their ownership role should have members on the board or at least a constant 
communication with the board and the company management to be seriously involved 
and able to exercise influence and authority.  
 
It is theorized that the bigger outside ownership is, the bigger the external pressure to 
reduce information assymetry will be (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
However, if outside ownership is concentrated in blockholder ownership (i.e., external 
shareholders who own at least 5% of the common stock outstanding of the firm these 
investors are able to obtain information directly from the company, reducing the need for 
public disclosure (La Porta et al., 1999; Archambault and Archambault, 2003). Dominant 
shareholders typically have access to the information they need and are therefore not 
interested in public disclosure (Cormier et al., 2005; Bushee et al., 2003; Prencipe, 2004). 
The tendency of dominant shareholders to limit disclosure is typically found in family-
controlled firms (Kraaijeveld, 2002; Chau and Gray, 2002; Chen et al., 2008) 
A substantial amount of research confirms that outsider ownership is positively 
associated with (financial) disclosure (Ruland et al.,1990; Healy et al., 1999; Patelli and 
Prencipe, 2007; Darus and Taylor, 2008). Some authors however point out that the 
characteristics of the outside owner make a difference. For example Perotti and Von 
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Thadden (2001) find that bank-controlled firms are more opaque, while shareholder-run 
firms are more transparent. Eng and Mak (2003) find that blockholder ownership as such 
is not related to disclosure, but that significant government ownership is associated with 
increased disclosure.  
 
In summary, literature on the relation between ownership and (financial) disclosure 
generally suggests that ownership dispersion is positively associated with disclosure and 
that, conversely, ownership concentration is negatively associated with disclosure. It 
must be noted however that outside blockholder ownership is positively associated with 
disclosure, until the outside blockholders prefer to reduce information assymetry in direct 
communication with agents, rather then through public disclosure. 
Based on the arguments mentioned above, I hypothesize as follows: 
H5 Ownership concentration is negatively associated with voluntary disclosure of 
corporate strategy. 
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3.1.6 Listing status 
This study is limited to companies that are publicly listed in the Netherlands. The legal 
and cultural environment of a corporation strongly influences its transparency, illustrated 
by a large body of literature on financial reporting in cross-national contexts 
(Archambault and Archambault, 2003, Santema et al., 2005). Higgins (1996) analyses 
that “How a company goes about achieving strategic credibility and how a firm 
communicates strategic information will vary by country and region.” It can therefore be 
expected that being listed in two or more countries is of influence on voluntary disclosure 
of corporate strategy.  In addition, Cooke (1989) argues that agency costs increase as 
shareholders become more remote from management. As unlisted companies tend to have 
a smaller number of shareholders, agency costs are expected to be lower than those for 
listed companies. Conversely, due to the greater separation between owners and 
managers, listed companies are likely to incur higher agency costs, such as “monitoring 
costs”. These costs can be reduced through the voluntary disclosure of additional 
corporate information (Schipper, 1981). Hossain et al. (1995) suggest that both stock 
exchange listing status and voluntary corporate disclosure are complementary forms of 
monitoring. Consequently, one would expect to find a positive relationship between the 
two variables. 
There is a considerable amount of literature investigating the effect of listing status on 
disclosure (i.e., Hope, 2003). With the globalization of business and capital markets, the 
number of companies cross-listed is increasing. However, evidence from previous 
literature on the effects of foreign exchange listing on disclosure is mixed. Several studies 
have found a positive relationship between disclosure and listing status of a company 
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(Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Cooke, 1989, 1991; Wallace et al., 1994; Ahmed and Courtis, 
1999; Archambault and Archambault, 2003). The found positive association is explained 
by the idea that, when listed internationally, firms are expected to face more demand and 
pressure for information, more regulations on disclosure, more ownership dispersion and 
more competition in disclosure. In a cross-country analysis, LaPorta et al. (2005) show 
that higher disclosure is positively correlated with larger stock markets and a larger 
number of listed firms. 
Other research found that cross-listing might not be a significant driver of disclosure. For 
the UK, Meek et al. (1995) found that, next to international listing, country and origin of 
region, national characteristics, different political costs and differences in disclosure 
requirements are also determinants of disclosure. Hossain and Reaz (2007) find that 
multiple exchange listing is insignificant in explaining the level of disclosure. For press 
releases in Spain and the UK, Guillamon-Saorin and Sousa (2010) find that cross-listing 
is insignificant, even when performed for each country separately and therefore they 
excluded the variable from the main analysis. 
As for the effects of dual-listing on voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy, I follow 
the argument that, when listed internationally, firms are expected to face more demand 
and pressure for information, more regulations on disclosure, more ownership dispersion 
and more competition in disclosure. Based on this reasoning, I hypothesize as follows: 
H6 Dual-listing status is positively associated with voluntary disclosure of 
corporate strategy. 
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Similarly, a listing effect can be expected on a national level, where publicly listed 
companies are ranked in different indices, based on market size but also on the number of 
shares outstanding. Callison (2003) observes that higher-ranking companies in the 
Fortune 500 list more often provide information on their company websites that 
journalists consider useful, such as press rooms and materials in press rooms than lower-
ranking companies. As for the Netherlands, Euronext Amsterdam, formerly The 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange, has three capitalization-weighted indices or market-value-
weighted indices, whose components are weighted according to the total market value of 
their outstanding shares. The impact of a component's price change is proportional to the 
issue's overall market value, which is the share price times the number of shares 
outstanding. The 25 companies with the highest share turnover (in Euros) over the 
previous year deemed to be "representative of the Dutch equity market" are admitted to 
the AEX-index. Companies which have fewer than 25% of shares considered free float 
on Euronext Amsterdam and a free-float market capitalisation ranked lower than 25th 
are, however, ineligible for inclusion. Unlike some other European benchmark equity 
indices, if a company has more than one class of shares traded on the exchange, only the 
most actively traded of these will be accepted into the AEX. Subsequently, The AMX 
index, derived from Amsterdam Midkap Index, also known as Midkap index or simply 
Midkap, is composed of the 25 funds that trade on the exchange and that rank 26-50 in 
size. The Amsterdam Small Cap Index (AScX) is composed of the 25 funds that trade on 
the exchange and that rank 51-75 in size. Being listed on the AEX results in substantially 
more visibility and pressure than being listed on the AMX, which in turn is surrounded 
by more visibility and pressure than the AScX-index. Other companies that are listed at 
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Euronext Amsterdam but that are not listed in the three indices typically struggle for 
exposure and face little pressure from external stakeholders. 
Following the argument that, when listed higher in a national ranking based on market-
capitalization and outstanding shares, firms are expected to face more demand and 
pressure for information as well as highet information asymmetries. 
Based on this reasoning, I hypothesize as follows: 
H7 National ranking status is positively associated with voluntary disclosure of 
corporate strategy. 
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3.1.7 Listing age 
The length of time a company has been listed on a capital market may be relevant in  
explaining the variation of disclosures (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Various arguments are 
used in explaining firm age as a variable for disclosure. On one hand, younger companies 
are expected to operate under more uncertainty and therefore higher information 
asymmetries than older companies. Younger companies can therefore be expected to 
deliver more disclosure than older companies. 
Younger listed companies without an established shareholder base are expected to be 
more reliant on external fund raising than more mature companies (Barnes and Walker, 
2006) and have greater need to reduce scepticism and boost investor confidence (Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2002). Research indicates disclosure of non-financial information is of 
greater importance in the valuation of younger companies (Kim and Ritter, 1999). The 
same applies to value relevant disclosure since it enhances the decision usefulness 
objective of financial reporting (Li et al., 2009). Company age has also often been used as 
a proxy for risk, and is therefore expected to be correlated with the extent of company 
disclosure (Bukh et al., 2005).  
Conversely, companies that are older in terms of listing age, can be expected to have 
gained more acceptance and a vested reputation, which in turn has lead to an expected 
level of disclosure that exceeds the expectations for newly listed companies. Wallace et 
al. (1994) observed that publicly listed companies are aware of raising expectations 
through increased disclosure, indicating they are reluctant to provide additional detail that 
will have to be continued in later years. Also Graham et al. (2005) found that the most-
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supported concern among interviewed U.S. executives (agreed by 70% of survey 
respondents) is “setting a disclosure precedent that may be difficult to continue.” 
Confirming that disclosure tends to increase through the years, Armitage and Marston 
(2008) found that U.K. executives believe that their policies for disclosure “had evolved 
gradually towards more openness.” 
Secondly, whether disclosure signals function as a stimulus or threat for (new) 
competition remains under debate. Verrecchia (1983) theorizes that market competition 
may provide disincentives for voluntary disclosure through increased proprietary costs. 
Wagenhofer (1990) suggests that corporations balance disclosure between maximizing 
the market price of the firm versus not stimulating market entry by a competitor and 
imposing political costs. Also Clinch and Verrecchia (1997) suggest that when 
competition increases, disclosure decreases. Alternatively, Darrough and Stoughton 
(1990) suggest that competition through threat of product market entry encourages 
voluntary disclosure.  
 
As for the association between listing age and voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy, 
I argue that companies increase their disclosure through the years, being stimulated or 
pressed increasingly by an increasing variety of stakeholders. I therefore hypothesize as 
follows: 
H8 Listing age is positively associated with voluntary disclosure of corporate 
strategy. 
 94 
3.2 Organisational outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy 
Stakeholder theory, especially instrumental stakeholder theory, suggests that engagement 
with stakeholders contributes to economic performance. Agency theory provides insight 
on how reduced information asymmetries might reduce adverse selection. Stakeholder 
theory and especially legitimacy theory also suggest that stakeholders appreciate being 
engaged as stakeholders. It can therefore be expected that stakeholder management, using 
voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy as a vital instrument, leads to economic 
success, but also to improved corporate reputation as a proxy for qualitative appreciation 
for the organisation by stakeholders. Building on agency theory and stakeholder theory, 
this section proposes three hypotheses to identify and test organisational (beneficial) 
outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy: liquidity of stock, volatility of 
stock and corporate reputation. These pursued outcomes are balanced against potential 
cost of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy: production, litigation and proprietary 
cost. The nature of these costs and benefits are discussed in the following paragraphs in 
order to develop testable hypotheses.  First, the potential costs of voluntary disclosure are 
discussed, as costs typically form the starting point of deciding to what extent voluntary 
disclosure takes place and are balanced against potential benefits. Following the 
arguments of Grossman and Hart (1980), several authors propose that theory of voluntary 
disclosure is a special case of game theory with the following central premise: any entity 
contemplating making a disclosure will disclose information that is favorable to the 
entity, and will not disclose information unfavorable to the entity (Camerer, 1996). 
Game-theoretic models of disclosure argue that full disclosure occurs through a process 
known as unraveling. This notion that the behavior of rational buyers can unravel 
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withheld information is a “seminal result that forms the basis for nearly all of the 
subsequent research” (Verrecchia, 2001). Approaching voluntary disclosure as a game, a 
substantial stream in the disclosure literature is investigating if and where there is a 
mathematical equilibrium or optimum in what companies are prepared to disclose. This 
literature approaches the so-called disclosure principle as a puzzle in the accounting 
literature. Researchers have built sophisticated models to understand how corporations 
balance perceived advantages and disadvantages of disclosure under various 
circumstances (Verrecchia, 2001).  Several game theoretic models of financial markets 
suggest that in equilibrium firms should disclose all their private information. The 
adverse-selection problem inherent in the buying and selling of company shares is said to 
compel the seller to fully disclose to the buyer (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Milgrom, 
1981). Korn and Schiller (2003) however show that even in the original disclosure 
models there are multiple equilibria, finding that in those equilibria good types disclose 
and bad types do not. As shown by the seminal work of Akerlof (1970) and Spence 
(1973), and by the subsequent contributions of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1975) and Riley 
(1975), equilibrium in markets with asymmetric information and signalling may have 
quite different properties from equilibrium either with no information transfer, or with 
direct and costless information transfer. Signalling equilibria may not exist, may not be 
sustainable, and may not be economically efficient. In sum, potential costs of voluntary 
disclosure can be expected to be compared with potential benefits. This can be illustrated 
by the concept of proprietary cost that is discussed in the coming section. Proprietary cost 
is frequently being used in literature on potential benefits of voluntary disclosure, which 
is discussed in the remaining sections of this chapter. 
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3.2.1 Economic costs of disclosure 
Academic literature identifies three types of costs in relation with disclosure of strategic 
information: production cost, litigation cost and proprietary cost. Their relevance for this 
research is discussed below. 
 
Production cost 
Production costs of corporate information include the cost of gathering, processing, 
auditing and disseminating information. As larger firms generally disclose more 
information, for instance in larger annual reports, they are also likely to incur higher 
production costs of disclosure (Lev, 1992; Kohut and Segars, 1992; Elliot and Jacobson, 
1994). Research by Goodman (2001) shows that cost for corporate communication are in 
the range of 0,5% of corporate turnover. Tapscott and Ticoll (2003) confirm that 
voluntary disclosure can be expensive, for instance when it comes to social responsibility 
staff, annual sustainability reports, external verification, consultants, and the like.  
As for mandatory disclosure, it is found that many firms “go dark”, i.e., cease filing with 
securities and exchange authorities, partly in response to increased compliance costs after 
the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley-law (Bushee and Leuz, 2005; Leuz et al., 
2008). 
Farvaque et al. (2009) suggest that production cost of disclosure approaches “The figure 
of 1 million Euro auditing costs by billion of revenue is often quoted by the press, with 
annual reductions (that can be attributed to initial fixed costs and to economies of scale) 
varying from 15% to 40%.”  
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Indirect costs, such as opportunity cost and risk aversion, are found to be very difficult to 
measure, although they are also typically assumed to erode over time as companies get 
more efficient in producing information (Elliot and Jacobsen, 1994; Verrecchia, 2001, 
Coates, 2007). Altogether, production cost of disclosure is regularly cited as an argument 
for companies to limit disclosure, even if the permanence of the legal obligation allows 
procedures to be standardized and economies of scale to be implemented (Leuz, 2004; 
Coates, 2007). However, disclosure of corporate strategy is assumed to have negligible 
production cost. Though production of corporate strategy as such might be very 
significant, if all related effort and time of management (and often hired consultants) is 
included, it must be noted that crafting strategy, as well as the cost of internal 
dissemination, are not in scope of my study. 
 
Litigation cost 
A second type of cost that is related with voluntary disclosure is labelled as litigation 
cost. Legal and reputational cost may be incurred when firms get their information 
practices wrong. Litigation costs can arise from allegations of insufficient informative 
disclosure or from allegations of misleading disclosure, independent of the judgment 
whether it concerns good or bad news (Skinner, 1994, 1997; Field et al. 2005). Litigation 
can be costly because of attorney fees and potential monetary settlements, but also 
because of the opportunity costs of managers’ time and effort taken away from value-
adding activities. When choosing voluntary disclosure policies, companies are expected 
to consider their risk of litigation. The threat of shareholder litigation can affect a firm’s 
disclosure decisions in two ways: on the one hand, the risk of legal actions taken for 
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inadequate or untimely disclosures can encourage firms to increase voluntary disclosure. 
On the other, the risk of litigation can reduce firms’ incentives to provide disclosure. 
Empirical esearch on the relation between voluntarydisclosure decisions and litigation 
risk provides mixed evidence (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Field et al. (2005) demonstrate 
that this may be in part attributable to the endogenous relation between litigation risk and 
disclosure. Their findings suggest that disclosure deters rather than triggers (certain types 
of) litigation.  For the Netherlands, legal battles against publicly listed companies on 
issues of information asymmetry between principals and agents are normally driven by 
the Dutch shareholders association (Vereniging EffectenBezitters, VEB), well known for 
its active participation as shareholder in most plc’s in the Netherlands tot protect the 
interests of their members – primarily shareholders with minor interests. Their legal 
battles against the companies in my sample of companies and years are listed below: 
 
Table 3.3: Litigation issues of the top-70 plc’s in the Netherlands 
 
Legal cases of the Dutch shareholders association VEB 
against top-70 plc’s in the Netherlands during 2003-2008 
1. In 2003, Ahold admitted to have delivered incomplete and fraudulent information on 
its value on a large scale. Ahold settled with the VEB for € 1,1 billion in 2005. 
2. In 2004, Royal Dutch Shell admitted in 2004 to have given false information on oil 
reserves. Royal Dutch Shell settled, next to related cases with various international 
shareholders, with the VEB for € 389 million in 2009. 
3. In 2004, Unilever settled a dispute on (earlier communication on) the value of 
preferred stock, for € 300 million with the VEB. 
4. In 2004, the VEB claimed mismanagement at Getronics and asked for compensation 
for giving too optimistic forecasts; no compensation was awarded however. 
5. In 2007, information on the take-over of Numico by Danone became public before the 
official release, thereby influencing shareprice irregularly. Numico compensated the 
VEB for € 17 million in 2009. 
6. In 2008, information on the take-over of Vedior by Randstad became public before 
the official release, thereby influencing shareprice irregularly. Vedior compensated 
the VEB for € 4 million in 2010. 
7. In 2008, the VEB started an inquiry into the collapse of Fortis. 
8. In 2009, the VEB started an inquiry right after the bankruptcy of VanDerMoolen, 
suspecting mismanagement and false disclosure during preceding years. 
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The cases above illustrate that considerable litigation cost can be expected in clear and 
substantial cases of mismanagement and fraud, of which the cases of especially Ahold, 
Royal Dutch Shell and Fortis have been widely documented in various media.  
However, this variable was not included in my research because, firstly, theory suggests 
that the cost of litigation mainly lies in opportunity and reputation cost. I found no 
reliable proxies to measure these cost in my model. Secondly, criteria like completeness, 
accuracy and credibility of disclosed information are not in scope of my research; which 
are key issues in relation to litigation. 
 
Proprietary cost 
The third and arguably most important costs that are presumed to be connected with 
voluntary disclosure are known as proprietary cost. Proprietary information concerns 
information whose disclosure is perceived to incur costs that are associated with 
competitive disadvantages (Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1986; Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; 
Wagenhofer, 1990; Lang and Lundholm, 2000; Prencipe, 2004).  
Theories of competitive advantage tend to rely, in varying degrees, on assumptions about 
the distribution of information among competitors. The literature on the resource-based 
view focuses heavily on isolating mechanisms that prevent rivals from acquiring or 
imitating an advantage (Barney, 1991). Strategic decisions are information-intensive, 
requiring data about the industry, competitors, and future prospects (Makadok and 
Barney, 2001). Strategic resources rarely offer an impermeable barrier for rivals who may 
hire away knowledgeable employees, invest in strategic information, or develop their 
own firm-specific substitutes. Indeed, many resources become more imitable as they are 
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deployed. For example, knowledge creation processes require that tacit knowledge is 
codified, transferred and used to generate more tacit knowledge (Nonaka, 1994). In 
addition, as firms scale up knowledge resources to meet the demands of rapid growth, the 
knowledge must be replicated, integrated, and transferred (Kogut and Zander, 1992; 
Grant, 1996). Thus, in the process of leveraging tacit knowledge into a competitive 
advantage, the knowledge must be codified which, in turn, renders it relatively more 
imitable. As a result, strategic resources are likely to be costly to imitate rather than 
absolutely inimitable. Rivals may be willing to incur these substantial costs if they are 
aware that the resource or capability is valuable (Ocasio, 1997). 
Guarding information about capabilities may extend a firm’s advantage if it prevents 
rivals from knowing what to imitate or how to develop substitutes for its capabilities 
(Barney, 1991). Revealing such information may attract rivals’ attention and spur efforts 
to erode that advantage (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983). Secrecy, the active maintenance 
of information asymmetries between firm insiders and firm outsiders, may give the firm 
time to establish a dominant position and appropriate returns from an innovation 
(McEvily and Chakravarthy, 2002). Cohen et al. (2000) found that firms increasingly rely 
on secrecy and lead-time advantages to stay ahead of rivals. As such, voluntary 
disclosure of strategic information may come at a substantial cost.  
Proprietary cost is arguably the most important reason mentioned in literature why 
companies do not disclose information (Leuz and Wysocki, 2008). There is however little 
consensus on how proprietary costs could be measured. 
Related to proprietary cost as a reason for non-disclosure, many authors suggest that 
corporate disclosure reduces strategic flexibility. Sun-Tzu (1963) already suggested in the 
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second century BC that strategy should be considered a secret: “All men can see the 
tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is 
evolved.” Wrapp (1967) suggests that “The more explicit the statement of the strategy, 
the more difficult it becomes to persuade the organisation to turn to different goals when 
needs and conditions shift. The public and the stockholders, to be sure, must perceive the 
organisation as having a well-defined set of objectives and a clear sense of direction. But 
in reality the good top manager is seldom so certain of the direction which should be 
taken.” For Eisenberg (1984), clarity in communication is not always necessary for 
effectiveness. Eisenberg maintains that the multiple goals of an organisation can be 
coordinated without extensive communication or consensus. Eisenberg (1984) suggests to 
use “strategic ambiguity”, whereby contextual cues are purposefully omitted from 
communication to “allow for multiple interpretations on the part of the receiver.” This 
approach is supposed to lead to improved relationships and creative problem solving, and 
helps to find a balance between creativity and constraints, both necessary in 
organisations. As organisations consist of members that have conflicting interests, Weick 
(1995) suggests that the interdependence of the community is easier to maintain if its 
exact meaning is not expounded too explicitly.  
Finally, Ferreira and Rezende (2007) see one major reason for managers not to disclose 
corporate strategy: “By disclosing their intentions, managers will be reluctant to change 
their minds in the future, which may lead them to make inefficient project 
implementation decisions. When distortion is sufficiently large, managers will choose not 
to disclose information.” 
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Leuz (2004) suggests that proprietary costs provide a theoretical rationale for why full 
disclosure does not prevail in equilibrium, even though firms have incentives to disclose 
information voluntarily to reduce information asymmetries, pre-empt costly private 
information acquisition, and lower their cost of raising capital (e.g. Verrecchia, 1983; 
Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Wagenhofer, 1990). 
As proprietary costs have been modeled analytically, empirical (quantitative) research on 
their effects on disclosure is notably absent (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Leuz, 2004). This 
paucity of empirical research can be largely attributed to the elusive nature of proprietary 
costs and the difficulty of finding settings where firms’ disclosure choices of potentially 
proprietary information can be observed. Most notably, the significance of proprietary 
cost has been identified for companies operating in various segments, as companies 
arguably seem reluctant to disclose which segments are more profitable than others 
(Leuz, 2004; Prencipe, 2004; Arya et al., 2008). 
Alternatively, various scholars have tried to understand the importance of proprietary cost 
through qualitative research. For instance Higgins and Diffenbach (1989) find through 
interviews that executives perceive the main potential problem of communicating 
corporate strategy to be the risk that information can be used against you by competitors, 
unions, regulators, consumers and the financial community. Graham et al. (2005) found 
that the second most-supported concern is ‘Giving away company secrets” (59% agree). 
Doing a similar survey on disclosure in the U.K. however, Armitage and Marston (2008) 
found that executives in the U.K. consider proprietary cost not a big issue, for instance 
less of a challenge than production cost.  
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In sum, literature on disclosure offers no credible proxies for proprietary cost, although 
some attempts were documented (Depoers, 2000; Berger and Hann, 2007). However, 
companies can be expected to balance these perceived costs against expected benefits for 
disclosure, that will be discussed in the following section.  
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3.2.2 Economic benefits of disclosure 
Stakeholder theory and agency theory help to identify the following organisational 
outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy that can be assessed as beneficial 
for a corporation: reduced cost of capital and improved corporate reputation. The 
following sections discuss how cost of capital is related to disclosure, especially through 
liquidity and volatility of stock. The remaining section discusses how corporate 
reputation is related to disclosure. 
 
Cost of capital, liquidity and volatility of stock 
A substantial amount of academic research is devoted to the relation between cost of 
capital and disclosure of (financial) information. According to Lambert et al. (2007): 
“The link between accounting information and the cost of capital of firms is one of the 
most fundamental issues in accounting.” The cost of capital for a firm, either cost of 
equity capital (Botosan, 1997; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002) or cost of debt (Sengupta, 
1998), are important for a firm as it must earn a return greater than the cost of capital. 
The cost of capital largely depends on the profitability rate required by shareholders. Yet 
this is not directly observable, as it depends on expectations of share prices and 
dividends: the equilibrium price of a share covers such a value because it provides 
shareholders with the profitability that they require, given their expectations of dividends 
and future share prices. In particular, the ex post profitability of the share does not 
represent a satisfactory estimate of the profitability required. An indirect estimate, based 
on a theoretical relationship, is therefore needed. 
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There is little academic consensus whether disclosure allows a firm in practice to reduce 
the cost of its capital, which is mainly caused by the difficulty of measuring cost of 
capital (Botosan 2006, Leuz and Wysocki, 2008). The exact mechanism of the 
relationship between information disclosure and the cost of capital is therefore considered 
unclear (Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005). Several studies found empirically, using various 
measures, that greater disclosure allows firms to reduce their cost of capital (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993; Botosan, 1997; LaPorta et al., 1999; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; 
Francis et al., 2005). Other studies however found no relation between disclosure and 
cost of capital (Cohen, 2004; Daske, 2006) or even find that disclosure is positively 
related to cost of capital (Richardson and Welker, 2001; Van Mourik, 2007). Botosan en 
Plumlee (2002) found that cost of capital - both equity and debt - decreases when annual 
reports provide high disclosure, but increases when disclosure is provided through 
quarterly statements and other timely disclosures like press releases. The latter result is 
considered contrary to theory but is consistent with managers’ claims that greater timely 
disclosures may increase the cost of equity capital, possibly through increased stock price 
volatility. 
Interviewing 16 corporate directors of publicly listed companies in the UK, responsible 
for disclosure policy, Armitage and Marston (2008) found that the primary motive for 
voluntary disclosure is to enhance the company’s reputation for openness, and not to 
reduce its cost of capital. The majority view is that additional disclosure beyond a good-
practice level makes little difference to the company’s cost of equity. Only one-quarter of 
those interviewed believe without qualification that disclosure reduces the cost of equity. 
But 56% believe that greater disclosure to bond rating agencies and bankers will reduce 
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the cost of debt or increase its availability. This is in line with earlier qualitative research 
(Eccles and Mavrinac, 1995; Graham et al., 2005). 
Assessing cost of capital is a challenge in business research as it is not in the interest of 
companies to disclose what interest they pay to acquire capital. Core (2001) observes that 
there is little research guidance as to which of the noisy proxies for the information 
asymmetry component of the cost of capital are likely to be more accurate. Researchers 
indirectly address measurement problems with the cost of capital by repeating their tests 
on different proxies for the cost of capital (e.g. Healy et al., 1999; Leuz and Verrecchia, 
2000). However, because these tests are not independent, it is difficult to assess 
significance. Overall, Leuz and Wysocki (2008) observe, “the evidence on the cross-
sectional relation between voluntary disclosure, accounting attributes and cost of capital 
is still evolving and hence it is difficult to draw definitive and unambiguous conclusions 
whether the empirical evidence supports current theories on the link between information 
quality and cost of capital.” The authors find that empirical results appear to be sensitive 
to and can vary across different measures of cost of capital (i.e. realized returns versus ex 
ante cost of capital proxies), types of firms (i.e. different sizes), with the presence of 
other intermediaries (i.e. financial analysts), across types of disclosures or earnings 
attributes (i.e. annual reports versus timely disclosures versus conservative earnings), 
across types of investors (shareholders versus bondholders), and across different 
institutional environments (i.e. U.S. versus other markets).  
 
To find proxies of economic benefits that are related to the cost of capital but offer less 
ambiguity, leading research on disclosure in finance and accounting analyzes the 
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association between disclosure and liquidity and volatility of stock. Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000) state that “A major link between economic theory and contemporary accounting 
thought is the notion that a firm’s commitment to greater disclosure should lower costs of 
capital that arise from information asymmetries.”  
Trading volume (liquidity of stock) and absolute price changes (volatility of stock) are 
both suggested to reflect the average change in investors’ expectations that are related to 
the economic importance of the public information. Empirical work on volume and 
volatility reactions to earnings announcements has validated these basic predictions (see 
reviews in Healy and Palepu, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001). However, trading volume and 
volatility reactions to public earnings announcements can also be understood in terms of 
differences across investors in interpreting public announcements instead of asymmetry 
of private information (Kandel and Pearson, 1995). 
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3.2.2.1 Liquidity of stock 
Liquidity of stock can be defined as the ability to buy or sell an asset at short notice 
without granting a price concession (Brennan and Tamarowski, 2000). Liquidity 
preference in macroeconomic theory refers to the demand for money, considered as 
liquidity.  
My framework offers two arguments that suggest that voluntary disclosure of corporate 
strategy is an instrument to manage liquidity of stock. First, instrumental stakeholder 
theory suggests that engagement with stakeholders leads to economic success. Higher 
levels of liquidity of stock are generally perceived as economically successful.  
Second, agency theory suggests that disclosure mitigates adverse selection, reduces 
uncertainty and thereby price and thereby increases liquidity of stock. 
The concept of liquidity was first developed by Keynes (1936) to explain determination 
of the interest rate by the supply and demand for money. Liquidity preference theory 
states that, other things being equal, investors prefer higher liquidity as it reduces risk of 
loss of capital. Diamond and Verrecchia’s (1991) theoretical analysis shows that more 
disclosure increases market liquidity, by reducing information asymmetries and the 
volume of informed trading. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) analyse that in real institutional 
settings, adverse selection is typically manifest in reduced levels of liquidity for firm 
shares (e.g. Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). To overcome the 
reluctance of potential investors to hold firm shares in illiquid markets, firms must issue 
capital at a discount. Discounting results in fewer proceeds to the firm and hence higher 
costs of capital. The more liquid a stock, the more easily it is converted to cash, the less 
exposed it is to market fluctuations share (Gitman and Joehnk, 2007). 
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As information asymmetries create costs by introducing adverse selection into 
transactions between buyers and sellers of firm shares, adverse selection is typically 
manifest in reduced levels of liquidity for firm shares in real institutional settings, 
(Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). If the company does not invest 
in disclosure to overcome the reluctance of potential investors to hold firm shares in 
illiquid markets, firms must issue capital at a discount. Discounting results in fewer 
proceeds to the firm and hence higher costs of capital. A commitment to increased levels 
of disclosure reduces the possibility of information asymmetries arising either between 
the firm and its shareholders, or among potential buyers and sellers of firm shares. Leuz 
and Verrecchia (2000) note that the theory is sufficiently broad as to allow the notion of 
"increased levels of disclosure" to be interpreted as either an increase in the quantity of 
disclosure or an increase in the quality of disclosure (or both). The use of the expression 
"increased levels" is primarily for expositional convenience, and should not be 
interpreted as exclusively the former (i.e., an increase in quantity). In addition, the theory 
makes no distinction as to how the information asymmetries arise (e.g., between a firm 
and its shareholders, among potential buyers and sellers of firm shares, etc.). The only 
requirement is that the information asymmetries manifest themselves as a liquidity 
premium in the price at which trades are executed. This, in turn, should reduce the 
discount at which firm shares are sold, and hence lower the costs of issuing capital 
(Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Baiman and Verrecchia, 1996). 
 
Leuz and Wysocki (2008) state: “arguably, the firm-specific benefit of disclosure best 
supported by theory is the effect on market liquidity.” Corporate disclosure can mitigate 
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the adverse selection problem and increase market liquidity by levelling the playing field 
among investors (Verrecchia, 2001). More information in the public domain makes it 
harder and more costly for traders to become privately informed and as a result, fewer 
investors are likely to be privately informed, which reduces the probability of trading 
with a better informed counter party. Second, more disclosure reduces the uncertainty 
about firm value, which in turn reduces the potential information advantage that an 
informed trader might have. Both effects reduce the extent to which uninformed investors 
need to price protect and hence increase market liquidity. 
 
However, some authors theorize that more disclosure leads to less liquidity, observing 
that voluntary disclosure lowers the cost of information acquisition for financial analysts 
and hence increases their supply (Bhushan, 1989; Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Boot and 
Thakor (1998) therefore argue that if firms increase their disclosure, trading information 
will be less valuable and the incentive to look for information is therefore reduced. Healy 
and Palepu (2001) also consider that public voluntary disclosure pre-empts analysts’ 
ability to distribute managers’ private information to investors, leading to a decline in 
demand for their services. Verrecchia (2001) takes up this idea, emphasizing the 
heterogeneity of participants in the market. This contrasts earlier findings by Lang and 
Lundholm (1996) who envisaged a representative investor, and showed that the most 
transparent companies are those that are monitored the most by financial analysts. 
Verrecchia (2001) analyzes that if the cost of acquiring information is heterogeneous 
(because of different competences, of access to different information etc.) then Boot and 
Thakor’s argument (1998) fully applies. This observation is in line with Dempsey (1989), 
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who shows that the more analysts who follow a firm, the less likely is the market to be 
surprised by the firm’s quarterly earnings announcement. This means that when more 
analysts follow a firm, there is less potential for profitable informed trading ahead of 
earnings announcements - in other words, the more levelled is the informational playing 
field. In this reasoning, disclosure will reduce the information that is globally available; 
this phenomenon is near the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox (1980), stating that if the market 
for information would be efficient, that is, all relevant information is already reflected in 
market prices, then no single agent would have sufficient incentive to acquire the 
information on which prices are based. In line with this paradox, Tong (2007) shows that 
if the most transparent companies do indeed benefit from higher quality forecasts, they 
suffer from a fall in the number of analysts, which in turn might have impact on the stock 
liquidity of the company. 
 
Empirical studies on the association between liquidity of stock and disclosure primarily 
found that firms with high levels of disclosure are more likely to attract investors who are 
more confident that stock transactions occur at “fair” prices, thereby increasing the 
liquidity in the stock (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Kim and Verrecchia, 1994; Lev, 
1992; Elliot and Jacobson, 1994; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Verrecchia, 2001; Sami and 
Zhou, 2008).  As for the determinants of trading volume or liquidity of stock as a proxy 
for information asymmetry, prior studies have identified significant associations with 
volatility, firm size, listing status (Standard & Poor's 500 inclusion) and (institutional) 
ownership (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). Looking at smaller U.S. firms coming under 
  112 
SEC regulations, Bushee and Leuz (2005), suggest that mandatory requirements do lead 
to more disclosure and for some firms a significant increase in liquidity of stock.  
In research on liquidity and disclosure, various studies observe a positive relation 
between analyst following and disclosure, taking analyst following as a proxy for 
liquidity (Bhushan, 1989; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Lang and Lundholm, 1996; 
Healy et al., 1999; Hope, 2003). Brennan and Tamarowski (2000) note that analysts 
influence liquidity of stock directly, but also that the most important determinant of 
liquidity of stock is trading volume. Brennan and Tamarowski (2000) underpin the 
possibility that analysts also increase trading volume because the services of most 
analysts are not paid for directly, but indirectly in the form of trading commissions. The 
finding that analysts can improve stock liquidity is consistent with their role as 
disseminators of information, whose reports reduce the asymmetry of information among 
investors about the future earnings of the firm. For the Netherlands, Van der Meer (2006) 
also found that professional investor relations is a key antecedent for analyst following. 
Bushee and Miller (2005) analyzed whether corporations that hire investor relations-
agencies have higher analyst following, as professional agencies appeared to stimulate 
high disclosure by issuing more press releases and generating more media coverage. 
Trade volume increased for companies that increased analyst following, both in absolute 
numbers as in the number and percentage of days that the stock was traded. Increased 
media attention and higher trading volumes mainly involved smaller, over-the-counter 
companies, probably because they have the most to gain in this respect.  
Relatedly, Bushee et al. (2009) found that greater press coverage reduces information 
asymmetry (i.e., lower spreads and greater depth) around earnings announcements, with 
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broad dissemination of information having a bigger impact than the quantity or quality of 
press-generated information. Rahman et al. (2007) find that frequent disclosure, in terms 
of quarterly reporting, is associated with higher analyst following. However, Guillamon-
Saorin and Sousa (2010) find no significant relationship between disclosure and analyst 
following.  
Although empirical research seems to deliver convincing evidence on a positive 
association between liquidity and disclosure, Armitage and Marston (2008) found little 
support for this notion, interviewing 16 corporate executives of publicly listed companies 
in the UK, responsible for disclosure policy. Earlier qualitative research by Graham et al. 
(2005), who survey managers from 312 public U.S. firms, found that 44% of managers 
strongly agree with the statement “voluntarily communicating information increases the 
overall liquidity of our stock” (compared to 17% of managers who strongly disagree with 
the statement). 
 
Related to my research on voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy, I follow the 
theoretical and empirical evidence that (financial) disclosure is positively associated with 
liquidity of stock. Based on the arguments mentioned above, I hypothesize as follows: 
H9 Voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy is positively associated with 
liquidity of stock. 
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3.2.2.2 Volatility of stock 
Volatility is a statistical measure of the dispersion of returns for a given security or 
market index. Volatility of share price can either be measured by using the standard 
deviation or variance between returns from that same security or market index. To the 
extent to which smooth transitions in share prices suggest the absence of information 
asymmetries between the firm and shareholders, or among investors, low levels of 
volatility suggest fewer information asymmetries. As with liquidity, however, volatility is 
influenced by many factors unrelated to information asymmetry.  
My framework offers two arguments that suggest that voluntary disclosure of corporate 
strategy is an instrument to manage volatility of stock. First, instrumental stakeholder 
theory suggests that engagement with stakeholders leads to economic success. Lower 
levels of volatility of stock are generally perceived as economically successful.  
Second, agency theory suggests that disclosure is related to information asymmetry and 
risk, which is reflected in stock-movements, being volatility. 
 
Literature offers various reasons for managers to be concerned about volatility of share 
price. Firstly, high stock return volatility can increase a firm’s perceived risk, thereby 
raising its cost of capital (Froot et al., 1992; Foster, 1986). Firms with high share price 
volatility have incentives to reduce information asymmetry between managers and 
investors since such actions are thought to lower financing (Gibbins et al., 1992; 
Clarkson et al. 1999). By reassuring a firm’s investors regarding various aspects of its 
operations or performance, expanded disclosure leads to a reduction in information 
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asymmetry between managers and investors and, ultimately, to a reduction in information 
costs incurred by investors (e.g. Kim and Verrecchia 1994). 
Secondly, to the extent that stock price becomes a noisier signal of firm value, high stock 
return volatility can also make stock-price-based compensation less effective and/or more 
costly (Baiman and Verrecchia, 1995). 
Thirdly, shareholder class-action lawsuits have been shown to be associated with sudden, 
large stock price drops, a specific form of stock return volatility (Francis et al., 1994). 
Fourthly, as Farvaque et al. (2009) observe: “being completely transparent creates 
volatility, which is desired by neither investors nor companies.” Being completely 
transparent provides less information on the firm’s ability to create value than a policy of 
smoothing out results or dividends.  
Finally, some studies relate disclosure with accurate pricing, which in turn is thought to 
reduce the cost of capital. Improved stock price accuracy is considered beneficial if it 
results in an improvement in the allocation of capital or reduces the agency costs 
associated with the divergence of interests between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders or between managers and dispersed shareholders (Fox 1999; Ferrell, 2007). 
There is some empirical evidence suggesting that share price accuracy can affect the 
allocation of capital and agency costs (Fox 1999). Empirical research has proxied 
accurate pricing in various ways, including volatility of stock (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
In these models, the earlier information becomes available to the market, the lower a 
stock’s return volatility will be, as any information about a firm’s future cash flow and 
profits will be more heavily discounted than it would be if the information were released 
at a later time. This implies, in turn, that stock price accuracy increases owing to the 
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incorporation of information into a firm’s stock price at an earlier time. Although, as 
Ferrell (2007) observes, the finance literature has not reached a consensus on the proper 
interpretation of volatility, it is argued by various researchers that (lower) volatility is a 
proxy for stock price accuracy. 
 
The common measure for volatility of share price is called “beta”, indicating how the 
price of a security responds to market forces. Beta relates historical returns of the security 
with market returns, being the average return of a selection of stocks (Gitman and 
Joehnk, 2007). Reducing information asymmetry and uncertainty among investors 
through corporate disclosure is supposed to reduce market risk, which is measured by 
beta. A lower beta signifies a reduced shareholder demand for profitability, and therefore 
potentially a lower cost of capital. Lambert et al. (2007) theoretically show that greater 
accounting disclosure reduces the firm’s cost of capital via the fall in the share’s beta; 
Ferrell (2007) confirmed this result empirically.  
As for the determinants of trading volume as a proxy for liquidity of stock, prior studies 
have identified significant associations with volatility, firm size, listing status (Standard 
& Poor's 500 inclusion) and (institutional) ownership (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). 
Empirical research on the relation between (financial) disclosure and volatility delivered 
mixed results: some research suggests a positive association; other research suggests a 
negative association. 
As for the determinants of volatility, research suggests that volatility is influenced by 
many factors unrelated to disclosure or information asymmetry (Leuz and Verrecchia, 
2000; Ferrell, 2007). Moreover, Bushee and Noe (2000) demonstrate that the effect of 
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disclosure on volatility is complex and may depend on the type of (institutional) investors 
attracted to the firm. Identifying determinants of volatility as a proxy for information 
asymmetry, prior studies primarily associate volatility with firm size and ownership 
concentration (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). 
 
Positive association between disclosure and volatility 
Literature offers a few arguments why an increase in disclosure might increase stock 
volatility (Baumann and Nier, 2004). First, an increase in disclosure implies that more 
information is released, which in and of itself might move the price and increase 
volatility. Second, an increase in the disclosure of information relies on sophisticated 
investors to interpret and put the disclosed information into context. Indeed, in view of 
attempts to encourage more quantitative disclosures by banks during the first decade of 
this century, the banks themselves have argued that specific disclosure requirements 
could provide the markets with more data that might be misconstrued by analysts. More 
disclosure might thus inject more market volatility. 
Empirically, Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) suggest a positive association between 
disclosure informativeness and price volatility. Lang and Lundholm (1993) find that 
analysts’ assessments of corporate disclosure practices are weakly positively associated 
with firms’ stock return volatility. They conjecture that stock return volatility proxies for 
information asymmetry, which managers are trying to reduce through improved 
disclosure. Lang and Lundholm later (1996) found that high disclosure decreases 
dispersion of analyses, reducing cost of estimation. At the same time, Lang and 
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Lundholm (1996) show that shareholders poorly receive a sudden increase in the 
frequency of disclosure. 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) use a sample of German firms and a reporting change from 
German to U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, which is interpreted as an 
increase in disclosure, finding that volatility increased. Also Perotti and Von Thadden 
(2001) suggest that transparency results in “higher variability of profits and output.” 
Therefore they assume that lenders prefer less information dissemination, as this protects 
firms when in a weak competitive position, while equity holders prefer more disclosure to 
maximize profitability when in a strong position. 
Botosan and Plumlee (2002), using U.S. data, find that the cost of equity decreases with 
the level of disclosure in annual reports but increases with the level in quarterly reports, 
news announcements and other more timely disclosures. They point out that managers 
claim that a greater level of timely disclosures may increase the cost of equity capital, 
possibly because timely information promotes short-term trading which increases the 
volatility of the shares. Relatedly, Rahman et al. (2007) find firms with higher price 
volatility disclosing more regularly and frequently. 
For emerging markets in China, Sami and Zhou (2008) find that companies experience a  
significant increase in price volatility subsequent to the implementation of standards  
that increase disclosure. O’Shea et al (2008) find that the number of disclosures, the 
number of price and non-price sensitive disclosures and the number of disclosures by 
category has a significant influence on daily price volatility. Moreover, the volatility 
impact of disclosure is greater for small and mid-sized firms than large firms. 
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Negative association between disclosure and volatility 
Economic theory suggests that an increase in disclosure should reduce stock volatility. 
By mitigating uncertainty, disclosure may reduce the magnitude of the impact of news 
about a firm’s performance, which would reduce stock price volatility. Simple theories of 
market microstructure theory suggest that by increasing the amount of public 
information, disclosure is likely to reduce information asymmetries in the market that 
result in pronounced price changes in response to changes in demand for the stock 
(Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Disclosure may reduce heterogeneity of beliefs about 
the true value of the firm. It may thus reduce both the volume traded and the volatility of 
the stock price (Baumann and Nier, 2004). Cormier et al (2007) suggest that qualitative 
disclosure reduces stock price volatility, regarding both financial and non-financial 
related disclosures. Used as a proxy for information asymmetry, Lambert et al. (2007) 
and Cormier et al. (2009) find that disclosure leads to a reduction in share price volatility. 
In a qualitative survey, Eccles and Mavrinac (1995) found that a selection of corporate 
managers, financial analysts, portfolio managers and investors expected that improved 
corporate disclosure could lead to, among others, decreases in share price volatility.  
Several researchers relate disclosure with firms’ bid-ask spreads, which, like volatility, 
may be thought of as a measure of asymmetric information (Baumann and Nier, 2004), 
finding a negative association (Sengupta, 1998; Healy et al., 1999; Leuz and Verrecchia, 
2000; Cohen, 2004; Francis et al., 2005). However, Healy et al. (1999) find no evidence 
for a change in the beta factor due to increased disclosure ratings. Auer (1998) examines 
changes in share price volatility and the firm’s beta factor for Swiss firms that have 
switched to IAS. He finds a small, but insignificant reduction in volatility and no change 
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in beta factor. Schleicher and Walker (2002) and Hussainey et al. (2003) find that 
improved levels of annual report disclosure lead to higher levels of share price 
anticipation of earnings, and thereby less volatility in share price, especially for loss 
making firms. 
 
In summary, there are mixed views and results on how (financial) disclosure and 
volatility of stock are related. Based on stakeholder theory, my general proposition is that 
voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy adds to engagement and reduced information 
asymmetry among stakeholders. However, as described in section 2.3.2, Farvaque et al. 
(2009) observe: “being completely transparent creates volatility, which is desired by 
neither investors nor companies.” This analysis has been confirmed by Botosan and 
Plumlee (2002) who found that increased disclosure leads to higher volatility of stock. I 
follow this analysis that stakeholders can easily be confused by too much transparency, 
which can result in increased volatility of stock. Based on these arguments, I therefore 
hypothesize as follows: 
H10 Voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy is positively associated with 
volatility of stock. 
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3.2.2.3 Corporate reputation 
Different from the financial consequences, but increasingly perceived to be an important 
organisational outcome of voluntary disclosure, is corporate reputation, defined as: “A 
relatively stable, issue specific aggregate perceptual representation of a company’s past 
actions and future prospects compared against some standard” (Fombrun, 1996).  
The key arguments from my framework that suggest that voluntary disclosure of 
corporate strategy influences corporate reputation is given by stakeholder theory, holding 
that engagement with stakeholders breeds a positive attitude. Legitimacy theory refines 
this notion, suggesting that engagement with stakeholders creates legitimacy: a 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions (Suchman, 1995). I proposes that engagement with stakeholders and creating 
legitimacy results in sustainable corporate reputation.  
Fombrun and Van Riel (1997) analyse that theory on corporate reputation draws from 
various theories in both conceptual and empirical papers, including institutional theory, 
signalling theory, stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, game theory, economic theory, 
mass communication theory, strategic management theory and impression management. 
In their textbook on stakeholder theory, Freeman et al. (2010) propose that: “An excellent 
reputation in the marketplace can be a source of competitive advantage and increased 
economic value.” This is explained by stakeholder theory because firms that have 
reputations as good citizens across a broad group of stakeholders are more attractive 
business partners and associates (Hosmer, 1994; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Puncheva, 
2008). For example, customers may be more likely to shop at a store with an excellent 
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reputation or suppliers may offer greater discounts to a firm that is known to be 
responsible in its treatment of stakeholders. Similarly, the best potential employees may 
be drawn to firms with reputations for excellent employee treatment (Greening and 
Turban, 2000). It also seems probable that firms with excellent customer relationships 
should be able to tap those relationships such that their new product success rates will be 
higher (Harrison and St.John, 1994).  
 
A trustworthy reputation becomes a source of competitive advantage as the firm is 
presented with a larger number of better business opportunities from which to select.  
From a resource-based perspective, reputation is considered to be a valuable and rare 
intangible resource because it is difficult to imitate and highly causally ambiguous, which 
in turn, leads to a sustained competitive advantage (Deephouse, 2000; Roberts and 
Dowling, 2002). The greater the ambiguity experienced by constituents, the greater the 
importance of reputation as it reduces uncertainty by signalling (Rindova et al., 2005). It 
seems likely also that increased trust leads to fewer transaction costs, by reducing the 
resources needed to create and enforce contracts and by eliminating the need for 
elaborate safeguards and contingencies that require detailed monitoring (Post et al., 
2002). 
Preston and Sapienza (1990) found positive correlations between ten-year rates of return 
and the pursuit of the interests of various stakeholders, using data collected by Fortune 
magazine’s reputation rankings. Fombrun and Shanley (1990) also provided evidence in 
support of the idea that the eight different dimensions of Fortune’s survey are highly 
related, concluding that the eight attributes, reflecting the interests of various 
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stakeholders, are components of a single factor of reputation. These findings have been 
criticized because of the possibility of a “halo” effect (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; 
Brown and Perry, 1994), assuming that the various variables are more a function of the 
overall perception of the firm than of – for instance – socially desirable behaviour. 
However, this issue is not a problem for stakeholder theory as Freeman (1984) 
conceptualized it, because the theory specifically predicts that there will be a positive 
relationship between the variables. 
 
According to Fombrun and Van Riel (1997), economists view reputations as either traits 
or signals. Game theorists describe reputations as character traits that distinguish among 
types of firms and can explain their strategic behaviour. Signalling theorists point at the 
informational content of reputations. Game and signalling theorists both acknowledge 
that reputations are actually perceptions of firms held by external observers. Weigelt and 
Camerer (1988) state “in game theory the reputation of a player is the perception others 
have of the player's values . . . which determine his/ her choice of strategies.”  
 
According to many (reputation) scholars, reputation is empirically related to sustained 
competitive advantage and organisational performance (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; 
Brown and Perry, 1994; Fombrun, 1996; Deephouse, 2000; Roberts and Dowling, 2002; 
an overview is given by Sabate and Puente, 2003). Reputation my have other potentially 
favourable consequences, such as enabling to charge premium prices (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1982), attract better applicants (Stigler, 1961), enhance access to capital markets 
(Beatty and Ritter, 1986) and attract investors (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982). Empirical 
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studies show that even when confronted with negative information, observers resist 
changing their reputational assessments (Wartick, 1992). 
Another reflection of the perceived importance of reputation is given by Fortune 
Magazine, which since 1983 has been publishing a corporate ranking system based on 
completely different standards than the traditional method of ranking companies in order 
of sales volume. That a high esteem for corporate image is however no guarantee for 
long-term success can be illustrated by the fact that Enron was selected by Fortune as 
most admired company in America in 1996, going bankrupt in 2004. Similarly, Dutch 
reputation scholar Van Riel indirectly acknowledges that reputation is a slippery concept, 
explaining the turbulence around ABN AMRO, the largest Dutch bank that was shredded 
by three competitors in 2007: “Earlier this year, there was national pride on ABN AMRO 
taking over Italian bank Antoveneta, today national shame prevails” (Smit, 2007). 
A critical note on the presumed relation between “Fame and Fortune” (Fombrun and Van 
Riel, 2004) comes from Hutton et al. (2001), commenting “unfortunately, such studies 
are largely meaningless and circular in their logic, given that the Fortune and other 
reputation measures they are studying are largely defined by financial performance.” In 
describing “the reputational landscape”, Fombrun and Van Riel (1997) acknowledge that 
in research on the relation between fame (reputation) and fortune (performance) 
“empirical studies have had difficulty untangling a causal ordering: both are produced by 
the same underlying initiatives.” 
 
Although corporate reputation has been researched intensively since the 1990s in relation 
with a variety of company characteristics and with performance, little research has 
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explored how communication with the environment contributes to corporate reputation 
and no research has assessed how voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy contributes 
to corporate reputation. There are however a few scholars who identify arguments that 
communication and strategy are related and potentially of influence on corporate 
reputation. Observing that scholars of strategy call attention to the comparative benefits 
of acquiring favourable reputations, Rindova and Fombrun (1999) for instance discuss 
the link between strategy and communication, concluding that a company can build 
competitive advantage not only by creating desired organisational outcomes through the 
use of material resources but by managing communication so as to influence the 
interpretations and perceptions of constituents. Similarly, a company can create 
competitive advantage by socializing its constituents to its own culture and can use 
communication strategy to form long-term relationships with the constituents who shape 
the organisation’s image and reputation (Rindova and Fombrun, 1999). 
Ferguson et al. (2000) observed that at firm level, identity, strategy and reputation have 
been connected theoretically and empirically. Strategic choices can be perceived as 
concrete examples of firm identity and communication of strategy creates a reputation. 
According to Ferguson et al. (2000) strategy, and corporate identity, are related to 
reputation in the following way: a firm projects images that reflect its identity to its 
stakeholders. These images include not only advertising and public relations, but also 
strategic actions and verbal statements of strategy, such as those communicated through 
annual reports or speeches by CEOs. In turn, stakeholders view these images, interpret 
them and form reputations based on them. Corporate strategy is also perceived to directly 
influence reputation (Ferguson et al., 2000).  
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Based on reputation theory, Ferreira and Rezende (2007) theorize that: managers will 
voluntarily disclose their private information about corporate strategy to stakeholders 
because they want to induce stakeholders to undertake investments that are specific to 
certain strategic directions; managerial public announcements of information about 
strategy are credible because managers are concerned about their reputations; and thus 
voluntary public disclosures of information about corporate strategy can be value 
enhancing due to their positive effects on incentives of stakeholders.  
Also Armitage and Marston (2008) suggest that open and proficient corporate 
communication might be one of the ways by which a company’s overall reputation for 
quality can be sustained. A good reputation is supposed to help in doing business and 
therefore to bring commercial benefits. 
 
Empirical evidence on the relation between disclosure and reputation 
Research has explored how strategic plans may act as consensus catalysts inside and 
outside the company (Higgins and Bannister, 1992). Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) find 
evidence that highly-regarded companies tend to use presentations of strategic plans as a 
‘‘sensegiving’’ device, to support managers’ efforts to influence how financial analysts 
interpret the company’s strategy in relation to its competitive context. Eccles and 
Mavrinac (1995) found that a selection of corporate managers, financial analysts, 
portfolio managers and investors expected that improved corporate disclosure could lead 
to, among others, increased credibility. A study by Falkenstein (1996) finds that mutual 
funds tend to invest more in companies that are in the news, as well as older and larger 
companies with more established track records. The preferences of analysts for firms that 
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provide extensive information are shared by the institutional investors who are analysts’ 
primary clients (Brennan and Tamarowski, 2000).  
 
As for the determinants of corporate reputation, research identifies a series of potentially 
influencing factors, including voluntary disclosure, profitability, size, age, industry, 
listing status and dual-listing (Brown and Perry, 1994; Callison, 2003; Fombrun and Van 
Riel, 1997, 2004; Eccles et al., 2006). Hutton et al. (2001) observe that larger companies 
tend to have better reputations - presumably benefiting from greater visibility. In line 
with this observation, Van Riel (2007) suggests that, to become best in class, firstly, 
performance should be increased in all reputation drivers and secondly, expressiveness in 
communication about the performance of each driver should be improved. Hutton et al. 
(2001) suggest that relatively large expenditures on corporate communications may 
provide a kind of reputation insurance for big corporations, but did not find a strong 
correlation between reputation and overall spending on corporate communication 
activities. Particularly the greater an organisation's charitable-foundation giving is, the 
stronger its reputation tends to be. To a lesser extent, Hutton et al. (2001) found this 
correlation valid for investor relations, executive outreach and media relations. In 
general, these more pro-active modes of communication seem to correlate stronger with 
reputation than routine modes like annual reports, employee communications and 
corporate identity. Somewhat reactive modes like social responsibility activities, 
corporate advertising and industry relations even appear to correlate negatively with 
reputation (Hutton et al., 2001).  
Interviewing 16 corporate directors in the U.K. responsible for disclosure policy,  
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Armitage and Marston (2008) found that the primary motives for disclosure to the stock 
market are to promote the company’s reputation for openness and to maintain confidence 
in the company among shareholders and others. Executives see these organisational 
outcomes as important objectives in themselves. This is in line with earlier research by 
Graham et al. (2005), questioning executives in the USA. 
 
In sum, there is a substantial body of knowledge that suggests that a communicative 
approach from companies towards their environment contributes to their corporate 
reputation. This is in line with the basic promises of stakeholder theory that stakeholders 
appreciate to be engaged, in particular by being updated on how an organisation wants to 
move forward. This leads to me to hypothesize the association between voluntary 
disclosure of corporate strategy and corporate reputation as follows: 
H11 Voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy is positively associated with 
corporate reputation. 
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4 EMPIRICAL MODELING AND TESTING 
In order to test the hypotheses that are developed in the previous chapter, proxies are 
developed to measure voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy and the determinants and 
organisational outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy that are identified 
using stakeholder theory and agency theory. For voluntary disclosure of corporate 
strategy, a proxy is constructed that includes detailed analysis of disclosed corporate 
strategy in annual reports, press releases, corporate websites and corporate social 
responsibility reports. For determinants and outcomes of voluntary disclosure of 
corporate strategy, proxies are used that are widely used in academic literature. For 
proprietary cost however, no credible proxy was identified. This potential outcome is 
therefore left out of the model. Subsequently, the proxies are used to collect appropriate 
data that are brought together in panel regression. 
 
4.1 Measuring voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy 
In spite of the criticism of authors like Mintzberg et al. (2002, 2005) that strategy is too 
often reduced to an oversimplified roadmap for success, the common way for 
corporations, business consultants, business schools, journalists, analysts and most 
authors on corporate strategy to define corporate strategy is to include elements that have 
proven to be well understood by the global business community for decades. For instance 
Porter (1980) defines firm strategy as “a combination of the ends (goals) for which the 
firm is striving and the means (policies) by which it is seeking to get there.” A similar, 
yet somewhat more elaborated, definition of strategy was given earlier by Andrews 
(1980) as follows: “Corporate strategy is the pattern of decisions in a company that 
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determines and reveals its objectives, purposes, or goals, produces the principal policies 
and plans for achieving those goals, and defines the range of business the company is to 
pursue, the kind of economic and human organisation it is or intends to be, and the nature 
of the economics and non-economic contribution it intends to make to its shareholders, 
employees, customers, and communities.” 
Hopkins and Hopkins (1997) observe that there is general agreement among strategic 
planning researchers and theorists that the strategic planning process consists of three 
major components: formulation, which includes developing a mission, setting major 
objectives, assessing the external and internal environments, and evaluating and selecting 
strategy alternatives; secondly implementation; and, thirdly, control. Formulation, 
implementation and control can be considered as key elements of corporate strategy that 
are important to know for stakeholders. Middleton (2003) finds that leading authors on 
strategy have one unifying theme, namely that all definitions of strategy concern 
themselves with the future direction of the organisation into that future. Strategy, then, is 
concerned with developing an understanding of the present situation (where are we now), 
the desired future position (where do we want to be) and the path to take the organisation 
from its present position into the future (how do we get there). In sum, at its most general 
level, strategy is concerned with planning how an organisation or an individual will 
achieve (“win”) its goals (Grant, 2010). 
According to Freeman et al. (2010), stakeholder theory is fundamentally related to 
corporate strategy, in the sense that strategy is “concerned with the configuration of an 
organisation’s resources in relation to its external environment.” The concept of strategy 
can be considered as inherently connected with setting some direction for the 
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organisation, based on an analysis of organisational capabilities and environmental 
opportunities and threats. Thus adequate information about the environment, past and 
future changes, and emerging strategic issues and problems is vital to an effective 
strategy and strategy-making process. In the fundamental schemata that Freeman (1984) 
described for “Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach”, a key notion is that “to 
be successful over time it will be better to have a clear answer to the question, “what do 
we stand for?” or enterprise strategy.” Freeman et al. (2010) argue that stakeholder theory 
is fundamentally in line with both the market-based approach (e.g. Porter 1980, 1985) as 
well as the resource-based approach (e.g. Barney, 1991), observing that these theories 
merely differ in their focus – market-factors and internal resources respectively – but are 
essentially in line with acknowledging that adaptation to (various elements of) the 
environment is fundamental for sustainable success. 
For measuring purposes, I use the following definition of disclosed corporate strategy: 
“The revelation of information an organisation decides to share with its stakeholders on 
the strategy it is pursuing and going to pursue in the future” (Santema and Van de Rijt, 
2001, Santema et al., 2005). This definition fills a gap in research on disclosure, as Core 
(2001) notes that improved measures of disclosure quality need to be developed.  
 
Defining modes of disclosure 
Corporate strategy can be disseminated through financial reporting (e.g. the annual report 
or SEC filings like the 10-K or 10-Q) and through various scheduled and unscheduled 
disclosures (e.g. press releases, conference calls). Disclosure of corporate strategy is 
typically qualitative and narrative in nature which makes objective measurement difficult 
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for empiricists. It is generally recognized, in the literature, that disclosure is an abstract 
concept that cannot be measured directly: “it does not possess inherent characteristics by 
which one can determine its intensity or quality like the capacity of a car” (Marston and 
Shrives, 1991). Thus disclosure indices provide only an indirect, and to some extent 
subjective, measure of the underlying concept. Moreover, theoretical research provides 
little guidance on what form, quantity and frequency of disclosure is relevant for various 
stakeholders. Yet, there seems to be agreement that that timely, relevant, verifiable, 
reliable, unbiased, comparable and consistent disclosures and financial reports are all 
“desirable” properties of corporate disclosures and financial reports (Accounting 
Standards Board, 2009). However, many of these properties are in conflict with each 
other and, as a result, empirical researchers face challenges in identifying and capturing 
the most important dimensions of high quality corporate information (Leuz and Wysocki, 
2008). 
 
Disclosure is typically measured on a quantitative basis by using an index. The use of 
indices to measure disclosure extent has a long tradition in the accounting literature. For a 
review of accounting studies employing disclosure indices see Marston and Shrives 
(1991) and Ahmed and Courtis (1999). They are typically constructed as a function of the 
number and sometimes the relevance of the items provided in the annual reports. The 
items considered for this purpose are previously selected by the researcher according to 
the specific objective of his/her analysis.  
Nevertheless, they have proved to be a valid research tool and their use is still common in 
empirical accounting research. Their validity is proved not only by previous studies on 
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the determinants of disclosure level (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999), but also by specific 
analyses carried out to assess their “internal” and “external” validity (Botosan, 1997). 
Both weighted and unweighted indices are proposed by the literature to measure 
disclosure extent.  
As for disclosure of strategic information, there are various modes of communication that 
are in use. For disclosure of corporate strategy there are basically three public modes of 
communication in which external opinions (e.g. from journalists or analysts) are of no 
direct influence: the annual report (either the corporate annual report or the corporate 
social responsibility annual report), press releases and, thirdly, the internet. Each of these 
modes will be discussed in the following sections. The following graph puts the modes of 
communication that are within scope of my research in perspective: 
 
Figure 4.1: Modes of external communication for corporate strategy 
The figure below shows how alternative modes of corporate communication differ in their reach of various 
groups of stakeholders and the extent of control the sender has on how the message is presented.  
Control by sender
Control by receiver
Public Limited audience
Annual reports
Press releases
Websites
Free publicity (TV, 
radio, internet)
Advertising Conference calls with 
analysts
Roadshows / 
meetings with 
analysts
Shareholder 
meetings
Focus 
of this 
study
 
  134 
Disclosure through annual reports 
Of all possible communication channels, the annual report is generally considered to be 
one of the most important sources of corporate information (Vergoossen and De Bos, 
2005). Research on impression management found many examples that annual reports 
have become part of the company’s efforts to create and manage a certain corporate 
image (Preston et al., 1996; Stanton et al., 2004). However, Santema and Van de Rijt 
(2001) found that Dutch listed firms generally do not disclose a lot of information about 
their corporate strategy. Although almost all Dutch listed companies do describe their 
strategy in general terms and reflect on the actions of last year with respect to their 
strategy, they score differently on the variables mission, goals and business unit 
strategies. Overall, little attention is paid to measurable objectives, the monitoring of 
those objectives, to business unit goals and to forward-looking action plans. Most 
companies disclosed more on their assessment of the past than of the future. Especially 
on risk management, Dutch publicly listed corporations are not very transparent to date, 
in spite of a strong increase of the average quantity of the narrative part of annual reports 
(Vergoossen and De Bos, 2005). Given management’s freedom in discussing and 
presenting the company’s results, the letter to the shareholders provides management 
with an excellent opportunity to interpret events to their own benefit (Ginzel et al., 1993). 
It can therefore be expected that if corporations want to disclose corporate strategy, the 
annual report is one of the main modes of communication to do so.  
 
As for annual corporate social responsibility reports, a growing body of research suggests 
that (disclosure of) strategic non-financial information, for instance on corporate social 
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responsibility in corporate social responsibility reports, is associated with financial value; 
but the results of these studies have been mixed (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000). Gelb 
and Strawser (2001) found that there is a positive relationship between the disclosure 
level and corporate social responsibility, and that therefore firms disclose more and more 
because it is the socially responsible thing to do. However, Chris Hibbitt, analyzing over 
a thousand environmental reports of 90 corporations in Germany and the Benelux from 
1989 through 1995, qualifies reporting on corporate social responsibility as “public 
relations crap” (Uffelen, 2004). Hibbitt (2004) finds that pressure from Non-
Governmental Organisations does not influence corporate environmental disclosures, 
other than increasing the number of pages of the reports. Hibbitt (2004) concludes that 
corporations use corporate environmental disclosures to manage support for the 
corporation to defend economic inequality and the prevailing capitalist system. Related 
research, looking at mission statements, Campbell et al. (2002) finds that, 
notwithstanding the ruminations in the academic literature and elsewhere about the 
importance of stakeholder theory, economic stakeholders remain the major focus of 
FTSE 100 companies when it comes to mission disclosure.  
 
To assess the voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy through annual reports, the 
approach of Santema (2002) is followed and used, who developed a framework in 1994 
to assess to what extent large companies in the Netherlands communicate about their 
corporate strategy. Since 1994, Scenter yearly publishes a ranking and analysis of 
approximately the 100 largest publicly listed companies (and a few non-listed companies) 
in the Netherlands, using 10 criteria that are detailed in Appendix B. For each criterium, a 
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6-point Likert-scale is used, having a minimal score of 0 and a maximum score of 5. The 
scores are recalculated to a total score on a scale of 0 to 10. 
It is important to note that disclosure of strategy does not include financial information 
such as forecasted earnings, although they can be communicated simultaneously, thereby 
creating a reaction from the market (Kothari et al., 2009). The approach taken by Scenter 
has two major advantages for usage in research on strategy disclosure. First, it contains 
many – if not most – key elements that widely used theories on corporate strategy 
proclaim. Second, this approach makes it very easy to measure disclosure on corporate 
strategy, in an easily replicable way. 
As for the measurement of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy through corporate  
social reponsibility reports, I use the published assessments that are sponsored by the 
Dutch Ministery of Economic Affairs, executed since 2003 by Berenschot consulting 
(2003-2005) and PriceWaterhouseCoopers (since 2006) respectively, published as the 
“Transparantiebenchmark”. This benchmark analyses and ranks annual corporate social 
responsibility reports (when available) of approximately the largest 175 largest 
companies in the Netherlands, of which about a 100 are publicly listed, leading to scores 
per company on a scale of 0 to 100.  
In case companies of my research sample were not assessed by either Scenter (for annual 
reports) or The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs (for corporate social reponsibility 
reports) I did the assessment myself, using the criteria hat are published by the respective 
institutes. Annual reports were obtained through the internet or sent by the applicable 
company upon request. 
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Disclosure through press releases 
Companies use different kind of communication tools to inform the market about news 
topics concerning the company. Gelb (2000) suggests that because annual and quarterly 
reports are less flexible, and therefore less likely to change, they may represent a more 
credible commitment to provide more informative disclosures than other modes of 
communication. Evidence from prior literature shows that the press plays an important 
role in enhancing the visibility of the company (Bushee and Miller, 2007). In addition, 
many shareholders do not analyze annual reports in depth, relying on the media and 
analysts’ reports for the information they use for investment decision-making (Bartlett 
and Chandler, 1997). Press releases also provide managers a forum in which to present 
their firm’s performance and perhaps influence the perceptions of the shareholders and 
other stakeholder groups (Bowen et al., 2005). Moreover, advances in technology have 
increasingly made press releases directly accessible to investors.  
Despite acknowledging the importance of the different types of press releases in the 
accounting literature (Francis et al., 2002; Bowen et al., 2005), researchers have 
conducted little systematic empirical research on this issue. Most studies on disclosure 
analyze annual reports; little research has content analyzed company press releases that 
are neither audited nor preread by the external auditors (Lightstone and Driscoll, 2008), 
although press releases offer an important stream of corporate information. 
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Figure 4.2: Perceived importance of modes of communication for corporate strategy 
In the 2003-edition of the yearly study by Dutch consulting firm Rematch (in 2009 renamed as 
“Investablish”) on investor relations, (international) respondents (mainly analysts and financial 
journalists) have been asked to indicate what modes of communication they prefer to receive information 
about corporate strategy and performance. The figure above ranks the aggregated preference. 
Source: International Investor Relations Survey, Jansen and De Man, Rematch (2003). 
 
Scale: 
1 = Completely not important 
2 = Not important 
3 = Neither important or unimportant 
4 = Important 
5 = Very important 
 
 
Press releases are important communication tools for the respondents (of the financial 
community). More than 70% of them want to receive more than five press releases of a 
single company per year. Another 25% think that 3 to 5 press releases on a yearly basis 
are enough. With an average of 4.6 press releases per year it is the most wanted 
communication tool of the eight under study. Jansen and De Man (2003) assume that the 
average is probably highly underestimated as they used the lower value of five in the top 
segment to calculate the average. All respondents wanted to receive at least one press 
release in a year. Therewith it can be considered indispensable to a company to send 
press releases to the financial market. 
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To assess voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy through corporate press releases, I 
used the criteria that Scenter consulting (Santema, 2002) developed for assessing 
voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy through annual reports (see Appendix B for 
details). I applied these criteria for all the corporate press releases that my sample of 70 
publicly listed companies published during the years they were listed at Euronext 
Amsterdam in the timeframe 2003 through 2008. This resulted in a sample of close to 
11.000 press releases that I assessed, leading to close to 8.000 press releases that earned 
more than zero points for disclosure of corporate strategy on a scale of 0 to 10. 
 
Disclosure through websites 
The power of the internet has led firms to adapt their disclosure strategies since it offers 
much more flexibility than traditional external reporting means. Internet is now seen as 
the best platform for the disclosure management and stewardship of financial and non-
financial information (Cormier et al., 2007). Towards the end of the first decade of this 
century, most annual reports, corporate social responsibility reports and press releases of 
Dutch publicly listed companies are available through the internet. Increasingly, the 
internet appears to be the primary, of not only source of corporate information. In the 
Netherlands, construction firm Heijmans was in 2007 the first among the publicly listed 
firms to stop printing the annual report and refer only to their financial corporate website. 
Academic literature on Internet-based corporate disclosure and financial reporting argues 
that online communication with stakeholders has the advantage over their paper-based 
equivalents of, for example, unlimited capacity, global reach, flexibility, versatility, 
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timeliness, and speed, but they also have disadvantages: the risk of information overload 
and the difficulty of controlling the use of the information (Tagesson et al., 2009).  
 
In spite of the rapidly rising importance of the internet as a platform for disclosure, the 
main literature on disclosure pays little attention for disclosure through press releases or 
websites.. As for ranking corporate disclosure on the internet of large Dutch companies, 
pioneering work has been delivered by Dutch leading financial daily newspaper “Het 
Financieele Dagblad” that awards the yearly Henri-Sijthoff-Prijs since 1954 for the most 
transparent annual reports by publicly listed companies in the Netherlands. Since 2002, 
disclosure through corporate websites is included in the consideration that wins the 
award. The Dutch internet consulting agency Jungle Minds, who publish their findings 
yearly, executes the analysis of disclosure through websites. 
As for data on disclosure of corporate strategy through corporate websites, the 
assessments Jungle Rating (sponsored by Het Financieele Dagblad) are used. Jungle 
Rating assesses corporate disclosure through websites using criteria that are are defined 
in various aspects by which disclosure is assessed. Special attention is given to 
accessability and ease of use of the websites. Websites are ranked on a scale of 0 to 100. 
As Het Financieele Dagblad / Jungle Rating only rank the top 50 corporate websites of 
publicly listed companies in the Netherlands, I completed missing assessments for my 
sample of 70 publicy listed companies by combining the Scenter-criteria (Appendix B) 
with website evaluation criteria that are developed by Kim et al. (2003) to approach the 
method of Het Financieele Dagblad / Jungle Rating. 
 
  141 
4.2 Creating a proxy for voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy 
This section explains what the final sample is, what the sources of data of this research 
are and how the hypothesized determinants and organisational outcomes of voluntary 
disclosure are measured. A longitudinal approach, analyzing voluntary disclosure of 
corporations from 2003 through 2008, is chosen in order to observe medium- to long-
term trends. A three- to five year period can be considered long enough to avoid short-
term financial cycle fluctuations and to overcome natural business cycles that can 
jeopardize a firm’s strategic performance (Barney, 1986) and short enough not to permit 
long-term economic climates and cycles to influence the results (Kangis and Williams, 
2000). 
 
The research sample is selected with the aim to find a robust and consistent set of data 
that enables a thorough quantitative analysis of the determinants and organisational 
outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. Therefore, a closer look is taken 
on how the 70 largest publicly listed companies in the Netherlands disclose their 
corporate strategy through annual reports, annual corporate social responsibility reports, 
websites and press releases (see appendix A for a complete list). As publicly listed 
companies form a both important and visible element in the global economy, they are a 
suitable and meaningful object for research in business administration in general en for 
this study in particular.  
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As detailed in the previous sections, a numerous number of variables are collected to 
represent the main variable Voluntary Disclosure. In sum, the four candidate proxies 
contain assessments for voluntary disclosure: 
 
Table 4.1: Proxies for Voluntary Disclosure 
Disclosure Proxy Sample (*) Source 
Annual 
reports 
Scenter-criteria (10 criteria 
assessed on a scale from 0 to 5 
for each annual report) 
Assessments of 399 
annual reports 
Scenter (**) 
Press 
releases 
Scenter-criteria (10 criteria 
assessed on a scale from 0 to 5 
for each corporate press release) 
Assessments of 
10.867 press releases 
Own research 
Websites Het Financieele Dagblad / Jungle 
Minds criteria (assessments on a 
scale of 0 to 100) 
Assessments of 399 
corporate websites 
Jungle Minds 
(**) 
Annual 
CSR-reports 
Berenschot and PwC-criteria 
(assessments on a scale of 0 to 
100) 
Assessments of 399 
annual corporate 
social responsibility 
reports 
Dutch Ministry 
of Economic 
Affairs (**) 
 
(*) The 70 largest publicly listed corporations in the Netherlands over the 6-year period 2003-
2008 delivered material for 399 company-years, as not all corporations were listed all six years 
during the selected period. Details are given in Appendix A.  
(**) For companies or years where no assessment was available, I executed the assessment 
myself, following the Scenter-criteria that can be found in Appendix B.  
For the missing assessments of Het Financieele Dagblad / Jungle Rating, I also used the 
framework for web-evaluation by Kim et al. (2003). For the missing assessments for 
environmental reporting in corporate social reponsibility reports, I followed the methodology 
that is reported in detail in the yearly “Transparantiebenchmark” reports that are published 
yearly since 2004 by the Dutch Ministery of Economic Affairs. 
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As detailed in Appendix B, the data for The Annual Report and Press Release are both 
subcategorized into the following ten variables: 
1. Business Definition 6. Corporate Strategy 
2. Goals 7. Business Unit Strategy 
3. Objectives 8. Monitoring 
4. SWOT Analysis  9. Results of actions plans 
5. Challenges 10. Action Plans for the coming year 
 
Hence, in total, there are 22 variables available that can serve as proxy for voluntary 
disclosure: 10 assessments for each annual report + 10 assessments for each press release 
+ 1 assessment for each corporate website + 1 assessment for each corporate social 
responsibility report.  The idea is to use all available information coming from these 
series, creating a continuous variable. Standard techniques to summarize these 22 
variables into one series are moving average methods, principal component methods, and 
factor analysis. However, these methods cannot be adopted since the dataset in this study 
does not have a balanced panel structure. The dataset may not contain all observations for 
company i for all time periods since only the years that the sample of 70 publicly listed 
companies were actually listed on one of the three Euronext Amsterdam indices (see 
Appendix A for details). The creation of a proxy for voluntary disclosure requires a 
method that is able to deal with the unbalanced panel structure of the dataset and not to 
lose any of its information. 
The proposed method to create a proxy comes from the research fields of engineering, 
medical science, physics, statistics and econometrics. A statistical model, which is known 
as an unobserved components (UC) model, is fit to the data. The model belongs to the 
class of State Space models (Harvey, 1989; Harvey and Koopman, 1996; Durbin and 
Koopman, 2001). The idea is that for each company in the dataset, the unobserved 
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components model is fit to the voluntary disclosure data and the Kalman filter and 
smoother are applied to extract a common signal out of the data. This common signal 
from 22 variables represents the variable Voluntary Disclosure. The Kalman filter and 
smoother is moreover able to deal with missing values in the dataset. So no information is 
lost during this process. The common signal is simply computed as a moving average of 
all available observations. The amenity of this method is that the weights of the moving 
average depend on parameters, which have to be estimated. These parameters are 
dependent on the information from the data. So the data determine the weighting pattern 
and thus the moving average filter.  
 
All 22 variables of company i are stacked into the vector yt. It is to be assumed that yt can 
be decomposed into two parts, namely a common component and an idiosyncratic 
component. The common component is the part of the data that can be explained, 
whereas the idiosyncratic component is a vector of random variables. The common 
component is modelled as a trend and it represents the main movement in all 22 
variables. This common trend is considered as the estimated proxy for voluntary 
disclosure. The proposed model is characterized by the following: 
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where yt is an (22×1) vector and contains the observations of 22 variables, m is an (22×1) 
vector that contains individual constants for each series, εt is an (22 × 1) vector of 
idiosyncratic or noise terms and I22 is an (22x22) identity matrix. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that the elements in εt have the same variance and that they are mutually and 
serially uncorrelated. Same values for the variance of the error terms are assumed 
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because it is not desirable to estimate 22 different variances using the small number of 
available observations. Effects due to the level of the individual variables are mostly 
captured by the corresponding constants m. For example, data on disclosure through 
corporate websites are measured in a different level than data on each of the 10 criteria by 
which disclosure through annual reports or press releases is assessed, the presence of m 
will capture this difference in levels of the two variables.  
 
The unobserved trend component µt is the main element of interest. In the economics and 
econometrics literature, the trend component is often modelled as a local linear trend 
process, (Gersch and Kitagawa, 1983; Durbin and Koopman, 2001; Commandeur and 
Koopman, 2007). In many applications, this trend specification is adopted to represent 
the slowly changing movements in the data. The proxy for voluntary disclosure can 
nicely be represented by such a specification, since it allows the common trend to vary 
flexibly over time. The process for µt is given by the following equations: 
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where βt is known as the slope of the trend and ηt is an error term in the slope. The slope 
can be regarded as the growth of the data. Notice that both µt and βt are not observed. 
They are extracted out of the data. Furthermore, only two parameters, 
2
εσ  and 
2
ησ  , need 
to be estimated in the model. The estimation of these is done by maximum likelihood. 
Conditionally on the estimated parameters, Kalman filter and smoother recursions are 
needed to extract the common trend µt, which is the proxy for voluntary disclosure. The 
Kalman filter and smoother assign weights to the observations and compute the common 
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trend as a weighted average of the data. The information in the dataset determines the 
values of the parameters 
2
εσ  and 
2
ησ . The weights are conditional on these estimated 
parameters. Thus, the data determine the weighting pattern to extract the common trend. 
 
The two stages of estimation and extraction are repeated for all 70 companies of the 
dataset, resulting in 70 estimated voluntary disclosure series. This rather simple method 
enables the extraction of the common signal out of 22 variables. Technical details on 
unobserved components models, Kalman filter and smoother and common trends are 
found in Harvey (1989) and Durbin and Koopman (2001). 
 
The computations are done by using the object-oriented matrix language Ox of Doornik 
(2007) together with the state space functions of SsfPack version 3, originally developed 
by Koopman et al. (2008). 
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4.3 Proxies of determinants and organisational outcomes of voluntary disclosure 
of corporate strategy 
To proxy for the determinants and organisational outcomes of voluntary disclosure, the 
following proxies, definitions and sources are applied: 
 
Table 4.2: Proxies for determinants of voluntary disclosure 
Determinants Proxy Definition Source 
Size Market-
capitalizat
ion 
Total euro market value of all of the company's 
outstanding shares, calculated by multiplying a 
company's shares outstanding by the current 
market price of one share 
NYSE 
Euronext 
Industry Industry 
category 
Industry-classification by Dow Jones Indexes 
and FTSE. 
ICB (Industry 
Classification 
Benchmark) 
Ownership Free float The percentage of total shares in issue available 
to ordinary investors, calculated as the total 
number of shares less the strategic holdings. 
Company data 
(**) 
Leverage Interest 
coverage 
A calculation of a company's ability to meet its 
interest payments on outstanding debt.  
Interest coverage ratio is equal to earnings 
before interest and taxes for a time period, in 
this case one year, divided by interest expenses 
for the same time period.  The lower the interest 
coverage ratio, the larger the debt burden is .  
Company data 
(**) 
Profitability Return 
On Equity 
A measure of how well a company used 
(re)invested earnings to generate additional 
earnings, equal to a fiscal year's after-tax income 
(after preferred stock dividends but before 
common stock dividends) divided by book 
value, expressed as a percentage.  
Company data 
(**) 
Age Year of 
first 
listing 
The year when a company was publicly listed 
for the first time.  
NYSE 
Euronext, 
Company data 
(**) 
Dual-listing Years of 
dual-
listing 
Years that a company of the research-sample 
was listed on Euronext Amsterdam in 
combination with another stock exchange.  
Company data 
(**) 
Listing status Listing 
per index 
Listing on either the AEX (large-cap), AMX 
(mid-cap), Ascx (small-cap) index or on the 
remaining list of publicly listed companies at 
Euronext Amsterdam (labelled as “small”). 
NYSE 
Euronext 
 (**) Company data are collected from various sources, including: Datastream, Bloomberg, Kempen 
Research, annual reports, press releases, corporate websites.  
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Table 4.3: Proxies for organisational outcomes of voluntary disclosure 
Organi-
zational 
outcomes 
Proxy Definition Source 
Liquidity of 
stock 
Trading 
volume / 
market 
capitalization 
The total trade per year (“electronic order 
book”) at NYSE Euronext divided by the 
market capitalization in that same year 
(year-end). 
NYSE Euronext 
Volatility of 
stock 
Beta Beta measures volatility, or systematic 
risk, of a security or a portfolio in 
comparison to the market as a whole.  
In this case, adjusted beta is used, derived 
from raw or historical beta then modified by 
the assumption that a security's true beta 
will move toward the market average of 
one, over time. It is an estimate of a 
security's future beta. The formula is as 
follows: Adjusted beta = (.67) * Raw beta + 
(.33) * 1.0 
Bloomberg 
Reputation Ranking in 
the MT500 
Dutch Magazine “Management team” ranks 
since 2001 the 500 companies (profit and 
non-profit, listed and not-listed) in the 
Netherlands with “the best image.” The 
ranking is accomplished by a yearly survey 
among 1.000 to 1.200 qualified managers 
(all having a higher education), executed by 
independent research agency Nipo.  
Yearly MT-500 
publications by 
“Management 
Team” (see also 
www.mt.nl), 
published by the 
independent 
publisher MT 
Mediagroep BV 
(***)  
(***) MT Mediagroep belonged until 2009 to VNU Media Groep, the publisher of business magazines that 
split off from Nielsen Company in 2006. 
 
All proxies for determinants and organisational outcomes are calculated on a calendar-
year-basis; data for companies with broken fiscal years (meaning the fiscal year does not 
match the calendar-year) are recalculated to match the calendar-year-structure. The 
reputation-rankings of MT500 are used for the year in which they are published. For 
example: the MT500 published in April 2003 is used for analysis over the year 2003. 
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4.4 Panel Regression 
In the empirical part of the study, a panel data regression model is fit to the data. Panel 
data analysis is a method of studying a particular subject within multiple sites, 
periodically observed over a defined time frame. Within the social sciences, panel 
analysis has enabled researchers to undertake longitudinal analyses in a wide variety of 
fields. In economics, panel data analysis is used to study the behaviour of firms and 
wages of people over time. With repeated observations of enough cross-sections, panel 
analysis permits the researcher to study the dynamics of change with short time series. 
The combination of time series with cross-sections can enhance the quality and quantity 
of data in ways that would be impossible using only one of these two dimensions 
(Gujarati, 2003). Panel data analysis endows regression analysis with both a spatial and 
temporal dimension. The temporal dimension pertains to periodic observations of a set of 
variables characterizing these cross-sectional units over a particular time span (Yaffee, 
2003, Hardy and Bryman, 2004). 
 
The collected dataset consists of annual observations starting from 2003 through 2008 for 
70 Dutch public listed companies. Therefore, both the time effect and the heterogeneity 
across the units must be taken into account. The basic framework for the panel regression 
model is given by 
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where yi,t is the dependent variable, Xi,t contains values for k independent variables for 
unit i at time t. In the literature, yi,t is also called as the regressand and Xi,t is called the 
regressor. The regressors X can also contain lagged variables or dummy variables to 
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measure the industry/sector effect. The unknown parameter vector is denoted by β. The 
error term εi,t consists of two components, a unit specific term vi and a random term ui,t. 
The former can be treated as a fixed effect or as a random effect, whereas the latter is 
assumed to be normally distributed noise.  
 
In the case of a fixed effects specification, vi is estimated as parameters and they may be 
correlated to the regressors. The resulting model is often referred to as the Least Squares 
Dummy Variable (LSDV) model. When vi is treated to be a random effect, it is assumed 
to be uncorrelated with the regressors and it comes into the model as a random draw from 
a distribution with mean 0 and variance 2vσ . Therefore, the number of parameters to be 
estimated will be reduced. The Generalized Least Squares (GLS) is the correct method to 
estimate the unknown parameters. More advanced techniques such as GMM are not 
needed for this purpose, since these are mostly adopted in dynamic panel data models. 
Classical papers on panel data models include Balestra and Nerlove (1966), Fuller and 
Battese (1974) and Mundlak (1978). The test proposed by Hausman (1978) is used to 
decide whether the fixed effects or the random effects model is the correct specification. 
This test is widely used in the literature related to panel data regressions. 
 
Moreover, it is necessary to check whether the residuals of the regression are not serially 
correlated and not heteroscedastic. Serial correlation is a serious problem, since its 
presence is an indication that the model is not correctly specified. When serial correlation 
is found, the estimation process must be adapted to correct for this problem. In this study, 
the test proposed by Wooldridge (2002) is applied in order to check for serial correlated 
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errors. The problem of heteroscedasticity can be solved by using robust standard errors. 
The econometric software package Eviews 7 is used to estimate the unknown parameter 
vector β and to carry out the Wooldridge test and the Hausman-test if needed. The 
software package also enables to calculate robust standard errors. 
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5 RESULTS 
5.1 Determinants of voluntary disclosure 
To find out which market and financial variables play a key role to determine Voluntary 
Disclosure, the dependent variable is regressed on a set of regressors that contains 
logarithm of Size, Profitability, Leverage, Ownership Concentration, Age and a large 
number of dummy variables. The dummy variables are included to assess the effects of 
the listing status, the dual listing status and the industry sector in which the companies are 
operating. The regression model is given by  
 
VDi,,t = β0 + β1log(SIZE)i,t + β2PROFi,t + β3LEVi,t + β4OCi,t + β5AGEi,t + 
 + β20LIS1,i,t + β21LIS2,i,t + β22LIS3,i,t + β23 DUAL,t + εi,t, 
where the unknown parameters are denoted by β0,...,β23. The variable VD represents 
voluntary disclosure, PROF is the variable profitability, LEV is the variable leverage and 
OC is the variable ownership concentration. Moreover, INDj, j=1,…,14 is the Industry 
dummy variable, LISk, k=2,3,4 is the Listing dummy variable and DUAL is the dual-
listing dummy variable that indicates whether the companies are listed on a foreign 
exchange index. A description of the dummy variables is given in Table 5.1.  
Notice that not all dummy variables can be included in the set of regressors. If all dummy 
variables are included, then estimation of the parameters is not possible due to the 
presence of the constant term. The constant term and the whole set of dummy variables 
are linear dependent in that case. Reduction in the rank of the set of regressors is the 
result and least squares estimation cannot be carried out. This problem is also known as 
the dummy-variable-trap. Therefore, from the group of the industry dummy variables, the 
one corresponding to the sector Technology Hardware and Equipment is dropped. 
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Further, from the listing dummy variables, the one that corresponds to AEX does not 
belong to the set of regressors. Effects of the remaining dummy variables are relative to 
the reference industry sector or listing status, i.e. the removed dummy variables. 
 
Table 5.1. Description of dummy variables  
This table gives a description of the dummy variables used in the regression of 
voluntary disclosure. Fifteen dummy variables are available to investigate the 
industry effect. Four dummy variables correspond to the listing status. Notice 
that one dummy variable in each group is removed from the regressor list to 
avoid the problem of linear dependency of the set of regressors, since a constant 
term is included as well. 
     
IND1 Oil & gas  IND9 Retail 
IND2 Basic materials  IND10 Media 
IND3 Construction & materials  IND11 Fixed line telecommunications 
IND4 Industrial goods & services  IND12 Financials 
IND5 Support services  IND13 Real estate investment trusts 
IND6 Consumer goods  IND14 Software & computer services 
IND7 
Food producers 
 IND15 Technology hardware & 
equipment 
IND8 Pharmaceuticals & 
biotechnology 
   
     
LIS1 Small   DUAL Dual-listing status 
LIS2 Ascx    
LIS3 AMX    
LIS4 AEX    
     
 
Estimation results of the panel regression including the dummy variables are given in 
Table 5.2. The random effects model is estimated. Since fixed effects are treated as 
parameters to be estimated, these effects can be regarded as dummy variables. In the case 
of model (4), there are too many dummy variables in the set of regressors. This leads to 
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reduction in rank, and therefore estimation problems arise. To avoid these, the random 
effects model is estimated. Company specific effects are no longer treated as parameters 
to be estimated and therefore no problems related to linear dependency are found. The 
Wooldridge-test indicates that serial correlation is present in the residuals. This problem 
is corrected in the estimation procedure. Robust standard errors are also computed in 
order to tackle the problem of heteroscedasticity.  
 
From Table 5.2 it is observed that the size of public listed companies seems to have a 
positive effect on voluntary disclosure. This result is in line with the literature, see among 
many others Cooke (1989), Meek et al. (1995) and Lang and Lundholm (1996). 
However, the effect found in this study is not significant. Large companies tend to 
provide more non-financial information than small companies. Large firms have more 
stakeholders which demand disclosure. Furthermore, large firms have more incentives to 
reduce information assymetries. These firms are supposed to be more complex and 
therefore have more to explain. Agency theory suggests that large firms have higher 
agency costs as larger firms carry out a greater number of contracts and more complex 
than smaller. Also signalling theory suggests that information asymmetries will be larger, 
which justifies more disclosure to mitigate them. Large firms also have a more diverse 
ownership, and as a result, higher agency cost that they try to reduce by higher voluntary 
disclosure levels. In Table 5.3, an overview is given of the expected effects of the 
variables along with the estimated effects. 
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Table 5.2. Panel regression model - Voluntary Disclosure.  
This table presents the estimation results of the panel regression corresponding to 
the dependent variable Voluntary Disclosure. Coefficients, standard errors and p-
values are reported. Industry effects, Listing status effects and Dual-listing 
effects are investigated as well. In order to avoid linear dependency problems in 
the set of regressors, the random effects model is estimated. The problem of 
autocorrelation in the residuals is detected by the Wooldridge-test. Furthermore, 
the estimates of the standard errors are corrected for the presence of 
heteroscedasticity.  
 Coefficient Standard Error p-value 
log (Size) 0.1552 0.0990 0.118 
Profitability -0.0025 0.0011 0.022 
Leverage -0.0730 0.0642 0.256 
Ownership Concentration -0.0012 0.0010 0.245 
Age 0.0107 0.0053 0.042 
IND1 0.7519 0.5962 0.208 
IND2 1.2975 0.6054 0.033 
IND3 1.0237 0.4299 0.018 
IND4 1.5710 0.5867 0.008 
IND5 0.4822 0.1947 0.014 
IND6 -0.0880 0.3188 0.783 
IND7 1.4947 0.5617 0.008 
IND8 -0.9167 0.4800 0.057 
IND9 0.8095 0.1075 0.000 
IND10 0.5615 0.2899 0.054 
IND11 2.2339 0.8614 0.010 
IND12 0.6763 0.2002 0.001 
IND13 -0.3961 0.5720 0.489 
IND14 0.5597 0.2456 0.023 
LIS1 -0.6390 0.2671 0.017 
LIS2 -0.6243 0.2861 0.030 
LIS3 -0.5762 0.2245 0.011 
DUAL 1.0870 0.4721 0.022 
R2 0.279   
Adjusted R2 0.229   
F-stat 5.723   
P-value 0.000   
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Table 5.3. Hypothesized/expected and estimated effects of the regressors  
This table presents the hypothesized/expected effects and the estimated effects of 
the regressors in the regression corresponding to voluntary disclosure.  
 Expected sign Estimated sign 
Size + Insignificant 
Leverage + Insignificant 
Profitability + - 
Ownership Concentration - Insignificant 
Age + + 
 
Table 5.2 shows that profitability negatively affects voluntary disclosure. Voluntary 
disclosure decreases when companies acquire a higher profit. This can be due to the 
relative inaction of high profit firms because they feel that investors are satisfied with 
reported high profits and so would not wish additional information (Wallace and Naser, 
1995). Moreover, these firms do not want to provide additional detail that will have to be 
continued in later years. This result does not support the hypothesis that profitability 
positively affects voluntary disclosure. However, this is not surprising either, since 
evidence is found in the literature that profitability negatively affects voluntary 
disclosure. Another argument not to disclose success is based on the notion that managers 
face proprietary costs if the revelation of high abnormal profits attracts more competition 
and, hence, reduces the abnormal profits (Verrecchia, 1983; Wagenhofer, 1990).  
 
Furthermore, from the results it is observed that both leverage and ownership 
concentration have a negative effect on voluntary disclosure. However, these effects are 
not significant. A possible explanation for the negative relationship of leverage and 
voluntary disclosure is the fact that debt is a mechanism for controlling the free cash flow 
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problem, which reduces the need for disclosure (Jensen, 1986). Zarzeski (1996) explains 
the negative association because creditors may be able to obtain private information.  
 
From Table 5.2, it is observed that the variable age has a significant positive effect on 
voluntary disclosure. This result does not support the hypothesis that younger listed 
companies have more incentives to disclose more information voluntarily, see Table 5.3. 
It seems that older listed companies tend to disclosure more information. This can be 
explained by the fact that older listed companies are used to disclose information in the 
past. If they disclose less information now, this may be regarded as bad news by 
investors.  
 
Fifteen dummy variables in the dataset correspond to fifteen different sectors in which 
the companies are operating. The sector Technology Hardware & Equipment is the 
reference sector. It seems that some industry sectors do have a significant effect on 
voluntary disclosure compared to the reference industry sector. The sectors Basic 
Materials (dummy IND2), Construction and Materials (dummy IND3), Industrial Goods 
& Services (dummy IND4), Support Services (dummy IND5), Food Producers (dummy 
IND7), Retail (dummy IND9), Media (dummy IND10), Fixed Line Telecommunications 
(dummy IND11), Financials (dummy IND12) and Software & Computer Services (dummy 
IND14) have a significant positive effect, suggesting that companies in these sectors 
disclose significantly more information than the reference sector. Moreover, the 
companies in the sector Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology (dummy IND8) disclose 
significantly less information than the reference sector.  
  158 
More interesting is the fact that the listing status also significantly affects voluntary 
disclosure. From the results, it can be seen that companies with listing status Small, ASCX 
and AMX disclose less information than the reference listing status AEX. The latter is the 
main stock exchange index of the Netherlands. This implies that when companies are 
listed on the AEX, they have more analyst following and more investors and therefore 
these companies tend to disclose more information. Furthermore, evidence has also been 
found that foreign exchange listing affects disclosure. Dual-listed companies significantly 
disclose more information than companies which are not listed on a foreign exchange 
index. This can be explained by the fact that dual-listed companies are expected to face 
more demand and pressure for information, more regulations on disclosure, more 
ownership dispersion and more competition in disclosure. 
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5.2 Liquidity of stock and voluntary disclosure 
The effect of Voluntary Disclosure on Liquidity is assessed in this part of the empirical 
study. As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, more information in the public domain 
makes it harder and more costly for traders to become privately informed and as a result, 
fewer investors are likely to be privately informed, which reduces the probability of 
trading with a better informed counter party. And also more disclosure reduces the 
uncertainty about firm value, which in turn reduces the potential information advantage 
that an informed trader might have. Both effects reduce the extent to which uninformed 
investors need to price protect and hence increase market liquidity.  
 
In the panel regression model for liquidity, the approach of Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) 
for financial disclosure is followed for my analysis of non-financial disclosure. To their 
approach I add a rich dataset for (voluntary non-financial) disclosure, using continuous 
variables, over a multiyear-period.  Three control variables are added in the regression, 
which are the logarithm of size, volatility of stock and ownership concentration. The 
panel regression model is given by: 
LIQi,t = β0 + β1VDi,t + β2 log(SIZE)i,t + β3OCi,t + β4VOLi,t + εi,t, 
where LIQ is the liquidity variable and VOL represent the volatility. Standard generalized 
least squares cannot be applied now, since the variable voluntary disclosure is 
endogenous in the model. Instrumental Variable (IV), also known as Two-Stage-Least-
Squares (2SLS), estimation must be applied in order to obtain consistent estimates. 
Moreover, the Hausman-test points out that the fixed effect model is the correct 
specification. The estimation results are presented in Table 5.4.  
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Table 5.4. Panel regression - Liquidity.  
This table presents the estimation results of the panel regression corresponding to 
the dependent variable liquidity. Coefficients, standard errors and p-values are 
reported. Since voluntary disclosure is an endogenous variable, instrumental 
variable regression technique is used to obtain consistent estimates. The 
Hausman-test suggests that the fixed effects model is the correct specification. 
The problem of autocorrelation in the residuals is not detected by the 
Wooldridge-test. Furthermore, the estimates of the standard errors are corrected 
for the presence of heteroscedasticity.  
 Coefficient Standard Error p-value 
Voluntary Disclosure 0.7004 0.4199 0.096 
log (Size) -1.1631 0.2149 0.000 
Ownership Concentration 0.0076 0.0069 0.271 
Volatility 1.9553 0.4030 0.000 
R2 0.620   
Adjusted R2 0.511   
 
The estimation results in Table 5.4 indicate that voluntary disclosure positively affects 
liquidity. This supports the findings in the studies of Verrecchia (2001), Graham et al. 
(2005), Leuz & Wysocki (2008), and Armitage & Marston (2008) amongst many others. 
The positive relationship of voluntary disclosure and liquidity means that high levels of 
disclosure are more likely to attract investors who are more confident that stock 
transactions occur at fair prices, thereby increasing the liquidity in the stock. Increased 
voluntary disclosure lowers the cost of information acquisition for financial analysts and 
hence increases their supply and increases the liquidity.  
Moreover, it is observed that the size variable negatively affects the liquidity variable. 
This implies that large sized companies have a lower relative turnover of their shares. 
From an economic perspective, it becomes obvious when the fact is taken into account 
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that institutional investors in general cannot and will not liquidate their portfolio or 
substantial parts of their shares, unless an extreme situation is present. Ownership 
concentration does not affect liquidity significantly. Although the estimated effect is 
positive, it is not significantly different from zero. Furthermore, high volatility of stock 
significantly leads to a higher liquidity. Investors are more willing to trade their stocks 
when there is much volatility in the share price, because within a certain time span more 
opportunities may arise to trade the stock in order to achieve excess returns. 
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5.3 Volatility of stock and voluntary disclosure 
High stock return volatility can increase a firm’s perceived risk, thereby raising its cost of 
capital. Firms with high share price volatility have incentives to reduce information 
asymmetry between managers and investors since such actions are thought to lower 
financing costs. In this section, the effect of voluntary disclosure on the volatility of stock 
is empirically investigated. There are a few reasons to assume that a high level of 
disclosure will raise the volatility of stock. An improvement in corporate disclosure 
practices may attract short-term investors, whose aggressive trading strategies may lead 
to higher stock return volatility. Further, an increase in the disclosure of information 
relies on sophisticated investors to interpret and put the disclosed information into 
context. When the disclosed information is interpreted incorrectly by analysts, this can 
lead to more market volatility. Therefore, a high level of disclosure may induce a high 
level of volatility of stock.  
 
In the panel regression model, two variables are added as control variables: logarithm of 
size and ownership concentration. The panel regression equation is given by the 
following: 
 VOLi,t = β0 + β1VDi,t + β2 log(SIZE)i,t + β3OCi,t + εi,t.. 
This approach is very similar to the model considered by Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) 
which was also followed by many authors on financial disclosure, including Cormier et 
al. (2007, 2009) and Sami and Zhou (2008). To their approach I add a rich dataset for 
(non-financial) disclosure, using continuous variables, over a multiyear-period. 
Estimation results are presented in Table 5.5. The Hausman-test suggests that the random 
effects model is the correct specification. In the estimation procedure, the presence of 
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heteroscedasticity residuals is taken into account by computing robust standard errors. 
Since voluntary disclosure is an endogenous variable, Instrumental Variable estimation is 
carried out to obtain consistent estimates.  
 
Table 5.5. Panel regression - Volatility.  
This table presents the estimation results of the panel regression corresponding to 
the dependent variable volatility. Coefficients, standard errors and p-values are 
reported. Since voluntary disclosure is an endogenous variable, instrumental 
variable regression technique is used to obtain consistent estimates. The 
Hausman-test suggests that the random effects model is the correct specification. 
The problem of autocorrelation in the residuals is not detected by the 
Wooldridge-test. Furthermore, the estimates of the standard errors are corrected 
for the presence of heteroscedasticity.  
 Coefficient Standard Error p-value 
Voluntary Disclosure 0.0180 0.0214 0.400 
log (Size) 0.0318 0.0159 0.047 
Ownership Concentration 0.0024 0.0009 0.007 
R2 0.100   
Adjusted R2 0.091   
 
From the results in Table 5.5, it is observed that voluntary disclosure positively affects 
volatility of stock. However, this effect is not significant. The R2 is quite low since it is 
empirically a difficult task to model the volatility variable (Ferrell, 2007). More elaborate 
or complex models to explain volatility are considered out of scope of this study, which 
follows the established literature on (financial) disclosure (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000), 
tested for the first time on the Dutch market. Although the sign of the disclosure variable 
is positive, this does not provide evidence that it significantly affects the volatility of 
stock. Moreover, the variables size and ownership concentration have a significant 
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positive effect on volatility. This suggests that large companies have more volatility in 
their share price, which is not in line with the literature. In this study however, the time 
span covers a relatively small number of years, in which the market itself underwent 
more fluctuations than expected. In particular, many downward shocks are observed in 
this period due to the recent global financial crisis. As a result, large companies were 
more subject to these shocks than small companies, since selling large caps is easier than 
selling small caps.  
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5.4 Corporate reputation and voluntary disclosure 
Reputation data are collected for all Dutch public listed companies. The original  
dataset considers the ranks in the Top 500 ranking of the companies for all years in the  
sample. Rank one corresponds to the top-ranked company, while higher ranks are 
assigned to companies with a worse reputation. Thus companies with a good reputation 
have a low rank, while companies with worse reputation have high ranks. However, it is 
easier to interpret a reputation variable when this variabele takes values between 1 and 
100 and when companies with a good reputation correspond to high ranks. In order to 
achieve this, the original ranking data is transformed as follows: 1) Divide the original 
data by 5, such that the ranking ranges from 0 to 100. 2) Subtract the transformed rank 
from 100, such that companies with the best reputation have the highest rank. 
To my knowledge, there is no previous empirical research published on how disclosure is 
associated with corporate reputation. In this study, it is assumed that voluntary disclosure, 
profitability, size and age possibly play a key-role to determine reputation, as all these 
variables create visibility, without which corporate reputation is difficult to establish. 
To measure industry effects, listing status effects and dual-listing effects, dummy 
variables are added in the regression. The panel regression model for reputation is given 
by:   REPi,,t = β0 + β1VDi,t  + β2PROFi,t + β3 log(SIZE)i,t +  β4AGEi,t + 
 +  β19LIS,i,t + β20LIS2,i,t + β21LIS3,i,t + β22DUAL,t + εi,t, 
where REP is the reputation variable. Other variables are already defined in earlier 
sections. The estimation procedure is comparable to the regression corresponding to 
voluntary disclosure. The random effects model is adopted since too many dummy 
variables are already present in the model and hence the fixed effects model cannot be 
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estimated. Moreover, voluntary disclosure is an endogenous regressor and therefore IV 
estimation must be carried out. Further, the Wooldridge-test does not suggest that 
autocorrelation is present in the residuals of the regression. The regression results are 
reported in Table 5.6.  
Table 5.6. Panel regression - Reputation.  
This table presents the estimation results of the panel regression corresponding to 
the dependent variable reputation. Coefficients, standard errors and p-values are 
reported. Industry effects, Listing status effects and Dual-listing effects are 
investigated as well. In order to avoid linear dependency problems in the set of 
regressors, the random effects model is estimated. The Wooldridge-test indicates 
that autocorrelation is not present in the residuals. Robust standard errors are 
computed to correct for the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
 Coefficient Standard Error p-value 
Voluntary Disclosure 3.1957 1.2875 0.014 
Profitability  -0.0212 0.0239 0.377 
log (Size) 2.6315 1.9988 0.190 
Age -0.1156 0.0257 0.000 
IND1 -23.0026 21.8101 0.293 
IND2 4.7495 8.2285 0.565 
IND3 14.9552 11.1580 0.182 
IND4 -14.8914 12.6053 0.239 
IND5 1.1904 9.1854 0.897 
IND6 3.9413 6.3495 0.536 
IND7 -16.3072 15.1771 0.284 
IND8 -19.9411 24.1345 0.410 
IND9 -8.2691 10.9200 0.450 
IND10 -16.8420 10.7040 0.117 
IND11 7.2083 6.9901 0.304 
IND12 -5.2042 6.2379 0.405 
IND13 -37.0609 21.7573 0.090 
IND14 14.5115 5.4035 0.008 
LIS1 -25.5312 6.4831 0.000 
LIS2 -16.7077 8.3714 0.047 
LIS3 -8.6939 3.2498 0.008 
DUAL 8.5148 2.8408 0.003 
R2 0.255   
Adjusted R2 0.166   
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From Table 5.6, it is seen that voluntary disclosure positively affects reputation. A high 
level of disclosure leads to a better reputation. The reason can be based on reputation 
theory: managers will voluntarily disclose their private information about corporate 
strategy to stakeholders because they want to encourage stakeholders to undertake 
investments that are specific to certain strategic directions, see Ferreira and Rezende 
(2007). Managerial public announcements of information about strategy are credible 
because managers are concerned about their reputations; and thus voluntary public 
disclosures of information about corporate strategy can be value enhancing due to their 
positive effects on incentives of stakeholders. Further, open and proficient corporate 
communication might be one of the ways by which a company’s overall reputation for 
quality can be sustained. A good reputation is supposed to help in doing business and 
therefore to bring commercial benefits (Fombrun and Van Riel, 2004; Armitage and 
Marston, 2008). The primary motives for disclosure to the stock market are to promote 
the company’s reputation for openness and to maintain confidence in the company among 
shareholders and others. 
 
Furthermore, the variables profitability and size do not affect the reputation significantly. 
The control variable age has a negative effect on reputation. This is counterintuitive, 
since it is expected that companies, which are listed on the exchange index for a longer 
period of time, are assumed to have a better reputation. The negative relationship can still 
be explained by the fact that companies, which are listed for a shorter period of time, put 
more effort to obtain a better reputation in order to attract investors. A high level of 
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reputation level can lower the cost of capital. Once these goals are achieved, these 
companies may reduce their efforts to further increase their reputation level.  
It is interesting to see that firms in the sector Computer and Services (dummy IND14) 
have a significant better reputation than the firms in the reference sector Technology 
Hardware and Equipment. Further, companies in the sector Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(dummy IND13) have a significant worse reputation than the reference sector. This may 
be due to the fraud in the construction and real estate sector that was announced publicly 
in the Netherlands in this period. The listing status has a significant effect on reputation 
as well. Companies with a listing status Small, ASCX and AMX all have worse reputation 
than companies listed on the AEX. It can also be concluded that companies with an AEX-
listing have the best reputation, followed by the companies listed on AMX and ASCX. 
Companies with a ‘Small’-listing status have the worst reputation. Subsequently, the 
results suggest that companies with a dual-listing status have a significant better 
reputation. This implies that companies benefit from the fact that they are listed on a 
foreign exchange. This can also be explained indirectly via voluntary disclosure. Since 
dual-listed companies are forced to disclose more information, this leads to open and 
proficient corporate communication and this may lead to an improved reputation.  
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5.5 Answers to the research questions 
This thesis poses two research questions: 
1. What are determinants of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy? 
2. What are outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy? 
To answer these questions, the hypotheses and results, previously discussed in more 
detail, are summarised below.  
As for determinants of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy, the following 
hypotheses and empirical results apply: 
• H1 Company size is positively associated with voluntary disclosure of corporate 
strategy. This hypothesis is confirmed, although the effect found in this study is not 
significant. 
• H2 Voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy is related to the industry in which the 
company is operating. This hypothesis is confirmed, as it seems that some industry 
sectors do have a significant effect on voluntary disclosure compared to the reference 
industry sector. 
• H3 Leverage is positively associated with voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. 
This hypothesis is rejected, as leverage has a negative effect on voluntary disclosure, 
although this effect is not significant. 
• H4 Profitability is positively associated with voluntary disclosure of corporate 
strategy. This hypothesis is rejected, as profitability has a significant negative effect 
on voluntary disclosure. 
• H5 Ownership concentration is negatively associated with voluntary disclosure of 
corporate strategy. This hypothesis is confirmed, as ownership concentration has a 
negative effect on voluntary disclosure, although this effect is not significant. 
• H6 Dual-listing status is positively associated with voluntary disclosure of corporate 
strategy. This hypothesis is confirmed as dual-listed companies significantly disclose 
more information than companies which are not listed on a foreign exchange index. 
• H7 National ranking status is positively associated with voluntary disclosure of 
corporate strategy. This hypothesis is confirmed as companies with small- or 
midkap-listing status significantly disclose less information than large cap companies. 
• H8 Listing age is positively associated with voluntary disclosure of corporate 
strategy. This hypothesis is confirmed as age has a significant positive effect on 
voluntary disclosure. 
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In sum, to answer the first research question, this study found that industry, profitability, 
dual-listing status, national ranking status and listing age have significant effects on 
voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. No significant effects are found for size, 
leverage and ownership concentration. 
 
As for outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy, the following hypotheses 
and empirical results apply: 
 
• H9 Voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy is positively associated with liquidity 
of stock. This hypothesis is confirmed, whereby size and volatility of stock have a 
significant impact. 
• H10 Voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy is positively associated with volatility 
of stock. This hypothesis is confirmed, although this effect is not significant. 
• H11 Voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy is positively associated with 
corporate reputation. This hypothesis is confirmed, whereby age, industry, national 
listing status and dual-listing status have a significant impact. 
 
In sum, to answer the second research question, this study found that liquidity of stock 
and corporate reputation are significantly influenced by voluntary disclosure of corporate 
strategy. No significant effect is found for volatility of stock as an outcome. 
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6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This research is arguably the first study to develop a theoretical framework for voluntary 
disclosure of corporate strategy, identifying determinants and organisational outcomes. A 
comprehensive methodology is introduced with which the associations of hypothesized 
determinants and organisational outcomes with voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy 
are empirically tested in a longitudinal study of the largest publicly listed companies in 
the Netherlands. This section elaborates on the contributions and limitations of my 
research, including suggestions for further research. Finally, some concluding remarks 
are made. 
 
6.1 Contributions 
Business leaders face increasing pressure to disclose strategic information. However, 
academic and business literature provides little guidance in choosing the optimal spot 
between the extremes of transparency or opacity. To fill this gap, my research explores 
what the firm-specific determinants and organisational outcomes are of voluntary 
disclosure of corporate strategy for publicly listed companies. My literature review shows 
that there is no (generally accepted) theory that answers this research question. I therefore 
propose a combination of two areas of research that touch upon disclosure. The first pillar 
of my framework is built on stakeholder theory, especially instrumental stakeholder 
theory, legitimacy theory and stakeholder-agency theory. These theories suggest that 
engagement with stakeholders is in the (ethical as well as economic) interest of the 
organisation as well as the stakeholders - typically taking a long-term, strategic 
perspective. However, stakeholder theory does not indicate whether communication with 
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stakeholders adds to the goals of stakeholder management. I fill this gap by introducing 
voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy as a (potentially) powerful instrument to 
execute effective stakeholder management.  
The other pillar of my framework is built on agency theory. This school of research 
analyzes cost and benefits of measuring information asymmetries - typically taking a 
short-term, tactical perspective. Agency theory however does not discuss strategic, long-
term considerations of exchanging strategic information, especially in a wider context 
than the relation between principal and agent. I extend agency theory by combining 
information asymmetries with the strategic considerations that are provided by 
stakeholder theory that are aimed to exchange valuable information with stakeholders. 
 
The methodological contribution of my research lies in building a comprehensive 
framework that includes assessments for voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy 
through annual reports, annual corporate social responsibility reports, websites and press 
releases, proved to be a labour-intensive but also powerful instrument which is easy to 
replicate to measure and test voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. 
 
My empirical research on voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy contributes to the 
extant empirical research on disclosure of financial information by identifying 
determinants of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy, in some cases with surprising 
associations. The expected associations of the identified determinants size (H1), industry 
(H2), ownership (H5), dual-listing and national ranking status (H6 and H7) with 
voluntary disclosure were confirmed. However, the expected associations of the 
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identified determinants leverage (H3), profitability (H4) and listing age (H8) were 
rejected. As the literature on the effects of leverage and profitability, and to a lesser 
extent on listing age, to date delivered mixed results, these outcomes can be of help for 
future research on voluntary disclosure. 
 
As for my research on organisational outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate 
strategy, I followed Leuz and Verecchia (2000) in my research model to test whether 
liquidity and volatility of stock are affected by voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. 
According to the extant financial literature on disclosure, liquidity and volatility of stock 
are perceived to be the two most significant, important, measurable and best understood 
organisational outcomes that are dependent from, amongst other determinants, disclosure 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001; Leuz and Wysocki, 2009). Both liquidity and volatility of stock 
are also perceived to be closely related to cost of capital, which is a field of research that 
is still in search of more clarity (Botosan, 2006). 
In my research, I found the expected positive association of voluntary disclosure of 
corporate strategy is positively associated with liquidity of stock (H9), which is in line 
with mainstream literature on disclsoure. A positive but not significant association was 
found between voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy with volatility of stock (H10). 
As volatility is a very complex concept, my findings contribute to the various theoretical 
and empirical literature that is in search of a better understanding of this measure of risk. 
Finally, my research offers a substantial contribution to the literature on reputation 
management, by empirically testing whether voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy is 
  174 
positively associated with corporate reputation (H11). The hypothesis was confirmed, 
thereby confirming core elements of stakeholder theory and reputation theory. 
 
The findings of my study can be of help in academic and professional fields of interest 
like strategic management, corporate governance, public relations, corporate 
communication, investor relations, reputation management and management accounting. 
The contributions to theory and practice of this study is relevant for a series of 
stakeholders. In stock market based economies, such as the U.S., the U.K. and the 
Netherlands, the informed pricing of corporate securities is vital for economic stability 
and the promotion of sustained levels of high quality investments by corporations. 
Understanding determinants and organisational outcomes of voluntary disclosure of 
corporate strategy is in the interest of financial authorities and policy makers, auditors, 
analysts, management executives, journalists, employees and consultants. 
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6.2 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
Firstly, my research is limited by its scope. The complexity of geographical, cultural and 
regulatory differences between companies is limited by selecting only companies that are 
publicly listed in the Netherlands. On a global basis of comparison by Standard and 
Poor’s, Patel et al. (2003) find that European disclosure compares favourably to Asia and 
Latin America, but less favourably relative to North America. While European disclosure 
levels fall short of composite disclosure levels as compared with the U.S., the level of 
disclosure in European annual reports alone is higher than for U.S. companies. There is a 
significant variation in transparency and disclosure among European countries (Patel et 
al., 2003). Cross-country regressions by Bushman et al. (2004) show that “governance 
transparency is higher in countries with a legal/ judicial regime characterized by a 
common law legal origin and high judicial efficiency”, whereas “financial transparency is 
higher in countries with low state ownership of enterprises.”  As I focus on voluntary 
disclosure in the Netherlands, the empirical results may not be valid for disclosure of 
publicly listed companies in other countries. Replications of disclosure practice in other 
national settings warrant potential research extensions of this study.  However, there are 
strong arguments given in academic literature to consider my research to be considered 
relevant for a wide variety of countries that are governed by similar standards as publicly 
listed companies in the Netherlands. 
Firstly, research shows that the level of corporate disclosure in the Netherlands is 
consistently comparable with the U.K., France and Germany (Patel et al., 2003; Santema 
et al., 2005), whereby the U.K., France and the Netherlands are distinguished among 
countries showing the highest disclosure levels globally (Patel et al., 2003). It can 
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therefore be assumed that the results of my study are relevant for developed countries 
where the international stock market plays a vital role. 
Secondly, the Dutch economy as a whole and Dutch companies in particular are very 
internationally oriented. More than 80% of all shares of Dutch publicly listed companies 
are held outside the Netherlands. All of the selected companies in my research sample 
trade internationally. So it can be expected that all companies in my sample are sensitive 
for signals of a wide variety of (international) stakeholders. This situation is arguably 
similar for large publicly listed companies in most developed countries. Thirdly, it also 
must be noted that since 2005, Dutch publicly listed companies are obliged to follow the 
International Financial Reporting Standards, just like all other publicly listed companies 
in the European Union. Currently, most important economies in the world require or 
permit IFRS reporting.  
As for the representativeness of the selected 70 companies in my research sample: these 
companies represent over 99% of all Dutch publicly listed companies in the selected 
timeframe (2003-2008) in terms of turnover as well as profit as well as assets under 
management as well as employees. 
As for the representativeness of the identified determinants and outcomes, substantial 
confirmation can be found in literature on financial disclosure. Although my research on 
voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy  (forward looking information) is the first of its 
kind to deliver generalizable empirical (quantitative) results, especially on this scale, it 
can be compared with a rich tradition of research on disclosure of financial information 
(which mainly concerns backward looking disclosure). Research on disclosure to date has 
shown that identified determinants and outcomes of (financial) disclosure prove to 
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function in a similar way for publicly listed companies in a great variety of countries with 
a stock-market.  
A specific limitation that follows my focus on Dutch publicly listed companies is that I 
could not control for corporate governance characteristics that are associated with 
disclosure in some areas of research.  Studies that relate corporate governance and 
disclosure typically focus on the level of independence in executive boards, 
hypothesising that independence is positively associated with disclosure (Filatotchev et 
al., 2007). For the sample in my study, measuring the influence of outside directors is 
however not meaningful, since the Netherlands and Germany are the only European 
countries where publicly listed practically all have a two-tier executive board, consisting 
of a separation between executive and outside directors. 
Another potential antecedent of disclosure that has no meaning for my research sample is 
given by signalling literature, suggesting that the choice of an external auditor can serve 
as a signal of firm value. This variable was not included in my research because, firstly, 
earlier research by Camfferman and Cooke (2002) shows that companies audited by a 
“Big 6 auditor” offered greater comprehensiveness of disclosure in the UK, but that this 
was not the case in The Netherlands in their comparative study on disclosure in these two 
countries. Secondly, auditor choice and reputation primarily seems to be an issue in 
emerging economies rather than developed Western economies (Wang et al., 2008). And 
thirdly, in the Netherlands, 98% of all publicly listed companies is audited by a Big-4 
auditor (Heitling, 2009). 
Another limitation is that my methodology and resulting empirics do not proxy for costs 
of disclosure. As for production cost and litigation cost, there is little reason to assume 
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that these cost are of significant relevance for voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. 
There is no indication that production cost of disclosure of corporate strategy (at least 
through annual reports, press reeases, websites and corporate social responsibility 
reports) are considered to be an issue for companies. As for litigation cost, the records of 
the Dutch shareholders association (Vereniging EffectenBezitters, VEB) show no legal 
issues on disclosure of corporate strategy for cases that were filed against plc’s that are 
among my sample of the 70 plc’s to date. Conversely, there are strong arguments to 
consider proprietary cost to be significant in this respect. However, as I did not find any 
credible proxy for proprietary cost, I excluded this variable from my research design, 
other than assuming that companies balance proprietary cost against the potential benefits 
from voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy, including beneficial effects on corporate 
reputation and on liquidity and volatility of stock. 
One of the major limitations of any study on disclosure is the difficulty in measuring the 
extent of voluntary disclosure. Researchers use several proxies for this variable, including 
management forecasts, metrics based on databases, and self-constructed measures (with 
each approach having particular limitations (Healy and Palepu, 2001). The limitations of 
the self-constricted types of measures that I proposed are that the selection and coding of 
the relevant disclosures are subjective, that they generally capture the existence of 
particular disclosures, rather than their quality, and that the construction of a single index 
assigns particular weights to the different disclosure items. In addition, my measures do 
not capture financial report disclosures. As I focus on disclosure that is available to all 
stakeholders, any disclosures that firms provide in analysts meetings, conference calls, 
and other such venues are omitted from the analysis. 
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Although my research concerns a multi-year period, which is quite uncommon in the 
literature on disclosure that typically is limited to analysis of a sample in a one-year 
timeframe, still a longitudinal study of 6 years (2003 through 2008) is limited in the sense 
that specific economic developments – such as the credit-crisis - are not flattened out in 
this timeframe. 
As a new framework and methodology for understanding and testing voluntary disclosure 
of corporate strategy are offered, avenues for further research can be found in replication 
and refinement in environments with different cultural and political characteristics. As 
this research focuses on essential costs and benefits that have a generic nature, further 
research on specific costs and benefits of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy for 
different types of stakeholders (like employees and suppliers) will provide additional 
understanding on how leaders can balance the risks and payoffs of disclosure. 
Future research can contribute to improve the R2 of the relation between voluntary 
disclosure of corporate strategy and corporate reputation by further exploring which 
explanatory and control variables are appropriate to model this relation. As my research 
is the first to explore the relation between voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy and 
corporate reputation, a firm stepping stone is provided for further exploration. For 
liquidity of stock, the found R2 can be assessed as satisfactory, following the broadly 
accepted approach that Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) developed for assessing the relation 
between financial disclosure and liquidity. For volatility of stock, the found R2 offers 
room for further research. However, as volatility is a very complex phenomenon, a wide 
variety of economic variables will have to be considered. 
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Another suggestion for further research is to further explore the meaning and impact of 
proprietary costs. Research suggests that leaders use very different and often personal 
criteria towards transparency in society (Coebergh and Cohen, 2009). While the 
economic costs and benefits of voluntary disclosure might be undisputed, it appears that 
leaders are also driven by political, emotional and psychological considerations in 
balancing perceived risks and payoffs of disclosure (Coebergh and Cohen, 2009). A 
better understanding of these considerations will contribute to understand how 
organisations and their leaders communicating with their environment about the 
challenges of our time. 
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6.3 Conclusion 
Transparency is a sign of strength, at least for publicly listed companies. Corporations 
show strength by deliberately exposing their strategic intentions and subsequently risking 
detrimental use by third parties. Strength is also shown by the corporate intention to 
pursue consensus and support among stakeholders, aiming for sustainable progress and 
success of the corporation. Reaching out to stakeholders by expressing strategic 
intentions can be analysed as a sign of strength since research shows that voluntary 
disclosure of corporate strategy is likely to lead to various beneficial organisational 
outcomes.  
Risks and payoffs of voluntary disclosure are identified in studies on information 
asymmetry that address the double-edged nature of revealing economically valuable 
information. Information asymmetries with investors can lead to greater investor 
uncertainty, potentially leading to various negative organisational outcomes. Information 
asymmetries with competitors, however, can lead to greater competitive ambiguity and 
reduce the firm’s threats from imitation and substitution. Any information that managers 
voluntarily disclose may therefore direct attention in ways that help rivals evaluate their 
strategic alternatives. Management’s voluntary corporate disclosure decision thus 
embodies a complex trade-off decision because the aim of rational managers is to select a 
disclosing strategy that will maximize the value of their company to the shareholders by 
seeking to protect proprietary information and, at the same time, to voluntarily disclose 
information to signal that they are acting in the stakeholders’ interests under the 
stakeholder-agency theory. 
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My research shows that a careful balance of the risks and payoffs of voluntary disclosure 
of corporate strategy is likely to be rewarded by stakeholders in general, measured by 
improved corporate reputation, and shareholders in particular, measured by an increased 
trade in the company’s stock. The extent to which companies voluntarily disclosure 
corporate strategy is largely driven by the mixture of stakeholders who are engaged with 
the corporation, which differs along determinants such as size, leverage, industry, 
ownership concentration and exposure as a listed company. 
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APPENDIX A: THE RESEARCH SAMPLE 
Company 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Aalberts Industries
ABN AMRO  
AEGON
Ahold, Koninklijke
Akzo Nobel
ARCADIS
ASM International
ASM Lithography
Ballast Nedam
BAM Groep, Koninklijke
Binck bank
Boskalis Westminster
Brunel International
Corio
Corporate Express / Buhrmann
Corus
Crucell
CSM
Draka Holding
DSM
Eurocommercial Properties N.V.
Exact Holding N.V.
Fortis
Fugro
Getronics
Grontmij
Hagemeyer
Heijmans
Heineken
Hunter Douglas
Imtech
ING
Innoconcepts
KPN, Koninklijke
KTC / Ten Cate, Koninklijke
LogicaCMG
Nieuwe Steen Investments
Numico, Koninklijke
Nutreco
Océ
OPG
Ordina
Pharming Group
Philips, Koninklijke
Randstad
Reed Elsevier
Rodamco Europe / Unibail Rodamco
Royal Dutch Shell
SBM Offshore (IHC Caland)
Sligro
Smit Internationale
Stork
Super de Boer (Laurus)
Telegraaf
TNT (TPG)
Tom Tom
Unilever
Unit 4 Agresso
United Services Group
Univar
Van der Moolen
Van Lanschot
VastNed Office/Industrial
VastNed Retail
Vedior
VNU
Vopak, Koninklijke
Wereldhave
Wessanen, Koninklijke
Wolters Kluwer 	  
The research sample of this study consists of the 70 largest publicly listed companies mentioned above that 
were at least 3 years listed at Euronext Amsterdam during 2003-2008.  
Years that companies of this sample were not listed are indicated by grey cells. 
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APPENDIX B: CRITERIA TO ASSESS VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE OF 
CORPORATE STRATEGY 
For the assessment of voluntary disclsoure of corporate strategy in annual reports and 
press releases, 10 criteria are applied that are developed by Scenter consulting in 1994 
(Santema, 2002). The overall assessent of each individual annual report and corporate 
press release of the 70 companies in my research sample is calculated as by taking the 
total score of all 10 criteria (for which a maximum score of 5 points could be earned per 
criterium), divided by 5. For the year 2004, the results for annual reports are calculated 
slightly differently. A 5-point Likert scale is used, having a minimum score of one and a 
maximum score of 5. The total result, between 0 and 10, is calculated as follows: (Total 
score -10) / 4. For 2003, the following formula was used: (Total score – 10) * 2,5 / 10. 
This has to do will the development of criteria and measurements that consulting agency 
Scenter developed since 1994 in assessing annual reports.  
The ten criteria are detailed and scored as follows: 
 
1) Business definition: A description of the firm’s key corporate activities, customer groups and 
approach to key markets. The following elements must be described: 
1. Customers   
2. Products and / or services   
3. Customer need the organisation fulfils 
4. Mission and / or vision of the organisation 
 
The criterium is scored as follows: 
Points Description 
5 The description of the business definition comprises all four elements 
4 The description of the business definition comprises three out of four elements 
3 The description of the business definition comprises two out of four elements 
2 The description of the business definition comprises one out of four elements 
1 The description of the business definition comprises none of the four elements, but 
does give a general description of the organisation 
0 There is no description of the organisation given, whatsoever. 
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2) Goals: The corporate operational targets for the coming year in qualitative terms. 
This criterium is assessed based on two elements: 
1. The number of goals being mentioned. 2. The clarity of presenting 
 
The criterium is scored as follows: 
Number of goals mentioned Clearly presented Not clearly presented 
4 (or more) 5 4 
3 4 3 
2 3 2 
1 2 1 
0 0 0 
 
 
3) Objectives: The corporate operational targets in quantitative terms. The objectives are 
quantified goals that are measurable in terms of quantity and time. 
This criterium is assessed based on two elements: 
1. The number of objectives being mentioned. 
2. The accuracy of the description: a clearly specified objective answers two basic questions: 
“how much” and “when”. 
The criterium is scored as follows: 
Number of objectives 
mentioned 
Specified in both time and 
quantity 
Specified in either time or quantity 
4 (or more) 5 4 
3 4 3 
2 3 2 
1 2 1 
0 0 0 
 
 
4) SWOT Analysis: A description of the firm's main corporate strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats.The criterium is scored as follows: 
Points Description 
5 A SWOT-analysis is given in which all four SWOT-elements are explicitly mentioned. 
4 All four elements of a SWOT-analysis are mentioned but only implicitly linked or 
analyzed. 
3 Three out of four SWOT-elements are mentioned 
2 Two out of four SWOT-elements are mentioned 
1 One out of four SWOT-elements are mentioned 
0 None of the four SWOT-elements are mentioned 
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5) Challenges: The confrontation of the corporate SWOT-elements and the resulting 
consequences for the way in which the company will have to arrange its business.  
Challenges are described by how a company: 
• Uses a strength to benefit from an 
opportunity 
• Uses a strength to avoid a threat 
• Transforms a weakness into a strength to 
benefit from an opportunity 
• Transforms a weakness to avoid a threat 
In this approach of describing challenges, an explicit link with a SWOT-analysis is considered 
necessary to be appreciated. Just mentioning challenges is not considered to give essential 
information about how the company is going to deal with the situation. 
The criterium is scored as follows: 
Points Description 
5 More than four challenges are mentioned. 
4 Four challenges are mentioned. 
3 Three challenges are mentioned. 
2 Two challenges are mentioned. 
1 One challenge is mentioned. 
0 No challenges are mentioned. 
 
6) Corporate strategy: The basis for the strategic decisions to be taken on an organisation-wide 
level. Corporate strategy translates challenges into a roadmap for implementation.  
The assessment of this criterium is based on two elements: 
1. The link between corporate strategy and challenges. Corporate strategy is supposed to be 
based on the analysis that delivered the challenges. 
2. The connection of qualitative targets (objectives) and quantitative targets (goals) for the 
coming year. This must be done in a clear and understandable way, therefore not scattered 
through the annual report  
The criterium is scored as follows: 
Description Linked with 
challenges 
Not linked 
with 
challenges 
The described corporate strategy connects objectives and goals 
and is clearly presented. 
5 4 
The described corporate strategy connects objectives and goals 
but is not clearly presented. 
4 3 
The described corporate strategy does not connect objectives 
and goals but is clearly presented. 
3 2 
The described corporate strategy does not connect objectives 
and goals and it is not clearly presented. 
2 1 
There is no corporate strategy mentioned. 0 0 
 
7) Business unit strategy: The strategy pursued by the different strategic business units (SBU’s). 
The SBU’s might be organised functional or geographical.  
The criterium is scored as follows: 
Points Description 
5 A business unit strategy is given for 100% of the business units. 
4 A business unit strategy is given for 80% of the business units. 
3 A business unit strategy is given for 60% of the business units. 
2 A business unit strategy is given for 40% of the business units. 
1 A business unit strategy is given for 20% of the business units. 
0 A business unit strategy is given for 0% of the business units. 
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8) Monitoring: The corporate review, evaluation and control of the strategic planning process. 
Results of a given period are being compared with goals, objectives and corporate strategy of the 
same period. The assessment of this criterium is being done on the basis of the number of three 
elements that are evaluated: corporate strategy, goals, objectives. Secondly, it is assessed whether 
the earlier defined corporate strategy, goals or objectives are explicitly mentioned again. 
The criterium is scored as follows: 
Description Mentioning 
previous 
goals or 
objectives 
Not 
mentioning 
previous goals 
or objectives 
Three elements are evaluated. 5 4 
Two elements are evaluated. 4 3 
One elements is evaluated. 3 2 
Evaluation is given but not on the elements specified above. 2 1 
No evaluation is given. 0 0 
 
 
9) Results of action plans: The concrete ways by which the company has implemented corporate 
strategy during the past year on either corporate or business unit level. This analysis shows how 
strategic plans are transformed into specific activities. 
The assessment of this criterium is based on two elements: 
1. The number of action plans mentioned. 
2. The connection action plans with corporate strategy.  
The criterium is scored as follows: 
  Number of past action plans 
mentioned 
Linked with corporate 
strategy 
Not linked with corporate strategy 
4 (or more) 5 4 
3 4 3 
2 3 2 
1 2 1 
0 0 0 
 
 
10) Action plans for the coming year: The concrete ways by which the company plans to 
implement corporate strategy during the coming year on either corporate or business unit level. 
This analysis shows how the company will transform strategic plans into specific activities. 
The assessment of this criterium is based on two elements: 
1. The number of action plans mentioned. 
2. The connection action plans with corporate strategy.  
The criterium is scored as follows: 
Number of future action 
plans mentioned 
Linked with corporate 
strategy 
Not linked with corporate strategy 
4 (or more) 5 4 
3 4 3 
2 3 2 
1 2 1 
0 0 0 
 
  
